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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Appellate No. 20060201 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Issue #1: Whether the trial court erred in granting the State's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on claims 1, 2, 3, 15,16, 18 (partial), 19, 5, 6,11, (partial), 12 
(partial), 13, 17, 20 (partial), 30, 32 (partial), 47, 33, 35, 37, 38, 34, 41, 42, and 46 
on the grounds that (1) these claims, although not raised on direct appeal, could 
have been, and thus were improperly raised, for the first time, in a memorandum 
opposing summary judgment, (2) that Petitioner had the burden of showing that there 
was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether appellate counsel was 
ineffective and failed to meet that burden, and (3) that sufficient facts were available 
to Petitioner that at the time of his direct appeal he could have raised all of the 
foregoing claims before the Utah Supreme Court? Record Citation: This issue was 
raised below in Lafferty's Memorandum in Opposition to the State's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and to Dismiss at 9-13 (Record at 361-363). Standard of 
Review: The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo under the 
correction of error standard of review, and this Court will accord no particular 
deference to such conclusions. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City 
Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). 
Issue #2: Whether the trial court erred in granting the State's Motion for 
Summary Judgment for claims 28 and 31, concluding that the Petitioner, by not 
specifically responding to the State's motion on these claims, warranted summary 
disposition? Record Citation: This issue was raised below in Lafferty's 
Memorandum in Opposition to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and to 
Dismiss at 15-16, 18 (Record at 361-363). Standard of Review: Appel la te 
courts review a grant of summary judgment for correctness and afford no deference 
to conclusions of law. Johnson v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2006 UT 15 
(Utah Supreme Court), citing Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 Utah 79. 
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Issue #3: Whether the trial court erred in granting the State's Motion for 
Summary Judgment by finding that Dr. Golding's denial of "situational competence" 
as a valid diagnosis did not amount to new evidence when it was the theory Dr. 
Golding advanced to find Lafferty competent? Record Citation: This issue 
was raised below in Lafferty's Memorandum in Opposition to the State's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and to Dismiss at 13-14 (Record at 361-363). Standard of 
Review: Appellate courts review a grant of summary judgment for correctness 
and afford no deference to conclusions of law. Johnson v. Utah Department of 
Transportation, 2006 UT 15 (Utah Supreme Court). 
Issue #4: Whether the trial court erred in granting the State's Motion for 
Summary Judgment by finding that the ineffective counsel issue for trial counsel on 
claims 12 (partial) 20 (partial), 22, 23, 11 (partial), 24, 25, 26, and for appellate 
counsel for claims 27 and 29, were not satisfied under the federal standard of 
Strickland? Record Citation: This issue was raised below in Lafferty's 
Memorandum in Opposition to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and to 
Dismiss at 14-15, 16-18. (Record at 361-363) Standard of Review: Johnson v. 
Utah Department of Transportation, 2006 UT 15 (Utah Supreme Court). 
Issue #5: Whether the trial court erred in finding that claim 44 warranted 
summary judgment, when the argument was there was ineffective waiver of a conflict 
of interest with his trial counsel, who had also previously represented his co-
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defendant Dan Lafferty on the same set of facts? Record Citation: This issue 
was raised below in Lafferty's Memorandum in Opposition to the State's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and to Dismiss at 20-21 (Record at 361-363). Standard of 
Review: Appellate courts review a grant of summary judgment for correctness and 
afford no deference to conclusions of law. Johnson v. Utah Department of 
Transportation, 2006 UT 15 (Utah Supreme Court). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The following statutory authorities are either determinative in this appeal or 
are of such central importance as to merit their inclusion herein: 
U.S. Constitution 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206 to 207; 76-5-202; 77-15a-101 through 106; 78-
35a-104 through 107. 
Utah Const. Art. I Sections 5, 7, 9,11,12, 24, and 25. 
UT. R. Civ. P. 56(c), 56(e), and 65C(c)(3). 
UT. R. Crim. P. 8(b). 
UT. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
4 
A± Nature of the Case: 
This appeal is from an Order of the Fourth District Court, Provo Department, 
Honorable Anthony W. Schofield presiding, granting the State's motion to dismiss 
and for partial summary judgment. 
EL Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below: 
Lafferty was convicted in May 1985 of two counts of first degree murder, two 
counts of burglary, and two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. 
After a sentencing hearing, the jury returned a verdict of death on each of the first 
degree murder convictions. Lafferty then appealed his conviction and death 
sentence to the Utah Supreme Court. On January 11, 1988, the Court issued its 
decision rejecting all of Lafferty's challenges. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1988) (Lafferty I). 
Rather than seeking state collateral review of his conviction and sentence, 
Lafferty opted instead to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah. This petition was denied by the federal 
district court and Lafferty appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit Court reversed the district court and granted 
Lafferty's writ of habeas corpus, thereby vacating his conviction and sentence. The 
Tenth Circuit Court concluded that the state trial court had relied upon an incorrect 
legal standard in evaluating Lafferty's competency. See Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 
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1546 (10th Cir. 1991). 
The State then chose to retry Lafferty for the offenses originally charged 
against him. In April 1996, Lafferty was again convicted of two counts of first degree 
murder, two counts of aggravated burglary, and two counts of conspiracy to commit 
first degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the jury returned verdicts of 
death on each of the first degree murder convictions. Lafferty then appealed his 
conviction and death sentence to the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
affirmed Lafferty's conviction and sentence, see State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 20 
P.3d 342 (Lafferty II). The United States Supreme Court denied review. See 
Lafferty v. Utah, 534 U.S. 1018(2001). 
On October 10,2002, Lafferty filed his Preliminary Petition for Habeas Corpus 
and/or Post-Conviction Relief in the Fourth District Court, Provo Department. On 
October 29,2004, Lafferty filed his Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus, Parts 
1 and 2, raising numerous claims challenging his conviction and death sentence. In 
response, on February 23,2005, the State filed its Motion to Dismiss and for Partial 
Summary Judgment. Lafferty filed his opposition to the motion on May 16, 2005. 
On June 20, 2005, the State filed its reply. On October 16, 2005, the Court heard 
oral argument on the motion. On November 29, 2005, the Fourth District Court, 
Provo Department, granted the State's motion. Lafferty now appeals this order. 
C. Statement of Facts: 
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1. Appellant Ronald Watson Lafferty ("Lafferty") is an inmate at the Utah 
State Prison, sentenced to death on two capital murder charges. 
2. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed his sentences in State v. Lafferty, 
749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988). 
3. Petitioner did not seek collateral relief in the State courts; instead, he 
proceeded directly to federal collateral review. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit reversed on the ground that the trial court had applied the 
incorrect legal standard for evaluating petitioner's competency. Lafferty v. Cook, 
949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). 
4. The Tenth Circuit ordered petitioner's convictions and sentences 
vacated; however, it elaborated that "[t]he state is of course free to retry Lafferty." 
Id. at 1557. 
5. Lafferty was retried. A second jury convicted him and he was again 
sentenced to death. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 
19,20P.3d342. The United States Supreme Court denied review. Lafferty v. Utah, 
534 U.S. 1018(2001). 
6. A Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post-Conviction Relief was filed on 
October 10, 2002 by prior counsel. On or about August 19, 2002, an order was 
entered allowing prior counsel to withdraw and also allowing the recusal of the sitting 
judge, Judge Hansen. On November 13, 2003, current counsel were appointed. 
7 
7. Current counsel were successful in having a mitigation specialist and 
investigator appointed and a Second Amended Habeas petition was filed on or about 
October 29, 2004. The Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus included Part 1, 
which was drafted by Appellant's counsel of record, and Part 2, which was drafted 
by Lafferty. 
8. The State filed a Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment 
on or about February 23, 2005, which was opposed by Appellant. Oral argument 
was heard on the 6th day of October, 2005 and the matter was taken under 
advisement. The Court found for the State and dismissed Lafferty's Petition for 
Habeas Corpus, with prejudice. The order of dismissal forms the basis of the instant 
appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is, at best, a tool to terminally end a pleading. It is not 
favored by the court, and requires a strict and narrow application of Rule 56 of the 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. It also allows the non-moving party to be given the benefit of 
having all inferences considered in a light most favorable to that party. The lower 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the State of Utah on each and every 
claim raised in the Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
The trial court granted the State's Motion for Summary Judgment on claims 
1,2,3,15,16,18 (partial), 19,5,6,11 (partial), 12 (partial), 13,17, 20 (partial), 30, 
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32 (partial), 47, 33, 35, 37, 38, 34, 41, 42, and 46 on the following grounds: 
(1) That these claims, although not raised on direct appeal, could have been, 
and thus were improperly raised, for the first time, in a memorandum opposing 
summary judgment. 
(2) That the Petitioner had the burden of showing that there was a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to whether appellate counsel was ineffective and 
failed to meet that burden. 
(3) That sufficient facts were available to petitioner that at the time of his 
direct appeal he could have raised all of the foregoing claims before the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
Petitioner argues that, essentially, both the State of Utah and the lower court 
concede that the issues raised in the claims specified were not raised in an appeal. 
Therefore, under the exception to the Post Conviction Remedies Act (utilized now 
in place of the Writ of Habeas Corpus), relating to ineffective counsel, these claims 
are now properly before the court. Petitioner submits that under the federal standard 
of Strickland, the trial counsel's performance was so constitutionally deficient as to 
effectively prejudice the defense. In other words, the Petitioner, at trial, did not 
receive sufficient and satisfactory representation as contemplated by the guarantees 
of the United States Constitution in the Sixth Amendment. This is the underlying 
thread throughout the entirety of the Petitioner's brief, and the brief is permeated with 
examples relating to all of the Petitioner's claims. 
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The second part of (1), that these issues are raised for the first time in a 
memorandum opposing summary judgment, is disputed. It is implicit within all of the 
claims raised in Petitioner's Writ, that, but for the lack of effective counsel, the claim 
would not have been raised. It was not the Petitioner who created the trial strategy, 
called and examined witnesses, cross-examined witnesses, introduced exhibits, 
made the opening and closing statements, did the research for the case, and so 
forth. It was the Petitioner's attorney. Issues that were not raised, testimony that 
was not objected to, evidence that was not introduced falls directly at the feet of the 
attorney tasked with the duty and responsibility of providing a constitutionally 
guaranteed, Sixth Amendment representation of his client. Further, in at least one 
claim, claim 12, the ineffective assistance argument was raised formally. It was not 
necessary, however, to formally argue in each claim that it was not Mr. Lafferty who 
was the attorney and was thus derelict in his duty, it was Mr. Lafferty's attorney. 
As to (2) the issue relating to appellate counsel's lack of effectiveness, a 
comparison between the arguments raised by appellate counsel and Mr. Lafferty's 
reflect that (a), they are markedly different, and (b), that appellate counsel missed 
other, equally salient issues. When the failure to raise these issues may be death, 
then the ineffectiveness of counsel becomes pronounced. 
The last of the issues, (3), that sufficient facts were available to Petitioner that 
at the time of his direct appeal he could have raised these issues, is not supported 
in any fashion by any evidence. There is not a solitary record citation, but the court 
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only states that, "From my view of the record, sufficient facts were available to 
Petitioner at the time of his direct appeal that he could have raised all of the 
foregoing claims...". This should be clearly inadequate for summary disposition. 
The Petitioner's second argument, that by not responding specifically to claim 
31 (claim 28 is not argued; both were ruled on by the lower court), summary 
judgment should issue, is not supported by the law. All pleadings can be considered 
with respect to a summary judgment, and when the initial Writ of Habeas is 
considered, a material and genuine issue of fact was created, and summary 
judgment on claim 31 ought to have been denied. 
The third argument of Mr. Lafferty, that Dr. Golding's finding of "situational 
competence", should now be considered as "new evidence" is compelling, if only 
because it was not available during Lafferty's trial. In fact, Dr. Golding's testimony 
was just the opposite. Ergo, the need for scrutiny. Apparently psychology has now 
progressed to where, as with the finding in law almost two hundred years after the 
constitution was created, of "penumbras of privacy" hidden in the Ninth Amendment, 
new evidence has surfaced in psychological circles of "situational competence". At 
the very least, this one hundred eighty degree position by a psychologist utilized by 
the State at trial needs a re-examination to insure fairness, and summary disposition 
should be available at this stage. 
The fourth argument, i.e., that the federal Strickland standard was not satisifed 
with respect to the ineffective counsel issue on claims 12 (partial), 20 (partial), 22, 
n 
23, 11 (partial), 24, 25, 26, and for appellate counsel for claims 27 and 29, is 
disputed by the record. Claims 12 related to the failure of the trial counsel to seek 
to sequester the jury when one of the jurors disclosed he had been given an 
instruction by his religious leaders. Considering the cultural background of the clear 
majority of the citizens in Utah and the high profile nature of this case, there ought 
to have been a sequestering of the jury to avoid this very possibility. The motion to 
sequester was never sought, and trial counsel was remiss in his trial duty. 
Claims 22, 23, 11 (partial), and 24 all related to there being a lack of a 
substantial investigation by trial counsel into every plausible line of defense. No 
mitigation expert was hired. No investigation of any exculpatory evidence or witness 
tampering was undertaken. The only mitigation evidence introduced at trial were 
prison officials testifying that Mr. Lafferty was a relatively trouble free inmate and the 
write-ups he had were of a non-violent type, plus some pictures from a yearbook and 
a few photos of Mr. Lafferty and his family. There was no attempt introducing Mr. 
Lafferty as a whole person; i.e., no witnesses of neighbors and family testifying to 
his good character, no educational records from either high school or Brigham Young 
University, no mental health records or psychological test results, not even his 
National Guard records showing an Honorable discharge. There was no testimony 
or evidence submitted showing how a person could go from a City Councilman and 
a respected member of his church, to a convicted murdered of a mother and child. 
Clearly, this failure of Mr. Lafferty's attorney could constitute nothing else than 
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ineffective counsel. 
Claims 25 and 29 relate to the American Bar Association Guidelines and Rule 
8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The American Bar Association 
guidelines require, inter alia, that there be two "death certified" trial attorneys who 
are qualified under Rule 8. Trial counsel did not qualify, and this lack of qualification 
is the epitome of ineffectiveness of counsel. 
Claim 26 is in regard to trial counsel's not making objections to closing 
arguments that prejudiced Mr. Lafferty. In particular, when the prosecutor stated 
improperly that the punishment for the death of a fifteen month old child should be 
greater than the punishment of the death of an adult, there was no objection. The 
obvious attempt by the prosecutor to elicit sympathy (and what normal person would 
not have enormous sympathy?) was so flagrant as to substantially prejudice the 
case. An objection was required to be made to ensure that Mr. Lafferty received a 
fair trial. It was not, and trial counsel was therefore deficient in this regard. 
The last argument by Mr. Lafferty is that claim 44, wherein it is argued that Mr. 
Lafferty received ineffective assistance of counsel, goes to the fundamental issue 
of conflict-free counsel. Trial counsel in Ronald Watson Lafferty's case was Mr. 
Esplin. Trial counsel in Dan Lafferty's case was Mr. Esplin. This case was not a 
simple civil dispute, it was a capital homicide. Mr. Esplin, even years apart, should 
not have represented both parties because of the obvious conflict of interest. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 1, 2, 3, 
15,16,18 (PARTIAL), 19, 5, 6,11, (PARTIAL), 12 (PARTIAL), 
13,17, 20 (PARTIAL), 30, 32 (PARTIAL), 47, 33, 35, 37, 38, 
34, 41, 42, AND 46 ON THE GROUNDS THAT (1) THESE 
CLAIMS, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL, 
COULD HAVE BEEN, AND THUS WERE IMPROPERLY 
RAISED, FOR THE FIRST TIME, IN A MEMORANDUM 
OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (2) THAT PETITIONER 
HAD THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THERE WAS A 
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WITH RESPECT TO 
WHETHER APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE AND 
FAILED TO MEET THAT BURDEN, AND (3) THAT SUFFICIENT 
FACTS WERE AVAILABLE TO PETITIONER THAT AT THE 
TIME OF HIS DIRECT APPEAL HE COULD HAVE RAISED ALL 
OF THE FOREGOING CLAIMS BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT 
The trial court held that the claims identified above should not be considered 
for three reasons. They are: 1), these claims, although not raised on direct appeal, 
could have been, and thus were improperly raised, for the first time, in a 
memorandum opposing summary judgment, 2) that Petitioner had the burden of 
showing that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether 
appellate counsel was ineffective and failed to meet that burden, and 3) that 
sufficient facts were available to Petitioner that at the time of his direct appeal he 
could have raised all of the foregoing claims before the Utah Supreme Court. 
As to the first, these claims, although not raised on direct appeal, could have 
been, and thus were improperly raised, for the first time, in a memorandum opposing 
14 
summary judgment; a blanket application of the statute is incorrect. It is conceded 
by the State that these claims were not raised on direct appeal. The issue then 
becomes if they were not raised on direct appeal, are they precluded from being 
raised by the Post Conviction Remedies Act? 
The Utah Post Conviction Remedies Act allows claims to be raised if failure 
to raise them was due to ineffective assistance of counsel (§78-35a-106(2)). 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is defined under Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984) as " (1) that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient 
and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 686. Under 
the first prong of the test, an attorney's performance is deficient if he has "made 
errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a] 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. 
Lafferty's trial counsel was clearly ineffective. Effective assistance of counsel 
mandated that the issues now raised by his current counsel, i.e, those set forth in 
claims 1, 2, 3, 15, 16, 18 (partial), 19, 5, 6, 11 (partial), 12 (partial), 13, 17, 20 
(partial), 30, 32 (partial), 47, 33, 35, 37, 38, 34, 41, 42, and 46, had to be raised by 
prior counsel. Failure to raise these issues deprived the Petitioner of not only 
potential defenses to a capital crime, but hamstrung defense strategies. If the failure 
was knowing and intentional, as a trial strategy, it was woefully below a recognized 
standard of competence required for a capital offense. If it was not, there is no other 
conclusion that can be drawn but that counsel was ignorant of the law. Irrespective 
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of the reason, it is clear that Lafferty's representation was below par. 
In fact, this is the very kernel of ineffective assistance of counsel: had prior 
counsel actually provided effective assistance, then these claims would have been 
brought on direct appeal. The fact that prior counsel did not bring these claims on 
direct appeal demonstrates a lack of competence and ineffective assistance. 
Furthermore, by failing to raise these claims, Lafferty suffered prejudice because 
these claims were never heard by the court or the very jury that would make a life 
or death decision. The efficacy of their arguments could never be heard because 
they were not raised. On capital cases, the lack thereof is even more pronounced 
because the consequences are so much more severe. 
The State acknowledges that Petitioner's Habeas Corpus claims 1-3, 5-6,11 
(partial), 12 (partial), 13,15-17,18 (partial), 19, 20 (partial), 30, 32 (partial), 33-35, 
37-38, 42, and 46-47 were not raised on appeal. Failure of Petitioner's previous 
counsel to raise those claims is a direct evidence of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel because of the prejudice to the Petitioner. Therefore, in accordance with 
§78-35a-106(2), Petitioner is entitled to raise them in his Habeas Corpus petition at 
this time. 
As to the second ground, that there was a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to whether appellate counsel was ineffective and Petitioner failed to meet 
that burden, Lafferty responds to as follows. On appeal, the Petitioner raised eight 
separate challenges: 
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"(1) whether the trial court erred in determining that he was competent 
to stand trial; (2) whether the trial court erred in granting the State's 
challenge for cause to remove Juror 220; (3) whether Utah's insanity 
defense, section 76-2-305 of the Utah Code, violates the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of 
the Utah Constitution; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting 
victim impact evidence during the penalty phase; (5) whether the trial 
court erred by allowing the introduction of statements made by 
defendant and his brother Dan Lafferty to the media; (6) whether the 
trial court erred by refusing to give defendant's requested instruction 
that the jury could consider sympathy or mercy in reaching its verdict 
during the penalty phase; (7) whether Utah's death penalty statute, 
section 76-3-207 of the Utah Code, is unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of 
the Utah Constitution; and (8) whether the retrial of defendant violated 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution." 
See State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342 (Utah 2001). 
Lafferty raised the following claims in his writ of Habeas Corpus: 
"1) Utah law unconstitutionally shifted the burden to him at the penalty 
phase because the State had already proven at least one aggravator 
by the time the penalty phase began (claims 4,14, and 18 (partial)); 2) 
the Court erroneously removed Juror 220 for cause (claim 7); 3) the 
Court erroneously admitted at the penalty phase a videotape of the 
crime scene showing the victims' bodies (claim 8); 4) the Court 
erroneously admitted a videotape of petitioner's media interviews; 5) 
the Court erroneously denied petitioner's request for a penalty-phase 
sympathy instruction (claim 10); 6) petitioner's retrial violated double 
jeopardy (claim 21); 7) the large number of aggravators gives 
prosecutors unlimited discretion in choosing whether to charge capital 
murder (claim 32 partial)); 8) the Court erroneously found petitioner 
competent to stand trial (claim 43); and 9) the Court erroneously denied 
petitioner's motion for a new trial (claim 45). These claims repeat 
claims that petitioner raised and lost on direct appeal. See State v. 
Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 2001 UT 19, cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1018 
(2001). (See State's Memorandum, at fl 9.)" 
As stated in Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 11, even a cursory comparison 
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between the claims on appeal and in the Writ of Habeas Corpus shows that the only 
claims that even remotely can be considered similar are the following: number 1 
(shifting the burden of the penalty phase to the Petitioner); number 2 (removal of 
Juror 220 for cause); number 3 (admission of a videotape at the penalty phase); 
number 4 (erroneous admission of the videotape of Petitioner's media interview); 
number 9 (competency to stand trial); and number 10 (denial of Petitioner's motion 
for new trial). 
However, claims of shifting of the burden at the penalty phase, claims 4,14, 
18 (partial), 5, penalty phase sympathy instruction 6, double jeopardy claim 21, or 
discretion to choose to charge with capital murder claim 32 (partial), were not raised 
during the appeal. These are clearly issues that ought to have been raised by 
appellate counsel but were not. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on these claims. 
The next issue is whether sufficient facts were available to Petitioner at the 
time of his direct appeal so that they could have been raised by his counsel? The 
trial court, in p. 19 of its ruling, held that sufficient facts were available to Petitioner 
at the time of his direct appeal that he could have raised all the foregoing claims 
before the Utah Supreme Court. The trial court based this "From my view of the 
record. . ." yet, even though this is a death penalty case, there is not a solitary 
reference to a single evidentiary fact that is supportive of the court's "view of the 
record." Certainly Mr. Lafferty is entitled to some substance, rather than opinion as 
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to the court's view. In a motion for summary judgment, especially in a capital case, 
we should demand no less. 
The lower court also concludes, as to the overall claim of ineffectiveness of 
counsel on p. 19 of its ruling, that in its view, 
"claiming that the foregoing issues were not raised on appeal because 
appellate counsel was ineffective amounts to a new claim that was not 
previously raised in the Second Amended Petition, and raising new 
claims in a Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment is improper." 
[Emphasis added]. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court was wrong on both counts. 
First, although present counsel did not specifically add the sentence "the 
failure to make this claim was ineffective counsel" at the end of each sentence of all 
of the claims, and especially claims 1,2,3,15,16,18 (partial), 19,5,6,11 (partial), 
12 (partial), 17,18 (partial), 20 (partial), 30, 32 (partial), 47, 33, 35, 37, 38, 34, 41, 
42, and 46 [in the same order the Court alluded to them]; nevertheless ineffective 
assistance of counsel is implicit within the claims. It was not Mr. Lafferty who was 
captain of the ship, it was Mr. Lafferty's attorney. That is, it is the captain of the ship 
who has the requisite knowledge of navigation to avoid the shoals, not the seaman 
swabbing the deck. Likewise, it was Mr. Lafferty's counsel who has the purported 
background and experience necessary to ensure that the defense is fairly presented, 
without egregious errors. Each and every claim raised by Lafferty is a recitation of 
a failure to act as a prudent attorney in like circumstances should have acted in 
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protection of Lafferty's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This is not a "new" claim 
raised by current counsel in their Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment, but 
a continuation of the Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
Last, the lower court apparently also overlooked claim 12, which did, in fact, 
reference "Due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness. . ."; which, as indicated in the 
preceding, did not have to be specifically listed and was a redundancy. It was not 
necessary to add "ineffective counsel" to each claim since the failure to raise the 
claim was not Mr. Lafferty's. 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in December 1991 vacated the Petitioner's 
original sentence and conviction and indicated that the State was free to retry the 
Petitioner. The reversal was made due to errors made by the court regarding the 
Petitioner's competency to stand trial in the first case, which again demonstrates the 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the Petitioner did not receive the 
benefit of counsel that was functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment as required in Strickland and he was prejudiced by the counsel's 
deficient performance. 
Also, the court in Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994) stated that: 
"absent the existence of unusual circumstances, a 'party may not raise 
the issues in a habeas corpus petition that could or should have been 
raised on direct appeal.'.. .We have held that unusual circumstances 
exist when a trial counsel represented the defendant on direct appeal 
and the defendant in a subsequent habeas proceeding contends that he 
had ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, on appeal, or both." 
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The showing of "unusual circumstances" is met in the Lafferty case where the 
same counsel represented Petitioner at trial and on appeal. Thus, the Petitioner's 
unusual circumstances allow him to raise the issue of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim and the trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment 
Moreover, pursuant to §78-35a-106(2), 
"[notwithstanding Subsection (1 )(c), a person may be eligible for relief 
on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial 
or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel." 
In this case, due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the claims as referred 
to supra have not been raised and therefore entitled the Petitioner to argue these 
claims in his Habeas Corpus Writ. 
Finally, the Petitioner's Habeas Corpus claim 23, i.e., failure of the previous 
counsel for the Petitioner to hire a mitigation specialist, is a new claim not raised on 
appeal. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the above-
mentioned claims. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR CLAIM 31 IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER, BY NOT 
SPECIFICALLY RESPONDING TO THE STATE'S MOTION 
ON THIS CLAIM, WARRANTED SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Utah law does not require a response for a request of summary judgment. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) states that: 
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"when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response . . . must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him." (Emphasis added.) 
As the rule states, the court must still determine whether summary judgment 
is appropriate. Thus, the mere non-response of Respondent's motion for summary 
judgment is inadequate grounds for the granting of summary judgment. 
In addition, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires the moving party in 
a summary judgment motion to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that one instance of a material fact is whether an 
attorney's conduct measured up to the standard of care required of attorneys in their 
professional duties (Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). 
The lower court, in reference to claim 31, adopted the argument of the State 
that these claims were not opposed and the Court should therefore grant summary 
judgment. 
It is correct that current counsel did not specifically respond to the State's 
argument against claim 31. It is also correct that a response was not needed. This 
Court, in Adams v. State, held that "We clarify that the court should rely not only on 
the petitioner's memorandum in opposition [to a motion for summary judgment] but 
also on the initial petition itself..." Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62 at paragraph 18. 
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Although the Court was discussing an "interest of justice" exception to the statute of 
limitations when examining and balancing the meritoriousness of a claim and the 
reason for its late filing, the principle is the same. It is also consistent with the 
Court's reluctance for summary disposition when allowable claims exist. The lower 
court, then, should not have disallowed claim 31, since it was raised in the Second 
Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus. This acted as opposition to the State's motion, 
and thus the State should have been precluded from summary judgment as to this 
claim. 
Also, claim 31, relating to the ABA guidelines for death penalty cases, is 
directly on point with the Jackson case. This claim argues that Petitioner's 
constitutional rights are being violated because his post-conviction counsel did not 
satisfy the American Bar Association Guidelines ("ABA guidelines") for attorneys 
representing capital post-conviction petitioners. In Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 LEd.2d 471 (U.S. 2003), the Supreme Court of the United 
States stated that the ABA guidelines on the standards for capital defense work 
serve as "guides to determining what is reasonable.'" Id. Thus, the ABA guidelines 
list the minimum requirements that the defense counsel should meet in death penalty 
cases. Since the Petitioner's former counsel did not meet the ABA guidelines, he 
did not meet even the minimum requirements for handling such cases. 
Again, because this claim involves whether an attorney acted in conformity 
with professional standards in representing a client, a genuine issue of material fact 
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exists. Thus, Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was satisfied in both the 
memorandum and the habeas petition, and the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on these claims. 
In conclusion, not only did claim 31 spell out the facts that form the basis of 
the Petitioner's claim to relief, but the habeas petition itself discussed the relevant 
facts. That should be sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that can be 
developed and fleshed out in an evidentiary hearing. The trial court erred by 
disregarding the facts in the claim and in the habeas corpus petition. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY FINDING THAT DR. 
GOLDING'S DENIAL OF "SITUATIONAL COMPETENCE" AS A 
VALID DIAGNOSIS DID NOT AMOUNT TO NEW EVIDENCE 
WHEN IT WAS THE THEORY DR. GOLDING ADVANCED TO 
FIND LAFFERTY COMPETENT 
Although Utah Code. Ann. § 78-35a-104(e)(iii) requires the newfound 
evidence to be more than mere impeachment evidence, a recent Utah Supreme 
Court case has helped interpret and refine the Code. In State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 
15, fl66 n.11 (2005), the Court stated, albeit in dictum, "that newly discovered 
impeachment evidence can justify the granting of a new trial in certain situations" 
(Emphasis added). Thus, the law is not black and white on this issue; it comes down 
to the circumstances of the case. 
Here, Dr. Stephen Golding, one of the forensic psychologists who evaluated 
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Lafferty as part of the competency determination, testified that Lafferty could be 
found "situationally competent." In other words, Lafferty was competent in some 
situations, but not competent in others. This testimony is a direct contradiction to 
what Dr. Golding testified to in State v. Brian Mitchell, case no. 031901884. In 
Mitchell, Dr. Golding specifically stated that situational competence is not a valid 
diagnosis or theory. Petitioner will further develop these facts in an evidentiary 
hearing, but the inconsistent statement itself is sufficient to demonstrate new 
evidence since it is directly contradictory to prior evidence. 
In addition, §78-35a-104(e)(i) states that the court is required to vacate the 
conviction or sentence where: 
"newly discovered material evidence exists. . .[that] (i) neither the 
petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of [the evidence] at the time of 
trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously 
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence 
could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence..." 
In other words, new evidence exists when the petitioner or his attorney was 
unaware of it and it could not have been discovered with due diligence. 
Because Mitchell took place long after Lafferty (I or II), the evidence regarding 
Dr. Golding's changed testimony was not available at the time of the Lafferty cases. 
Neither party had access to this evidence until Dr. Golding made his contradictory 
statements in his testimony in Mitchell. Had the parties had access to this evidence 
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at the time of the Lafferty cases, the impeachment could have been exposed at that 
time. Hence, the evidence was not available at the time of trial and is thus new 
evidence. 
This new evidence would be extremely helpful to Petitioner's case because 
Dr. Golding was a critical witness for the State. As mentioned in Pinder, this new 
evidence could be used as impeachment to discredit Dr. Golding's testimony 
regarding Lafferty's competence since the "situational competence theory" was what 
Dr. Golding used to find Lafferty competent. Had Dr. Golding's contradictory 
statements been available at the time of the Lafferty cases, Dr. Golding could have 
been discredited as a witness and Petitioner's competence may still be in doubt. 
However, this is new evidence that would be significant in raising a reasonable doubt 
as to Lafferty's competence, thus raising a genuine issue of material fact. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY FINDING THAT 
THE INEFFECTIVE TRIAL COUNSEL ISSUE ON CLAIMS 12 
(PARTIAL), 20 (PARTIAL), 22, 23,11 (PARTIAL), 24, 25, 26, 
AND FOR APPELLATE COUNSEL FOR CLAIMS 27 AND 29, 
WERE NOT SATISFIED UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD 
OF STRICKLAND 
A. Claim 12 (Partial): Improper Jury 
Petitioner is entitled to have a fair and impartial jury hear his case See State 
v. Wach, 2001 UT 35,1J36, 24 P.3d 947 ("Both the United States Constitution and 
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the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a fair and impartial jury".). 
Furthermore, as stated in State v. Andrews, 576 P.2d 857, 859 (1978), "it is the 
general rule that who wishes to challenge a judge's allowance of juror separation 
must demonstrate either actual prejudice or a substantial likelihood that some 
prejudice did result from the refusal to sequester." United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 
670 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hill, 496 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. 
Jones, 218 Kan. 720, 545 P.2d 323 (1976). 
Here, prior counsel did not move to sequester the jury when one of the jurors 
disclosed that he had been given an instruction by his religious teachers. The juror 
felt that he agreed with the Petitioner's views on religion and Constitutional areas 
being discussed in the trial. The juror received a "blessing" from a fellow church 
member and was told that Petitioner was evil and that he should not be deceived by 
Petitioner. After that, "the juror felt compelled that he should go forward and quietly 
find the Petitioner guilty and sentence him to death." Second Am. Pet. at 10. This 
"out of court" instruction was clearly improper and obviously prejudicial. It is not 
known if the result would have been different; all that is known is that if the jury had 
been sequestered, this juror, having some sympathy with the Petitioner's views on 
religion, could have been the one juror, as in Dan Lafferty's case, who voted against 
the death penalty. 
In such a high profile case as Lafferty, which drew media from around the 
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world, surely the jury should have been sequestered to prevent prejudice. Not only 
that, but in this high-profile case, the death penalty was at stake, and thus trial 
counsel should have been even more cautious to avoid prejudice to the Petitioner. 
However, trial counsel never raised the issue. 
Furthermore, the instructions and verdict forms were faulty. They allowed 
jurors to find only that death was the appropriate penalty, or that they were 
reasonably satisfied they could not do so. The verdict forms and instructions did not 
give jurors the affirmative option of indicating that one or more jurors had decided 
that Petitioner deserved a life sentence. These instructions and verdict forms in 
effect directed the jury to focus on death. An affirmative option, such as a life 
sentence, ought to have been offered. 
Also, while engaging in the process of jury selection, the trial court 
systematically precluded from the jury those members of the community who were 
prone, though not entirely predisposed, to impose a life sentence rather than a death 
sentence. Therefore, the trial court improperly death qualified the jury without any 
objection from trial counsel. Any jury selection process which systematically 
excludes from the jury services a specific segment of the population based solely on 
their views of capital punishment violates a fundamental principle which ensures that 
a criminal defendant has a right to a trial by an impartial jury. Therefore, Petitioner 
was prejudiced by a death qualification of the jurors serving in this case and trial 
counsel was ineffective in failing to object or move for a sequester. 
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Where Lafferty's defense counsel allowed a jury where every member of the 
jury was in favor of the death penalty, and was not sequestered, such jury was not 
impartial. It was a jury biased in favor of the death penalty against Lafferty. The 
only juror who was against the death penalty was dismissed. 
B. Claims 22, 23,11 (Partial), and 24: Ineffective Mitigation 
The lower court held, relative to these claims, that each and every claim fell 
within the ambit of summary disposition. The Petitioner will address each claim in 
turn, and review the ineffective assistance of counsel argument. Trial counsel bears 
the responsibility of conducting a "substantial investigation into each of the plausible 
lines of defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68. Furthermore, the United States 
Supreme Court in the recent case of Wiggins v. Smith, (539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 
2527,1561 LEd.2d471 (U.S. 2003), held that the absence of a thorough mitigation 
investigation is per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Under these claims, trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to hire a mitigation expert who could have found 
additional mitigating factors for the Petitioner. Under Strickland, trial "counsel has 
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that 
makes particular investigations unnecessary." Id. at 691. 
Any diligent counsel would have investigated exculpatory evidence and any 
facts of evidence tampering. Failure to do so would render a deficient performance 
that would fall below the objective standards of a reasonable professional judgment. 
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Failure to discover exculpatory evidence or facts of evidence tampering would 
prejudice the defendant at the trial and at sentencing. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1994). Here, trial counsel failed to hire a mitigation investigator who 
could have provided crucial mitigating factors to spare the Petitioner's life in the 
sentencing stage. 
Trial counsel hired ineffective investigators, or in the alternative, failed to hire 
effective investigators to go back and interview witnesses and to discover if any of 
the evidence had been tampered with or to effectively find exculpatory evidence that 
would have assisted the Petitioner in his case. Trial counsel also failed to hire or 
provide a mitigation specialist to ascertain and develop mitigating circumstances to 
place before the jury at the penalty phase in order to persuade the jury that there 
was mitigating evidence that could give them reason to find, as they had for his co-
defendant Dan Lafferty, that he should serve life in prison rather than face the death 
penalty. 
The only mitigating evidence that was provided to the jury at the penalty phase 
of the case was a short series of prison officials who indicated that the Petitioner was 
a relatively trouble-free inmate and that his write-ups were of a non-violent nature, 
a few pictures from a yearbook, and some photographs of the Petitioner with his 
family. Some of the documents that should have been, but were not introduced in 
mitigation were: educational records from high school and BYU, mental health 
records and psychological test results, National Guard military records showing an 
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honorable discharge, Utah County Jail records, Utah Department of Corrections 
records, items from Petitioner's journal, as well as witnesses and family members 
who may have been willing to step forward on his behalf to discuss childhood issues, 
family background, physical, verbal, and emotional abuse, childhood illnesses, 
medical issues, and injuries. Petitioner's educational records and employment 
records show particularly Petitioner's good adaptability and getting along with other 
people around him and provide mitigating factors for the penalty phase. 
The clear paucity of these records provided a woefully incomplete picture and 
history of exactly who Ronald Watson Lafferty was. The holes and gaps in this 
history were, unfortunately, filled in by the State, with the State's heavy emphasis on 
exacting the death penalty. There was no favorable (or at best, inadvertent) 
evidence for Mr. Lafferty; that was not the state's job. It was Mr. Lafferty's 
attorneys' jobs, and it was not complete. Not by a green mile. Petitioner's brother 
Dan received only a life sentence, whereas Petitioner received the death penalty. 
Considering that co-defendant Dan actually confessed to the killings, it is likely that 
had a mitigation expert been hired for the Petitioner, he would have received the 
same or lesser punishment as Dan. 
C. Claim 25 and 29: ABA Guidelines and Rule 8 
As mentioned supra, the ABA provides guidelines for counsel who are working 
death penalty cases. Specifically, the 1989 ABA guidelines required that two 
qualified trial attorneys should be assigned to represent a Defendant, as did the Utah 
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Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, for 
example, requires that counsel be "proficient in the trial of capital cases." Utah 
R.Crim. P. 8(b). Because the trial counsel did not meet the requirements, and did 
not provide proper mitigating factors, among the other errors listed supra, Petitioner 
suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel. This is contrary to the lower court's 
holding, on p. 39, that "It is not enough to assert that trial counsel did not meet 
statutory criteria. Petitioner must demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective." 
It seems to be accepted by the lower court, at least to a degree, that 'trial 
counsel did not meet statutory criteria.' In fact, it is clear that trial counsel did not 
meet the criteria necessary to qualify to defend capital cases. It should also be clear 
that there is a reason behind having qualified attorneys represent death penalty 
client, and that reason is if the attorneys are not qualified, there will be ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Contrary to the lower court's conclusion, that Petitioner did 
not show trial counsel to be ineffective, Petitioner did just that. To reiterate, the lack 
of mitigating factors, i.e., the very reasons put forth as to why the Petitioner was a 
worthy enough person not to be executed, were all but non-existent. That alone 
should be sufficient. Other factors and ineffectiveness abide, supra. 
D. Claim 26: Closing Argument 
Trial counsel failed to object to improper closing arguments that prejudiced the 
Petitioner. The prosecutor improperly stated that the punishment for the death of a 
15-month old girl should be greater that the punishment of the death of an adult. 
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Even if trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's closing argument by itself 
does not rise to the Strickland standard which the Petitioner claims it is, then the 
cumulative evidence of the misconduct does rise to the Strickland level. Moreover, 
the court stated in Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626 that "to satisfy the first prong of 
the Strickland test, Carter must rebut the strong presumption that 'under the 
circumstances, the challenged action' might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. 
at 689. Failure to object to the damaging prosecutor's closing argument cannot 
possibly be considered a sound trial strategy but clearly is a serious omission. Such 
omission, if preserved on appeal, could have resulted in reversal. Therefore, the 
trial court erred in granting summary judgment on claim 26. 
E. Claim 27: Failure to Appeal Change of Venue 
In accordance with State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989), four factors 
must be considered when making a change of venue request "(1) the standing of the 
victim and the accused in the community; (2) the size of the community; (3) the 
nature and gravity of the offense; and (4) the nature and extent of publicity." Id. 
Surely the Petitioner's case met all four requirements in where the Petitioner 
had little standing in the community, the community was small, Petitioner had a 
negative reputation as the killer of a mother and the child which was an offense of 
an extreme nature and the pretrial publicity was enormous. See also State v. 
Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001). As the court stated in Lafferty and Widdison, 
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"the ultimate test of whether a failure to change venue constitutes an abuse of 
discretion is whether the defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury." See Id. 
See also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1250 (Utah 1988). In the Petitioner's 
case, the counsel failed to request a change of venue and failure to preserve the 
issue of change of venue on appeal significantly prejudiced the Petitioner by having 
a tainted jury pool. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLAIM 44 
WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHEN IT ARGUES 
INEFFECTIVE WAIVER OF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST WITH 
HIS TRIAL COUNSEL, WHO HAD ALSO PREVIOUSLY 
REPRESENTED HIS CO-DEFENDANT DAN LAFFERTY ON 
THE SAME MATTER 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an 
accused the right to conflict-free counsel. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,271 
(1981) ("Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases 
hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of 
interest."). Furthermore, a Utah Supreme Court case noted that "the assistance of 
counsel is among those constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction 
can never be treated as harmless error" (State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697,699, (1980)). 
Hence, conflict cases are dealt with the utmost care and attention and harmless error 
is no defense. 
Additionally, pursuant to Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, 
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[A] lawyer who had formerly represented a client in a matter shall 
not thereafter: 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially 
factually related matter in which that person's interests are materially 
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client 
consents after consultation; or 
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with 
respect to a client or when the information has become generally 
known. 
Note that there is no "passage of time exception." Lafferty's Sixth Amendment 
right to conflict-free counsel was violated here because prior counsel for Lafferty had 
also already represented Dan Lafferty, who is a co-defendant on the same set of 
facts. The former counsel of Ron Lafferty, Mr. Esplin, represented him in the same 
matter as co-defendant Dan Lafferty. The interests of the co-defendants were 
adverse because they were both being charged as defendants in the same matter, 
under the identical set of facts. Hence, Petitioner's trial counsel had an actual 
conflict in his representation because counsel represented a co-defendant with 
contrary interests. 
In addition, Rule 1.9 makes it is clear there was a violation in this case. Using 
the language from the Rule, Ron Lafferty's prior counsel represented another person 
(Dan Lafferty) in the same matter (criminal homicide charges) in which that person's 
(Ron Lafferty's) interest are materially adverse to the interests of the former client 
(Dan Lafferty). By virtue of being co-defendants in the same case the defendants 
needed their own defense and thus, their own lawyer representing their needs. Ergo, 
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the Petitioner's prior counsel violated Rule 1.9 by representing both Ron and Dan for 
the same set of facts. 
Furthermore, the issue of co-defendants' guilt in committing the crime was 
also materially adverse. The co-defendants were the only witnesses to the homicide 
charges and upon being charged as co-defendants, there created a naturally 
adverse relationship in their defense. As the Smith case pointed out, "members of 
the same association may not represent defendants with conflicting interests, as 
there is a strong likelihood that both have been privy to the confidences of both 
defendants." (State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699, (1980)). Thus, it is important that 
members of the same law firm or association do not get involved in representing 
conflicting interests. 
Here, not only was it the same association representing the two clients, but 
it was the same lawyer. That is a clear violation of the conflict of interest rule. By 
representing both Ron and Dan, prior counsel had access to confidential information 
of both co-defendants and his trial strategy could incorporate those facts in a manner 
detrimental to the Petitioner. Moreover, Ron Lafferty did not get a fresh start with 
a new lawyer because his counsel had already been through a trial regarding the 
exact same set of facts. That is akin to a jury member getting a pre-trial bias from 
media reports. Because Ron's and Dan's interests were materially adverse, there 
was an actual conflict of interest. 
Moreover, the State did not show at what time on the time-line of 
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representation Mr. Esplin withdrew from representing Dan Lafferty and if he 
withdrew at all. Therefore, the State's allegation that Dan's representation was 
concluded by the time the counsel was representing Ronald Lafferty is not supported 
by evidence. The State's arguments about the conclusion of the representation on 
the co-defendant does not mean that there was not a conflict still remaining and 
Petitioner has an absolute right to conflict-free counsel. The merefinalization of one 
case does not remove the possible conflict in the companion case. This is 
especially so when there are still appellate and post-conviction remedies available 
as were available to Dan Lafferty at the time. See Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment at p. 21. 
In making its ruling, the trial court relied in its decision on Gardner v. Holden, 
888 P.2d 608 (1994), where the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
"The charges against [co-defendant] Hainsworth were resolved 
separately from the charges against [defendant] Gardner, and by the 
time [attorney] Brass was appointed to represent Gardner, the charges 
against Hainsworth were concluded, and a conflict, potential or 
otherwise, no longer existed between the two defendants." (Id. at 620). 
Lafferty's facts differ from Gardner in important ways. Most importantly, the 
co-defendant in Gardner played a much lesser role in the crime than did Dan 
Lafferty. In Gardner, the co-defendant Hainsworth merely handed a gun to the 
defendant Gardner. Gardner was the one who committed the homicides. 
Hainsworth was not even present when the homicides occurred. Dan Lafferty, on the 
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other hand, played a much more prominent role in the facts of his case. Dan 
confessed to killing Erica and both parties were present during the commission of 
the crime. The State, when prosecuting Ron, claimed he was the actual perpetrator, 
and maintains that position in the current pleadings. An adversarial position existed 
and continues to exist between Ron and Dan Lafferty. Therefore, an impermissible 
conflict of interest existed at the time counsel represented both defendants and 
exists to this day. 
CONCLUSION: 
In dismissing Lafferty's petition, the trial court erred as a matter of law. In 
order to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court must find that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact. Because summary judgment is an extreme measure, 
a strict reading of Rule 56 of the Utah R. Civ. Proc. is required. While the non-
moving party is entitled to a reading of the case in its favor, the lower court granted 
summary judgment on each and every motion by the State. 
The lower court erred in granting each of the motions for summary judgment. 
The Petitioner, at trial, did not receive sufficient and satisfactory representation as 
contemplated by the guarantees of the United States Constitution in the Sixth 
Amendment. Strickland was satisfied because of trial counsel's failure to object to 
inflammatory comments by the Prosecutor at closing argument and for its failure to 
hire an effective mitigation expert, among other deficiencies as described supra. In 
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addition, Dr. Golding's testimony in Mitchell was new evidence because it was not 
available in the first trial. Last, Lafferty's counsel clearly had a conflict of interest 
when he represented both Ron and Dan Lafferty in the same matter for which they 
were co-defendants. 
Based upon the foregoing, Lafferty respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the lower court's granting of the State's motion to dismiss and for partial 
summary judgment. 
DATED this _2-2. day of Au&tsv , 2006 
MORRISON & MORRISON, LC. 
Grant W. P. Morrison 
William P. Morrison 
Morrison & Morrison, L.C. 
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Attorneys for Ronald Watson Lafferty 
Petitioner and Appellant 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Following a jury trial in May 1985, Petitioner was convicted of 
two counts of first degree murder, two counts of aggravated burglary, 
and two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder Pursuant 
to statute, a sentencing hearing was convened after which the jury 
returned a verdict of death on each of the first degree murder 
convictions Petitioner subsequently appealed his conviction and death 
sentence to the Utah Supreme Court On January 11, 1988, the Court 
issued its decision rejecting all of Petitioner's challenges See State v 
Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239 (Utah 1988) (Lafferty I) Petitioner did not 
seek state collateral review of his conviction and sentence, but opted 
instead to file a petition for wnt of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah This petition was denied by the 
federal district court and Petitioner appealed to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit The Tenth Circuit Court reversed the 
district court and granted Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, thereby 
vacating his conviction and sentence It concluded that the state trial 
court had relied upon an incorrect legal standard in evaluating 
Petitioner's competency See Lafferty v Cook, 949 F 2d 1546 (10th 
Cir 1991) 
Respondent thereafter chose to retry Petitioner for the offenses 
originally charged against him In April 1996, Petitioner was again 
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convicted of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of 
aggravated burglary, and two counts of conspiracy to commit first 
degree murder Following a sentencing hearing, the jury returned 
verdicts of death on each of the first degree murder convictions 
Petitioner then appealed his conviction and death sentence to the Utah 
Supreme C ourt The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction 
and sentence, see State v Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 20 P 3d 342 {Lafferty 
II) The United States Supreme Court denied review See Lafferty v 
Utah, 534 US 1018(2001) 
On October 10,2002, Petitioner filed his Preliminary Petition 
for Habeas Corpus and/or Post-Conviction Relief m this court On 
October 29, 2004, Petitioner filed his Second Amended Wnt of 
Habeas Corpus, Parts 1 and 2, raising numerous claims challenging his 
conviction and death sentence In response, on February 23, 2005, 
Respondent filed the motion now at issue Petitioner filed his 
opposition to the motion on May 16, 2005 On June 20, 2005, 
Respondent filed its reply On October 6,2005, the court received oral 
argument on the motion 
SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner s second amended petition first raises a claim for 
relief based upon newly discovered evidence Petitioner asserts that he 
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has new evidence of perjury or inconsistent testimony by Dr Stephen 
Golding, who was one of the forensic psychologists that evaluated 
Petitioner as part of the competency determination According to 
Petitioner during his competency hearings Dr Golding specifically 
stated that Petitioner could be found "situationally competent," that is, 
competent in some situations, but not competent in others However, 
m recent competency hearings held m the case of State v Brian 
Mitchell, case no 031901884 (3rd District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah), Petitioner claims that Dr Golding testified that 
situational competence is not a viable diagnosis 
Additionally, Petitioner also raises forty-seven separate claims 
challenging the legality of his conviction and the sentence of death 
imposed upon him These claims include (1) error by the trial court in 
denying the motion for change of venue, (2) errors committed during 
the jury selection process, (3) errors concerning the penalty phase jury 
instructions and verdict forms, (4) errors committed by the trial court 
with respect to the admission of evidence, (5) challenges to Utah's 
capital decision-making process, (6) error committed by the trial court 
in finding that Petitioner was competent to proceed, (7) error 
committed by the trial court in failing to sequester the jury, and (8) 
cumulative error In addition, Petitioner raises several claims of 
ineffective assistance of both trial counsel and appellate counsel 
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These ineffectiveness claims generally challenge the qualifications of 
both trial and appellate counsel Moreover, there is also an 
ineffectiveness claim challenging the qualifications of post-conviction 
counsel 
Based upon the claims he raises, Petitioner asks that I grant 
him sufficient funds to pay for counsel and to hire necessary and 
appropriate experts and investigators to prepare for an evidentiary 
hearing on these issues and that I thereafter conduct a heanng to allow 
him to present evidence in support of his contentions Ultimately, he 
desires that I "[ajllow a Writ of Habeas corpus to have the Petitioner 
brought before the Court so he might be discharged from his illegal 
and unconstitutional confinement and restraint, and/or relieved of his 
illegal and unconstitutional sentence of death " Second Am Pet at 25 
In addition to the foregoing claims, Petitioner requested 
counsel to attach a Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus Part 2, 
apparently written by Mr Lafferty himself, m which he raises the 
following claims (1) evidence was planted at the rnal proceedings by 
the prosecution, (2) his second trial violated his protection against 
double jeopardy, (3) after the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated 
Petitioner's first conviction and death sentence, Respondent failed to 
arrest, re-charge, or properly arraign him on the current charges, and 
(4) his counsel erroneously advised him not to file a 120-day 
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procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of 
parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence Neither 
is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve 
disputed issues of fact Its purpose is to eliminate the 
time, trouble[,] and expense of trial when upon any 
view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled 
against, he would not be entitled to prevail 
Holbrook Co v Adams, 542 P 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) Indeed, any 
showing in support of summary judgment "must preclude all 
reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, produce 
evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor " 
Bullock v Deseret Dodge Truck Ctr, 354 P 2d 559, 561 (Utah 1960) 
See also Burmngham v Ott, 525 P 2d 620, 621 (Utah 1974) (same) 
"Only when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing such a party 
the opportunity of presenting his evidence and attempting to persuade 
the fact trier to his views " Holbrook, 542 P 2d at 193 However, if 
the party moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of 
"informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying 
the portions of the pleadings or supporting documents which it 
believes demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue of material fact," 
TS 1 Partnership v Allred, 877 P 2d 156, 158 (Utah Ct App 1994), 
then the opposing party cannot simply "rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for tnal If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
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disposition request Based upon these claims, Petitioner requests the 
court to immediately release him from custody and order monetary 
relief and redress in the amount of thirty-five million dollars 
Respondent argues that summary judgment is appropriate on 
all of Petitioner's claims According to Respondent, many of 
Petitioner's claims are procedurally barred pursuant to the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) because they either were previously 
raised and rejected on direct appeal or they are claims that could have 
been raised on direct appeal, but were not With respect to the other 
claims, Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to plead or 
establish the existence of sufficient facts to support the claims and to 
grant him sufficient funds to pay for counsel and hire the necessary 
and appropriate experts and investigators 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that tliere is no genuine issue 
as to any matenal fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law " Utah R Civ P 56(c) The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that, 
[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment 
5 
him" Utah R Civ P 56(e) 
In considering a motion for summary judgment in the context 
of a petition for post-conviction relief, the court is obligated to bear in 
mind that a "petition for post-conviction relief collaterally attacks a 
conviction and/or a sentence It is not a substitute for direct appellate 
review " Gardnerv Holden, 888 P 2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994) Thus, 
"[i]ssues raised and disposed of on direct appeal of a conviction or a 
sentence cannot properly be raised again in a [post-conviction petition] 
and should be dismissed as an abuse of the writ without a ruling on the 
merits "Id See also Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-106(l)(b) In 
addition, "issues that could and should have been raised on direct 
appeal, but were not, may not be raised for the first time in a [post-
conviction] proceeding," Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96, ^ 6, 44 P 3d 
626 {Carter I), unless the petitioner can demonstrate that "the failure 
to raise [these issues] was due to ineffective assistance of counsel" 
Utah Code Ann § 78-3 5a-106(2) Finally, when claims of newly 
discovered evidence are raised, relief can be granted only if the 
petitioner, or his counsel, was not, and could not have been, aware of 
the evidence at the time of tnal or sentencing and it can be shown that 
the new evidence is not merely cumulative, is not simply impeachment 
evidence, and that, when all the other evidence is taken into 
consideration, no reasonable tner of fact could have found the 
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petitioner guilty of first degree murder or returned a verdict in favor of 
the death penalty See Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-104(l)(e)(i)-(iv) 
With respect to Petitioner's claims that allege ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, in order to prevail he must demonstrate that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each prong of 
the test set forth in Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668(1984) (1) 
that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and (2) that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense Id at 686 See also 
Bundy v Deland, 763 P 2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988) (to prevail on a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, "a defendant must show, first, that 
his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant "), State v Geary, 707 P 2d 645, 
646 (Utah 1985) (to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner 
must prove "(1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in 
some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial would 
probably have been different but for counsel's error ") However, as 
the Supreme Court noted in Strickland, "counsel is strongly presumed 
to have rendered adequate assistance," Strickland, 466 U S at 690, 
696, and there is also a strong presumption that the outcome of the 
particular proceeding is reliable 
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challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's 
perspective at the time " Id at 689 Moreover, the assessment of 
counsel's performance cannot be based upon "what is prudent or 
appropriate, but only [upon] what is constitutionally compelled " 
United States v Cromc, 466 U S 648, 665 n 38 (1984) In addition, 
the Supreme Court has specifically noted that, 
[judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be 
highly deferential Because of the difficulties 
inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge 
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fells within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, 
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
"might be considered sound trial strategy " 
Strickland, 466 U S at 689 
Concerning the second prong of the test, even if an attorney's 
representation is found to be unreasonable under prevailing 
professional norms, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will 
nevertheless fail if the errors committed by counsel had no effect on 
the outcome of the criminal proceeding Wa t 691 Thus, 
[it] is not enough for the defendant to show that the 
errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of 
the proceeding Virtually every act or omission of 
counsel would meet that test and not every error that 
conceivably could have influenced the outcome 
undermines the reliability of the result of the 
proceeding 
Id at 693 A petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable 
Under the first prong of the test, an attorney's performance is 
deficient if he has "made errors so serious that [he] was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a] defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment" Id at 687 The seriousness of any errors is judged by 
whether counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing 
professional norms Id at 688 In this context, the "reasonableness of 
counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the 
defendant's own statements or actions Counsel's actions are usually 
based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the 
defendant and on information supplied by the defendant" Id at 691 
But see Rompilla v Beard, 125 S Ct 2456, 2466-68 (2005) (holding 
that even if a defendant suggests that no mitigating evidence is 
available, trial counsel is required to review material he knows the 
prosecutor will rely on as evidence in aggravation) 
In challenging counsel's effectiveness, a petitioner "must 
identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have 
been the result of reasonable professional judgment The court must 
then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance " Id at 690 In making this determination, 
fairness requires "that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting 
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's 
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probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different A reasonable probability is 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence m the outcome '" Id 
at 694 
The United States Supreme Court has also held that the 
effective assistance of appellate counsel is a right guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Evitts v Lucey, 
469 US 387,396(1985) Whether an appellate counsel's 
performance is ineffective is judged by the same standard that applies 
to judging the ineffectiveness of trial counsel See Smith v Bobbins, 
528 U S 259, 285 (2000) ("[T]he proper standard for evaluating 
[petitioner's] claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in neglecting 
to file a merits brief is that enunciated in Strickland v Washington ") 
See alsoBruner v Carver, 920 P 2d 1153, 1157 (Utah 1996) ("The 
standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the 
same as the standard forjudging ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel") This standard requires Petitioner to "first show that his 
counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues 
to appeal-that is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover 
1
 This showing is greater than simply demonstrating "that the errors had 
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding," but less than 
demonstrating "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered 
the outcome in the case " Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668, 693 
(1984) 
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nonfnvolous issues and to file a merits brief raising them " Robbins, 
528 U S at 285 If Petitioner "succeeds in such a showing, he then has 
the burden of demonstrating prejudice That is, he must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's unreasonable failure 
to file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his appeal" Id 
In considering the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel in the context of a post-conviction petition, the Utah Supreme 
Court, in Carter I, cited to a Tenth Circuit case which held that 
[w]hen a petitioner alleges that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal, we 
examine the merits of the omitted issue Failure to raise 
an issue that is without merit "does not constitute 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel" 
because the Sixth Amendment does not require an 
attorney to raise every nonfnvolous issue on appeal 
Thus, counsel frequently will "winnow out" weaker 
claims in order to focus effectively on those more likely 
to prevail However, an "appellate advocate may 
deliver deficient performance and prejudice a defendant 
by omitting a 'dead-bang winner,' even though counsel 
may have presented strong but unsuccessful claims on 
appeal" 
Banks v Reynolds, 54 F 3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir 1995) (quoting 
United States v Cook, 45 F 3d 388, 393, 395 (10th Cir 1995)) See 
also Carter I, 2001 UT 96 at 148 
The Tenth Circuit initially defined a claim as a "dead-bang 
winner" if it "was obvious from the trial record and would have 
resulted in a reversal on appeal " Cook, 45 F 3d at 395 (emphasis 
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disavows the use of the "dead-bang winner" language to 
imply requiring a showing more onerous than a 
reasonable probability that the omitted claim would 
have resulted in a reversal on appeal 
Nedl v Gibson, 278 F 3d 1044, 1057 n 5 (10th Cir 2001) 
The standard forjudging the effectiveness of appellate counsel 
embodied in the phrase "dead-bang winner" is identical to the standard 
enunciated in Strickland Therefore, in order for a petitioner to avoid 
summary judgment on any claims that allege ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel, he must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to each prong of the "dead-bang winner" 
standard (1) that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue which was 
obvious from the trial record and (2) that the issue is one which 
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal 
ANALYSIS AND RULING2 
I. Claims Previously Raised and Rejected on Direct Appeal 
All of the following claims were raised and rejected on direct 
:
 Throughout his second amended petition, Petitioner refers to both state 
and federal constitutional provisions in asserting his claims During oral 
argument, he specifically requested that the court provide an independent 
analysis of his claims under both state and federal law However, Petitioner 
does not proffer any explanation as to how the court's analysis under the 
federal constitution should differ under the state constitution Therefore, 
consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's approach, this court will not 
"embark on an independent analysis under the Utah Constitution when the 
parties had neither argued for nor briefed a separate analysis " State v 
Trane, 2002 UT 97,^21, 57 P 3d 1052 
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added) According to the court in Cook, "[b]y omitting an issue under 
these circumstances, counsel's performance is objectively 
unreasonable because the omitted issue is obvious from the trial 
record Additionally, the omission prejudices the defendant because 
had counsel raised the issue, the defendant would have obtained a 
reversal on appeal" Id The Utah Supreme Court, however, did not 
adopt this language Rather, the Carter I Court adopted language from 
the Banks decision which defined "dead-bang winner" "as an 'issue 
which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would 
have resulted in reversal on appeal'" Carter I, 2001 UT 96 at 148 
(emphasis added) (quoting Banks, 54 F 3d at 1515 n 13) The fact that 
the Carter /Court adopted the "probably would have resulted" 
language instead of the "would have resulted" language is important 
because the "probably would have resulted" language is consistent 
with the United States Supreme Court's holding noted above that it is 
the Strickland standard that applies to claims of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel See Robbins, 528 U S at 285 Indeed, in a recent 
decision the Tenth Circuit held that 
[t]o the extent [the "dead-bang winner"] language can 
be read as requiring the defendant to establish that the 
omitted claim would have resulted in his obtaining 
relief on appeal, rather than there being only a 
reasonable probability the omitted claim would have 
resulted in relief, this language conflicts with 
Strickland The en banc court, therefore, expressly 
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appeal 
1) Claims 4, 14, and 18 (partial) addressing the issue of 
burden-shifting at the penalty phase, see Lafferty II, 2001 UT 19 at 
11127-28, 
2) Claim 7 challenging me removal of juror 220, see id at 
1158-64, 
3) Claim 8 challenging the trial court's decision to admit the 
crime scene videotape, see id at 1179-84, 
4) Claim 9 challenging the trial court's decision to admit the 
videotape of Petitioner's media interview, see id at H98-107, 
5) Claim 10 challenging the trial court's decision to deny 
Petitioner's proposed mercy and sympathy instruction, see id at 
11108-112, 
6) Claim 21 addressing the double jeopardy issue, see id at 
11142-149, 
7) Claim 32 (partial) addressing the issue of prosecutorial 
discretion in charging capital murder, see id at HI40-41, 
8) Claim 43 challenging the trial court's finding that Petitioner 
was competent to proceed to trial, see id at H45-51, and 
9) Claim 45 challenging the trial court's denial of Petitioner's 
motion for a new trial, see id at H52-57 
Unless "there has been an intervening change of controlling 
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authority, new evidence has become available, or [the Utah 
Supreme Court's] prior decision was clearly erroneous and would 
work a manifest injustice," Gildea v Guardian Title Co of Utah, 2001 
UT 75,1110, 31 P 3d 543, "when a legal 'decision [is] made on an issue 
during one stage of a case,' that decision 'is binding m successive 
stages of the same litigation '" Jensen v IHC Hosps, lnc, 2003 UT 
51, ^[67,82 P 3d 1076 (quoting Thurston v Box Elder County, 892 
P2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995) See also AMS Salt Indus v Magnesium 
Corp of Am , 942 P 2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997) ("One branch of the 
doctrine stands for the general rule that 'one district court judge cannot 
overrule another district court judge of equal authority '" (quoting 
Mascaro v Davis, 741 P 2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987)) Petitioner has not 
demonstrated that any of the foregoing exceptions apply in this case 
Because the foregoing claims raised by Petitioner duplicate 
claims that were raised and rejected on direct appeal,3 it follows that 
these claims are procedurally barred pursuant to Section 78-35a-
1
 Respondent also argues that claim 23, addressing the issue of trial 
counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to hire a mitigation expert, claim 38, 
which asserts that Utah's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it 
creates a presumption of death, and claim 41, which asserts that the death 
penalty as applied to Petitioner is unconstitutional because it violates human 
dignity and serves no penological interest, also were raised on direct appeal 
and rejected and thus are procedurally barred However, it does not appear 
to the court that the issues raised in these claims were specifically presented 
on appeal They therefore are not procedurally barred on the grounds 
Respondent asserts 
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at both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, 
8) Claim 17 asserting that insufficient evidence was presented 
at the penalty phase to support the aggravating circumstance that the 
homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or 
exceptionally depraved manner, 
9) Claim 18 (partial) asserting that jurors were naturally 
disposed to imposing a death sentence at the penalty phase because 
they had already found the existence of at least one aggravating factor 
at the guilt phase, 
10) Claim 20 (partial) addressing the issue that, after the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Petitioner's conviction and sentence, 
he was not arrested on a warrant, but simply transferred from the Utah 
State Prison to the Utah County Jail, 
11) Claim 30 asserting that Petitioner's constitutional rights 
were violated when the prosecution argued that Petitioner murdered 
one and perhaps both of the homicide victims after already having 
argued at Petitioner's co-defendant's trial that the co-defendant had 
committed both murders, 
12) Claims 32 (partial) and 47 challenging the constitutionality 
of Section 76-5-202, 
13) Claims 33, 35, 37, and 38 challenging the constitutionality 
of Utah's death penalty scheme, 
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106( 1 )(b) Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing 
these claims 
II. Claims That Could Have Been Raised on Direct Appeal But 
Were Not. 
With respect to all of the following claims, sufficient facts were 
available to Petitioner at the time of his direct appeal that he could 
have raised these claims before the Utah Supreme Court, but he chose 
not to do so 
1) Claim 1 challenging the constitutionality of certain parts of 
the Utah capital sentencing statute, 
2) Claims 2, 3,15,16,18 (partial), and 19 challenging the 
penalty phase instructions and verdict forms, 
3) Claim 5 challenging the process of death qualification 
during jury selection, 
4) Claim 6 challenging the trial court's denial of Petitioner's 
motion for change of venue, 
5) Claim 11 (partial) challenging the trial court's decision 
preventing Petitioner from admitting a number of mitigating 
circumstances at the penalty phase, 
6) Claim 12 (partial) challenging the tnal court's decision not 
to sequester the jury, 
7) Claim 13 challenging the reasonable doubt instruction given 
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14) Claims 34 and 41 challenging the constitutionality of the 
death penalty, 
15) Claim 42 asserting that the cumulative effect of the 
numerous errors committed during Petitioner's trial violated his rights 
to due process and a fair trial, and 
16) Claim 46 challenging the constitutionality of Utah's 
insanity defense statute and asserting that the tnal court improperly 
relied on the 1995 version of the statute rather than the 1984 version, 
which was in effect at the time the homicides were committed 
Petitioner argues in his opposition memorandum that the 
foregoing claims were not raised on appeal because appellate counsel 
was ineffective Indeed, according to Petitioner, the fact that these 
claims were not raised is clear evidence that appellate counsel was not 
performing effectively Therefore, Petitioner argues, these claims are 
not procedurally barred and should be considered by the court 
In my view, however, claiming that the foregomg issues were 
not raised on appeal because appellate counsel was ineffective 
amounts to a new claim that was not previously raisedin Petitioner's 
second amended pejjlioji,_and raising new claims in a memorandum ' 
opposing summary judgment is improper See Holmes Development, 
LLC v Cook, 2002 UT 38, p i , 48 P 3d 895 ("A plaintiff cannot 
amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories of recovery in 
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a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment because such amendment fails to satisfy Utah's pleading 
requirements ") Nevertheless, even if the court did not view the 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim as a new post-
conviction claim, Petitioner still is not entitled to the relief he seeks. 
In order to avoid summary judgment with respect to whether appellate 
counsel was ineffective in failing to raise these claims, he must show 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether 
appellate counsel failed to raise an issue which was obvious from the 
trial record and which probably would have resulted in reversal on 
appeal See Carter I, 2001 UT 96 at 1J48 
Petitioner has not alleged any facts in support of his ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim otiier than simply to state that the 
failure to raise these claims on appeal demonstrates that appellate 
counsel was ineffective However, merely raising these claims in his 
petition without an adequate factual record to support them does not 
demonstrate that these issues were obvious from the trial record and 
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal That is the burden 
which Petitioner must meet but which he failed to meet 
From my view of the record, sufficient facts were available to 
Petitioner at the time of his direct appeal that he could have raised all 
of the foregoing claims before the Utah Supreme Court Apparently he 
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III. Claims for Which Respondent Has Requested Summary 
Judgment and No Objection Was Raised in Petitioner's 
Opposition Memorandum. 
Petitioner did not respond to Respondent's request that the 
court grant summary judgment on each of the following claims raised 
in the second amended petition 
1) Claim 28 asserting that appellate counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to appeal the trial court's denial of Petitioner's 
request to argue as a mitigating circumstance the fact that his co-
defendant only received a sentence of life in prison, and 
2) Claim 31 asserting that Petitioner's constitutional rights are 
being violated because his post-conviction counsel do not satisfy the 
American Bar Association Guidelines (ABA Guidelines) for attorneys 
representing capital post-conviction petitioners 
Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a 
petitioner to set forth "in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that 
form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief" UtahR Civ P 
65C(c)(3) Moreover, "the petitioner shall [also] attach to the petition 
affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the 
allegations" UtahR Civ P 65C(d)(l) Even a generous reading of 
the foregoing claims set forth in Petitioner's second amended petition 
cannot overcome his failure to provide sufficient facts which, if proven 
and believed, would warrant a grant of relief on these post-conviction 
?? 
chose not to do so Moreover, Petitioner alleges no facts 
demonstrating that the failure to raise these claims was the result of 
ineffective assistance of counsel It follows that these claims are 
procedurally barred pursuant to Section 78-35a-106(l)(c) and Section 
78-35a-106(2) Respondent, therefore, is entitled to summary 
judgment dismissing these claims 
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claims Indeed, it was for this reason that Respondent filed its motion 
for summary judgment 
By not opposing Respondent's request for summaryjudgment 
oi attempting in any way to cure the pleading deficiencies related to 
these claims, Petitioner has failed to show that any genuine issue exists 
with respect to the issues they raise Respondent therefore is entitled 
to summary judgment dismissing claims 28 and 31 
IV. Newly Discovered Evidence Claim. 
Petitioner's initial claim for relief is based upon his assertion 
that he has new evidence of perjury or inconsistent testimony by Dr 
Stephen Golding, one of the forensic psychologists that evaluated 
Petitioner as part of the competency determination During the 
competency hearings, Dr Golding apparently testified that Petitioner 
could be found "situationally competent," that is, competent in some 
situations, but not competent in others However, Petitioner contends 
that during the recent competency hearings held in the case of State v 
Brian Mitchell, case no 031901884 (3rd District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah), Dr Golding took a position contrary to his 
testimony in Petitioner's competency proceedings, specifically stating 
that situational competence is not a valid diagnosis or theory 
It is absolutely clear that neither Petitioner nor his counsel 
could have known about the evidence of Dr Golding's claimed change 
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of heart concerning situational competence at the time of Petitioner's 
trial and sentencing or discovered it through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence as it first occurred in the relatively recent Mitchell 
proceedings However, whether Dr Golding in fact subsequently took 
a contradictory position from that which he took during Petitioner's 
competency proceedings, and therefore, whether newly discovered 
evidence actually exists, is impossible for the court to judge because 
Petitioner has failed to provide the court with transcripts "f TV
 J 
Golding's testimony, either from Petitioner's competency hearings or 
the competency hearings in the Mitchell case Furthermore, even 
assuming that Dr Golding actually made contradictory statements 
concerning "situational competence," Petitioner never expressly states 
for what purpose he would use this newly discovered evidence 
Indeed, based upon the information Petitioner does provide, the court 
can apprehend no purpose for its use other than as impeachment 
evidence against Dr Golding 
However, because Petitioner cannot prevail on this post-
conviction proceeding unless the newly discovered evidence is more 
than merely impeachment evidence,4 see Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-
4
 The court is aware that the Utah Supreme Court has recently stated, albeit 
as dictum,' that newly discovered impeachment evidence can justify the 
granting of a new trial in certain situations " State v Pinder, 2005 UT 15, 
1)66 n 11 (2005) (emphasis added) However, at the same time the Supreme 
Court declined "to address the issue of whether the Post Conviction 
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Petitioner's argument is that because trial counsel failed to request that 
the jury be sequestered, Petitioner was denied his constitutional right 
to the jury that had been selected and thereby lost "the advantage of 
perhaps one juror who would have voted for life without parole, 
thereby sparing the Petitioner's life " Id 
In response to this claim, Respondent correctly argues that 
Petitioner is constitutionally entitled to have a fair and impartial jury 
hear his case and decide his punishment See State v Wach, 2001 UT 
35,1J36, 24 P 3d 948 ("Both the United States Constitution and the 
Utah Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a fair and impartial 
jury ") However, Respondent also correctly argues that Petitioner is 
"not entitled to a jury of any particular composition " Taylor v 
Louisiana, 419 US 522,538(1975) See also State v Chatwin,2002 
UT App 363, f 19, 58 P 3d 867 ("[T]he Constitution does not guarantee 
either the State or a defendant a jury comprised of any specific gender 
balance or composition "), State v Tillman, 750 P 2d 546, 575 (Utah 
1987) (same) 
In this case Petitioner does not argue that he was denied an 
impartial jury, only that he was deprived of one of the originally 
impaneled jurors, one who may potentially have been a more 
104(e)(m), Petitioner's claim fails as a matter of law Respondent is 
entitled to summary judgment dismissing this claim 
V. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims. 
1. Claim 12 (Partial). 
In claim 12 (partial), Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because he failed to request that the jury be sequestered In 
support of this claim Petitioner alleges that during trial one of the 
jurors spoke with fellow church members about the case and indicated 
that he was having trouble with the decisions he had to make He was 
given a "blessing" and apparently told that Petitioner was evil and that 
he should not be deceived by Petitioner Following this event, 
Petitioner asserts that "the juror felt compelled that he should go 
forward and quietly find the Petitioner guilty and sentence him to 
death" Second Am Pet at 10 However, the juror subsequently 
revealed his discussions with church members to counsel and the trial 
court and the juror was removed from the jury panel At its heart, 
Remedies Act's disallowance of post conviction relief on the basis of newly 
discovered impeachment evidence is consistent with our case law predating 
that act and what effect, if any, such an inconsistency may have " Id In any 
event, the use of Petitioner's alleged newly discovered evidence as 
impeachment evidence is not, in my view, the type of impeachment evidence 
that would justify the granting of a new trial as Dr Golding was only one of 
a number of mental health evaluators who testified about Petitioner's mental 
condition and it appears that he was an important, but not a key witness 
However, without a transcript of the hearing it is impossible to fully evaluate 
the extent of his importance 
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sympathetic juror' He has not shown, however, that the jury that 
deliberated his fate was not impartial The constitution requires no 
more Petitioner has not shown that there is any genuine issue with 
respect to whether trial counsel's performance fell "outside the wide 
range of professionally competent assistance " Strickland, 466 U S at 
690 Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 12 
(partial) 
2. Claim 20 (Partial). 
In claim 20 (partial), Petitioner argues that his federal habeas 
corpus counsel was ineffective because, after the Tenth Circuit vacated 
Petitioner's conviction and sentence, counsel failed to file the Order of 
Release he had prepared, thereby resulting in Petitioner being 
transferred from the Utah State Prison to the Utah County Jail without 
being arrested on a warrant Petitioner contends that this failure 
resulted in an unconstitutional seizure which has continued to the 
present day Respondent argues that to the extent Petitioner is 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, his claim necessarily fails 
because he is not constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of 
federal habeas corpus counsel Moreover, the Tenth Circuit indicated 
5
 It seems clear to this court that had the juror at issue been retained on the 
jury and the death penalty still imposed, given the facts asserted in the 
Second Amended Petition, Petitioner likely today would be arguing that 
retention of that juror was improper 
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that Respondent was free to retry Petitioner and, when Respondent 
chose that option, Petitioner was not entitled to release from custody 
As Respondent correctly argues, there is no federal 
constitutional right to habeas corpus counsel See Johnson v Avery, 
393 U S 483,488 (1969) ("It has not been held that there is any 
general obligation of the courts, state or federal, to appoint counsel for 
prisoners who indicate, without more, that they wish to seek post-
conviction relief ") Moreover, because "ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims spring from the right to counsel contained in the sixth 
amendment, it follows that there is no constitutional underpinning for 
the claimed right to effective assistance [of] habeas [corpus 
counsel] " Blair v Armontrout, 916 F 2d 1310, 1332 (8th Cir 1990) 
See also Wainwright v Torna, 455 U S 586, 587-88 (1982) (where 
there is no constitutional right to counsel, there can be no deprivation 
of effective assistance) Therefore, Petitioner cannot show that any 
genuine issue exists with respect to whether his federal habeas corpus 
counsel was ineffective m not filing the Order of Release that had been 
prepared Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing 
claim 20 (partial) 
3. Claim 22. 
In claim 22, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because he failed to hire effective investigators to interview 
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whatsoever, that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
adequately investigate the case Petitioner has failed to set forth any 
facts he contends should have alerted tnal counsel that additional 
investigation was warranted or any facts which a more extended 
investigation would have uncovered Without these facts, Petitioner 
cannot show that there is any genuine issue with respect to whether 
tnal counsel performed deficiently or, even if he did, that the deficient 
performance was prejudicial Respondent is entitled to summary 
judgment dismissing claim 22 
4. Claim 23. 
In claim 23, Petitioner argues that his tnal counsel was 
ineffective because he failed to hire a mitigation expert to ascertain 
and develop mitigating evidence Respondent argues that Petitioner 
has failed to "allege[] specific facts about how the failure affected him 
other than to point out that his brother Dan received a life sentence " 
Resp'tMem in Supp at 10 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, although "[d]efense 
attorneys need not present all evidence uncovered by a mitigation 
workup, they absolutely must perform one " State v Taylor, 947 
P 2d 681, 687-88 (Utah 1997) In conducting a mitigation workup, 
tnal "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make 
a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
witnesses and to discover whether evidence had been tampered with or 
whether exculpatory evidence existed that would have been helpful to 
Petitioner Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to identify (1) 
any facts suggesting the possibility of evidence tampenng, (2) any 
facts tnal counsel had a constitutional duty to discover, or (3) any facts 
that would have made a more favorable outcome at either phase of the 
trial reasonably likely 
There is no question that trial counsel bears the responsibility 
of conducting a "substantial investigation into each of the plausible 
lines of defense" Strickland, 466 U S at 681 Nevertheless, in order 
to avoid summary judgment, Petitioner must do more than simply "rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
tnal If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropnate, 
shall be entered against him " Utah R Civ P 56(e) Indeed, Rule 
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires Petitioner to set 
forth "in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of 
[his] claim to relief" Utah R Civ P 65C(c)(3)(emphasis added) 
This includes "attaching] to the petition affidavits, copies of 
records and other evidence in support of the allegations " Utah R Civ 
P 65C(d)(l) However, as repeatedly pointed out by Respondent, 
Petitioner's pleadings merely assert, without any factual support 
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unnecessary" Strickland, 466 U S at 691 However, the Strickland 
court has clearly held that there is no "checklist for judicial evaluation 
of attorney performance [and] [n]o particular set of detailed rules 
for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the vanety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate 
decisions regarding how best to represent a cnmmal defendant" Id at 
688-89 Indeed, the adoption of hard and fast rules that a defense 
attorney must follow in order to effectively represent a capital 
defendant "would interfere with the 'constitutionally protected 
independence of counsel' at the heart of Strickland " Wiggins v 
Smith, 52,9 US 510, 533 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U S at 689) 
While it may be true that mitigation specialists are often 
helpful in assisting trial counsel to perform their required mitigation 
investigation, such specialists are not the only manner in which a 
mitigation workup may be accomplished Because tnal counsel is 
constitutionally permitted the discretion to perform a mitigation 
investigation in the manner he believes will best represent the interests 
of his client, it follows that counsel also must be allowed trie discretion 
to determine whether he will retain the services of a mitigation 
specialist Because the hmng of a mitigation specialist is 
discretionary, in order for Petitioner to avoid summary judgment on 
his claim, he must allege specific facts demonstrating that there was a 
particularized need for a mitigation specialist such that trial counsel's 
decision not to hire one constituted deficient performance and, if so, 
why counsel's failure was prejudicial Petitioner has provided the 
court with no such facts Therefore, he has not shown that any genuine 
issue exists with respect to whether trial counsel was ineffective in 
opting not to hire a mitigation specialist Respondent is entitled to 
summary judgment dismissing claim 23 
5. Claims 11 (Partial) and 24. 
In claim 11, Petitioner makes the general claim that his trial 
counsel was ineffective because he "did not do an appropriate analysis 
or investigation into mitigating factors " Second Am Pet at 9 More 
specifically, m claim 24, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because he failed to present the following available 
mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial educational 
records, mental health records, psychological test results, National 
Guard records, Utah County Jail records, and evidence of childhood 
issues, family background, physical, verbal, and emotional abuse, and 
childhood illnesses and injuries that could have been testified about by 
family members and that were found in Petitioner's journal entries 
According to Petitioner, had trial counsel discovered and presented 
these mitigating circumstances, the outcome of the penalty phase 
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Petitioner fails to provide any convincing argument that trial 
counsel performed deficiently in conducting a mitigation workup and 
presenting mitigating evidence However, he has submitted a social 
history of his life that he contends contains mitigating evidence that 
could, and should, have been investigated and presented by trial 
counsel during the penalty phase of the trial As Respondent details, 
however, with the exception of Petitioner's National Guard records, all 
areas of mitigating evidence Petitioner claims was not investigated or 
presented, was in fact laid before the sentencing authority during the 
guilt or innocence phase of the trial This included evidence of 
childhood issues, physical, verbal, and emotional abuse directed 
toward Petitioner by his father, illnesses and injuries suffered by 
Petitioner, Petitioner's performance in school, mental health records 
and psychological test results, entries from Petitioner's journal, 
Petitioner's character, Dan Lafferty's influence on Petitioner, and* 
Petitioner's conduct while incarcerated in the Utah County Jail and the 
Utah State Prison See Resp't Mem in Supp at 27-46 
In addition, Respondent also details the areas of mitigating 
evidence argued by trial counsel during the penalty phase These 
included Petitioner's lack of a criminal history, that Petitioner acted 
under the domination of his brother, Dan, that Petitioner was merely an 
accomplice in the homicides and that his participation was relatively 
might have been different Respondent argues, on the other hand, that, 
with the exception of Petitioner's "unremarkable" National Guard 
records, trial counsel overlooked no relevant mitigating evidence As a 
result, Respondent contends that Petitioner cannot show that trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance with respect to the 
investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence 
As previously noted, the Utah Supreme Court has held that trial 
counsel in a capital case must perform a mitigation investigation In 
conductmg a mitigation workup, trial "counsel has a duty to make 
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary " Strickland, 466 U S at 691 
However, as noted in Wiggins, "Strickland does not require counsel to 
investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter 
how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing 
Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating 
evidence at sentencing m every case " Wiggins, 539 U S at 533 See 
also Taylor, 947 P 2d at 687 ("Defense attorneys need not present all 
evidence uncovered by a mitigation workup ") The standard is simply 
that "'strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable' only to the extent that 'reasonable professional judgments 
support the limitations on investigation '" Id (quoting Strickland, 466 
US at690-91) 
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minor, that Petitioner suffered from a mental illness and could not 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law, that Petitioner was influenced by a 
dysfunctional family and was terrorized by his father, that Petitioner 
was remorseful for the murders, that Petitioner exhibited good 
behavior while incarcerated, that Dan, not Petitioner, was the actual 
murderer, and, finally, that death was not the appropriate punishment 
for Petitioner based upon the circumstances of the case See id at 46-
51 The only conclusion that can be drawn from this detailed analysis 
is that Petitioner's proffered social history contains no relevant 
mitigating evidence that trial counsel should have mvestigated and 
presented, but failed to do so 
Petitioner can only avoid summary judgment on this claim by 
specifically identifying some relevant mitigating evidence that trial 
counsel should have investigated and presented but did not 
Unfortunately, Petitioner fails to allege any such facts in his opposition 
memorandum6 Without these facts, Petitioner has not demonstrated 
that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether trial counsel was 
6
 The court agrees that trial counsel's failure to present Petitioner's National 
Guard records is inconsequential and cannot support any finding that tnal 
counsel's performance was deficient or, even if it was, that Petitioner was 
prejudiced by this failure As noted by Respondent, "[e]ven [Petitioner's 
current mitigation specialist admits that [Petitioner's 'time spenft] in the 
National Guard is rather unremarkable as part of his social history '" Resp't 
Mem in Supp at 51 (quoting Pet'r Social History at 13) 
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ineffective in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence 
Petitioner also argued during oral argument that even if most of 
the mitigating evidence trial counsel relied upon was presented during 
the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, counsel was nevertheless 
obligated to reintroduce that evidence to the sentencing authority at the 
penalty phase Petitioner contends that counsel's failure to do so 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel Agam, Petitioner has 
provided no legal authority suggesting that in order for trial counsel to 
perform effectively, he must reintroduce at the penalty phase all 
mitigating evidence that may have been presented during the guilt or 
innocence phase Indeed, Petitioner cannot point to any legal authority 
for this position 
As noted previously, the United States Supreme Court has 
expressly held that no "checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney 
performance [and] [n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's 
conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances 
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding 
how best to represent a criminal defendant" Id at 688-89 Indeed, the 
adoption of hard and fast rules that a defense attorney must follow in 
order to effectively represent a capital defendant "would interfere with 
the 'constitutionally protected independence of counsel' at the heart of 
Strickland " Wiggins, 539 U S at 533 (quoting Strickland, 466 U S 
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6. Claim 25. 
In claim 25, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because tnal counsel was not qualified under 
Utah law or the ABA Guidelines to be appointed to represent a capital 
defendant Respondent argues that Petitioner had no constitutional 
right to trial counsel who satisfied certain qualifications and, therefore, 
even if counsel did not satisfy the specific requirements enumerated in 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or the ABA 
Guidelines, this cannot serve as a basis for asserting an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim 
There is no specific language in the Utah Constitution requiring 
counsel in capital cases to satisfy certain qualifications in order to 
provide effective representation Rule 8, however, does specifically 
state that when an indigent defendant is charged with a capital offense, 
the tnal court must appoint two or more attorneys to represent the 
defendant and that the tnal court must make a finding that counsel are 
"proficient in the tnal of capital cases" UtahR Cnm P 8(b) The 
rule then mandates that in making this finding, the tnal court must 
ensure that the experience of appointed counsel satisfy certain 
minimum requirements set forth in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(4) 
However, Rule 8 also states that "[m]ere noncompliance with this rule 
or failure to follow the guidelines set forth in this rule shall not of itself 
at 689) 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that 
the sentencing authonty at the penalty phase of a capital trial is entitled 
to consider all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented 
dunng the guilt or innocence phase See Lqfferty II, 2001 UT 19 at 
TJ127 ("Additionally, just as aggravating factors from the guilt phase of 
the trial may be considered at the penalty phase, so may any mitigating 
evidence or factors presented in the case-in-chief ") It follows from 
this holding that tnal counsel does not act deficiently in choosing not 
to reintroduce at the penalty phase of a tnal all of the mitigating 
evidence introduced dunng the guilt or innocence phase In addition, 
it is clear in the present case that trial counsel repeatedly referred to 
mitigating evidence presented in the guilt or innocence phase in 
making his argument against a death sentence during the penalty 
phase This included mitigating evidence related to physical, verbal, 
and emotional abuse and illnesses and injuries suffered by Petitioner, 
Petitioner's performance in school, his mental health records and 
psychological test results, entries from Petitioner's journal, Petitioner's 
character, his co-defendant's on Petitioner, and Petitioner's conduct 
while incarcerated in the Utah County Jail and the Utah State Prison 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent is entitled to summary 
judgment dismissing claims 11 (partial) and 24 
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be grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively 
represented the defendant at trial or on appeal " Utah R Cnm P 8(f) 
Thus, neither the language of the Utah Constitution nor the sole fact 
that an attorney may not have satisfied the requirements set forth in 
Rule 8 will support a finding that Petitioner's tnal counsel was 
ineffective 
The same is also true with respect to the federal constitution 
In the same way that Strickland does not set forth a ngid checklist or 
set of rules that tnal counsel must satisfy in order to provide effective 
representation, see Strickland, 466 U S at 688-89, Strickland also does 
not set forth specific qualifications that tnal counsel must meet in 
order to effectively represent a capital defendant It is not enough to 
assert that tnal counsel did not meet statutory cntena Petitioner must 
demonstrate that tnal counsel was ineffective Petitioner cannot show 
that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether tnal counsel 
provided ineffective assistance because he was not "qualified" to 
represent Petitioner under Utah law or the ABA Guidelines 
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 25 
7. Claim 26. 
In claim 26, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because he failed to object to the prosecutor's statement 
dunng closing argument at the penalty phase that the punishment for a 
fifteen-month-old girl should be greater than the punishment for the 
death of an adult As a result of this failure, Petitioner argues that 
when he raised the issue of the prosecutor's improper statements on 
appeal, he was required to rely on a more burdensome plain error 
analysis Respondent contends that Petitioner cannot prevail on his 
claim because the very factors Petitioner would have been required to 
prove in order to succeed on his prosecutorial misconduct claim on 
appeal were expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court 
During closing argument at the penalty phase of Petitioner's 
trial, the prosecutor commented to the sentencing authority that 
"if you determine that the defendant deserves life 
without parole before we even consider [the child 
victim] lying dead in her crib, before we ever consider 
that the second person he killed was a 15-month-old 
infant, then there's only one punishment left that is 
meaningful, and that is death " 
Lafferty II, 2001 UT 19 at ^91 Because tnal counsel did not make a 
contemporaneous objection to this statement, Petitioner contends that 
when he raised the issue of prosecutorial misconduct based upon the 
prosecutor's statements, he was forced to demonstrate to the Utah 
Supreme Court not only that the prosecutor's comments "callfed] to 
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict and [that] the error [was] 
substantial and prejudicial such that there [was] a reasonable 
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standard of review would have been abuse of discretion State v 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^ 38, 28 P 3d 1278 See also State v Stubbs, 
2005 UT 65, (^13, 535 Utah Adv Rep 47 In determining whether an 
abuse of discretion has occurred, the Utah Supreme Court 
distinguishes situations where a jury has already reached a verdict and 
those where the jury has not yet been impaneled Here, where the jury 
had already reached a veidict before appeal, the Supreme Court would 
have "examine[d] whether defendant was ultimately tried by a fair and 
impartial jury " Id (citing Lafferty I, 749 P 2d at 1240) Contrary to 
Petitioner s argument, the standard set forth in State v James, 167 
P 2d 549 (Utah 1989) is not the proper standard, although the factors 
listed may be useful m assessing whether a defendant has been tried by 
a fair and impartial jury See Stubbs, 2005 UT 65 at f 17 ("[T]he 
evaluative criteria established in James can, and often should, play a 
role in assessing the ultimate question asked by Widdison whether the 
defendant in fact was tried by a fair and impartial jury " ) 7 
Here, I am unaware of any disputed material facts sufficient to 
overcome summary judgment on the issue of appellate counsel's 
''State v James focuses on the community attitudes concerning the alleged 
offense and articulates four factors that may be relevant, namely (1) the 
standing of the victim and the accused in the community, (2) the size of the 
community, (3) the nature and gravity of the offense, and (4) the nature and 
extent of publicity, but these factors are not controlling See State v James, 
767 P 2d 549, 552 (Utah 1989) 
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likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result," id at ]^90, but also that the statements were obviously 
improper See State v Emmett, 839 P 2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992) (plain 
error requires a defendant to "show that the prosecutor's remarks were 
obviously improper ") 
However, as Respondent has argued, even if tnal counsel had 
made a contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's statement, and 
thus avoided having to demonstrate obvious impropriety, the Supreme 
Court specifically held that the statement was neither inflammatory nor 
prejudicial See Lafferty II, 2001 UT 19 at ffl92-93 Petitioner cannot 
show that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether tnal counsel 
was ineffective in not objecting to statements made by the prosecutor 
during closing arguments at the penalty phase Respondent is entitled 
to summary judgment dismissing claim 26 
VI. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claims. 
1. Claim 27. 
In claim 27, Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective because he failed to appeal the change of venue issue A 
similar claim was raised and rejected in Petitioner's first direct appeal, 
Laffertv I, 749 P 2d at 1240, but was not raised after Petitioner's re-
trial 
Had the change of venue issue been raised on appeal, the 
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claimed ineffectiveness in omitting the venue issue In order to avoid 
summary judgment, Petitioner has the burden of pointing to genuine 
issues of material fact showing that the venue issue was a "dead-bang 
winner," or more specifically, that the venue issue was (1) obvious 
from the trial record and (2) probably would have resulted in reversal 
on appeal However counsel has not pointed to any specific evidence 
showing that any juror was biased Petitioner therefore does not meet 
his burden and Respondent is entitled to summary judgment 
dismissing claim 27 
2. Claim 29. 
In claim 29, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel because counsel was not qualified to 
handle a death penalty appeal under the then-existing Utah rules of 
criminal procedure or the ABA Guidelines Respondent argues that 
Petitioner had no constitutional right to tnal counsel who satisfied 
certain qualifications and, therefore, even if counsel did not satisfy 
specific qualifications enumerated in Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure or the ABA Guidelines this cannot serve as a basis 
for asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
This is a corollary claim to claim 25 discussed above with 
respect to trial counsel As noted there, no specific language in the 
Utah Constitution requires appellate counsel in capital cases to satisfy 
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certain qualifications in order to provide effective representation Rule 
8 provides that when an indigent defendant has been sentenced to 
death, the trial court must appoint one or more attorneys to represent 
the defendant on appeal and that the trial court must make a finding 
that counsel is "proficient in the appeal of capital cases " Utah R 
Cnm P 8(d) The rule then mandates that in making this finding, the 
trial court must ensure that the experience of appointed counsel satisfy 
certain minimum requirements set forth in subsections (d)(1) and 
(d)(2) However, Rule 8 also states that "[m]ere noncompliance with 
this rule or failure to follow the guidelines set forth in this rule shall 
not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed counsel 
ineffectively represented the defendant at trial or on appeal " Utah R 
Cnm P 8(f) Thus, neither the language of the Utah Constitution nor 
the sole fact that an attorney may not have satisfied the requirements 
set forth in Rule 8 will support a finding that Petitioner's appellate 
counsel was ineffective because he did not satisfy certain 
qualifications set forth in Utah law 
The same is also true with respect to die federal constitution 
Because the "standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel is the same as the standard forjudging ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel," Brunei, 920 P 2d at 1157, in the same way that 
Strickland does not set forth a rigid checklist or set of rules that 
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As argued by Respondent, the PCRA specifically sets forth the 
exclusive grounds for relief that a post-conviction petitioner may rely 
upon m raising a claim related to his sentence These are that "the 
sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or 
Utah Constitution , the sentence was imposed in an unlawful 
manner , the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel , or 
newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to 
vacate the sentence " Utah Code Ann § 78-35a 104(l)(a), (d)-(e) 
In his claim, Petitioner is only challenging his sentence of death to the 
extent that it has resulted, in his view, in certain untoward 
consequences for him while waiting to be executed, namely, that life 
on death row limits his access to prison programs, health care, and 
interaction with others Thus, Petitioner is basically arguing that but 
for his sentence of death, he would not be on death cow where, he 
contends, his conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment In challenging his sentence, Petitioner has raised none of 
die foregoing grounds for relief required by the PCRA His claim 
necessarily fails as a matter of law and Respondent is entitled to 
summary judgment dismissing claim 36 
2. Claim 39. 
In claim 39, Petitioner argues that death by firing squad 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment This is borne out, he 
counsel must satisfy in order to provide effective representation, see 
Strickland, 466 U S at 688-89, Su ickland also does not set forth 
specific qualifications that counsel must meet in order to effectively 
represent a capital defendant on appeal Petitioner cannot show that 
any genuine issue exists with respect to whether appellate counsel 
provided ineffective assistance because he was not "qualified" to 
represent Petitioner on appeal under Utah law or the ABA Guidelines 
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 29 
VII. Claims Related to the Constitutionality of Utah's Death 
Penalty Scheme. 
1. Claim 36. 
In claim 36, Petitioner argues mat as a result of Utah's death 
penalty scheme, his punishment has been cruel and unusual in 
violation of his constitutional rights because he has been on death row 
for approximately 20 years with limited access to prison programs, 
health care, and interaction with others Respondent argues that the 
PCRA only "permits post-conviction relief for constitutional defects in 
how a conviction is obtained or a sentence is imposed " Resp't Mem 
in Supp at 57 Because Petitioner's complaint about his conditions of 
incarceration have no bearing whatsoever on how his conviction was 
obtained or how his sentence was imposed, his claim fails as a matter 
of law 
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argues, by recent legislation in Utah abolishing death by firing squad 
and mandating lethal intravenous injection as the sole method of 
execution See Utah Code Ann §77-18-5 5 Respondent contends 
that at the time Petitioner was sentenced to death, death by firing squad 
was permitted but only if that method of execution was selected by the 
defendant Because, pursuant to United States Supreme Court 
precedent, a defendant cannot select a method of execution and then 
challenge its constitutionality, Petitioner's claim fails as a matter of 
law Petitioner responds that at the time he was sentenced to death, he 
was being represented by ineffective counsel and he was not 
competent As a result, Petitioner contends that his selection of death 
by firing squad could not have been made knowingly and voluntarily 
and, therefore, he is entitled to challenge the constitutionality of death 
by firing squad 
Petitioner cites to no state or federal case law holding that 
death by firing squad is unconstitutional On the contrary, although of 
ancient origin, the United States Supreme Court held in the case of 
Wilkerson v Utah, 99 U S 130 (1879) that "[c]ruel and unusual 
punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but the punishment 
of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of 
murder in the first degree is not included m that category, within the 
meaning of the eighth amendment" Id at 134-35 See also Andrews 
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v Shulsen, 802 F 2d 1256,1275 n 16 (10th Cir 1986) (holding that 
death by firing squad does not violate the Eighth Amendment), 
Andrews v Shulsen, 600 F Supp 408,431 (D Utah 1984) (citing the 
holding in Wilkerson that" execution by shooting was not cruel and 
unusual") 
Petitioner contends that the recent enactment of Section 77-18-
5 5 demonstrates that "the State's own action through the legislative 
and executive branch, have indicated that death by firing squad is cruel 
and unusual," Second Am Pet at 21 Yet nowhere in Section 77-18-
5 5 is death by firing squad expressly declared to be unconstitutional 
Moreover, simply because the new legislation abolishes death by firmg 
squad, this does not warrant the conclusion that this method of 
execution was, or currently is, unconstitutional under either the state or 
federal constitutions Indeed, Section 77-18-5 5 implies just the 
opposite 
The new legislation provides that "[i]f a court holds that 
execution by lethal injection is unconstitutional as applied, the method 
of execution for that defendant shall be a fmng squad " Utah Code 
Ann § 77 18-5 5(4)(b) If Petitioner's argument is correct, then in the 
event lethal injection is found to be unconstitutional in a particular 
case, Section 77-18-5 5 allows the state to resort to a method of 
execution that, according to Petitioner, the legislature has impliedly 
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cannot be subject to the death penalty, his execution would constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment because he has never had the chance to 
raise the issue whether he is mentally retarded Respondent argues that 
Petitioner has not alleged sufficient facts demonstrating that he is 
mentally retarded Therefore, he cannot prevail on his claim 
Consistent with the holding of Atkins v Virginia, 536 U S 304 
(2002), the Utah Code exempts from the death penalty any defendant 
the trial court determines to be mentally retarded See Utah Code Ann 
§ 77-15a-101 (I) According to this exemption statute, a defendant is 
mentally retarded if 
(1) the defendant has significant subaverage 
general intellectual functioning that results in and exists 
concurrently with significant deficiencies in adaptive 
functioning that exist primarily in the areas of reasoning 
or impulse control, or in both of these areas, and 
(2) the subaverage general intellectual 
functioning and the significant deficiencies in adaptive 
functioning under Subsection (1) are both manifested 
prior to age 22 
Utah Code Ann § 77-15a-102(l)-(2) Petitioner contends that he is 
mentally retarded, but he fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating 
that he satisfies the foregoing standard for a finding of mental 
retardation Although he does assert that his social history shows that 
in his life he "had a diminished capacity to communicate, to make 
conclusions from his mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, [and] to 
control his impulses," Pet'rOpp Mem at 20, these alleged deficits fail 
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declared to be cruel and unusual by enacting Section 77-18-5 5 Such 
an obvious inconsistency clearly undermines the validity of 
Petitioner's argument See Griffin v Oceanic Contractors, 458 U S 
564, 575 (1982) ("It is true that interpretations of a statute which 
would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative 
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available ") 
Petitioner has not shown that any genuine issue exists with respect to 
whether death by firing squad constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment8 Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing 
claim 39 
3. Claim 40. 
In claim 40, Petitioner argues that in light of the United States 
Supreme Court's recent ruling that mentally retarded defendants 
* In his opposition memorandum in response to Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment, Petitioner asserts that at the time he was sentenced to 
death, he was being represented by ineffective counsel and he was not 
competent He contends, therefore, that his choice to be executed by firing 
squad was not knowingly and voluntarily made This, he asserts, allows him 
to challenge the constitutionality of death by firing squad The claim that 
Petitioner's choice to be executed by firing squad was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made as a result of mental incompetence and ineffective 
assistance of counsel is, in the court's view, a new claim that was not 
previously raised in Petitioners second amended petition However, raising 
new claims in a memorandum opposing summary judgment is improper 
See Holmes Development LLC v Cook, 2002 UT 38, p 1 , 48 P 3d 895 ("A 
plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories of 
recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment because such amendment fails to satisfy Utah's pleading 
requirements ' ) Therefore, the court will not consider Petitioner's new 
claims 
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to satisfy the above standard Moreover, even if these deficits were 
relevant, Petitioner never demonstrates how they warrant concluding 
that his intellectual and adaptive functioning was subaverage 
Finally, and perhaps most telling, there is no indication from 
Petitioner that any subaverage intellectual or adaptive functioning he 
may have experienced manifested itself pnor to age 22 Indeed, 
although Petitioner may have endured a traumatic childhood in a 
dysfunctional family, his social history clearly indicates that prior to 
1963,9 "he was a good and easy child to raise, suffering from no 
abnormalities 'He seemed to progress through the normal stages of 
growth and development with no complications '" Pet'r Social 
History at 4-5 (quoting P Heinbecker's report of 11/28/84) "In 1960, 
[he] graduated from Payson High School According to his school 
record he received a 3 2 GPA, well above average Teachers 
described him as well-behaved and a well-adjusted young man " Id at 
7 In his formative years, Petitioner "worked odd jobs commonly 
available to high school students, including farm work, gas station 
attendant, and labor work," id at 13, and spent two years in the Army 
National Guard prior to his honorable discharge See id From 1960 to 
1962, Petitioner served a two-year LDS mission to Florida and 
9
 Petitioner was born on November 4, 1941 See Pet'r Social History at 4 
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Georgia and, following his release, he married in 1963 See id at 7 
Finally, there is no indication from his social history that prior to 1963 
Petitioner needed or received any type of mental health treatment or 
psychological evaluations See id at 14 Petitioner has failed to allege 
sufficient facts demonstrating that he could satisfy the statutory 
definition of "mentally retarded" for exemption from the death penalty 
Thus, he has not shown that any genuine issue exists with respect to 
whether his execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
on the ground that he never had the chance to raise the issue whether 
he is mentally retarded Respondent is entitled to summary judgment 
dismissing claim 40 
4. Claim 44. 
In claim 44, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because his mental health difficulties prevented 
him from conscientiously waiving trial counsel's alleged conflict of 
interest resulting from counsel's prior representation of Petitioner's 
co-defendant, Dan Lafferty He also contends that the trial court 
erroneously permitted trial counsel to represent Petitioner despite the 
presence of a conflict of interest Respondent argues that Petitioner 
has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that his constitutional right 
to conflict-free counsel was violated That is, Petitioner fails to show 
that an actual conflict of interest existed and that the conflict adversely 
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assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel's alleged conflict of 
interest To do this, Petitioner must plead sufficient facts 
demonstrating that trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest and 
that the conflict adversely affected trial counsel's performance See 
State v Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f22,984 P 2d 382 
Petitioner contends that his trial counsel did have an actual 
conflict of interest during trial as evidenced by the fact that his counsel 
previously represented Petitioner's co-defendant, Dan, on the same 
criminal allegations that Petitioner was facing Petitioner argues that 
this created an obvious conflict because his interests and Dan's 
interests on the issue of guilt in committing the homicides were 
materially adverse Thus, according to Petitioner, his trial counsel had 
an actual conflict m his representation of Petitioner because counsel 
represented a co-defendant with contrary interests 
Petitioner, however, fails to refer to any decisions made or trial 
strategies relied upon by trial counsel that actually undermined 
Petitioner's interests in favor of his co-defendant's interests 
Moreover, Dan was tried in 1985 and Petitioner's second trial occurred 
in 1996 Merely pointing out that Petitioner's trial counsel also 
represented his co-defendant on identical charges of capital homicide 
in a separate trial that occurred eleven years prior to Petitioner's trial is 
insufficient to show that trial counsel was actively representing 
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affected trial counsel's performance Without this showing, 
Respondent argues that Petitioner cannot prevail on his claim 
There is no question that Petitioner had a constitutional right to 
be represented by conflict-free counsel during his trial See Wood v 
Georgia, 450 U S 261, 271 (1981) ("Where a constitutional right to 
counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a 
correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of 
interest") As with any constitutional right, it is also true that the 
waiver of tnal counsel's conflict must be knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary See State v Johnson, 823 P 2d 484, 490-491 (Utah Ct 
App 1991) ("A defendant can generally waive his or her right to 
conflict-free counsel To be valid, such a waiver must be knowing and 
intelligent, and made 'only after adequate warning by the [trial] court 
of the potential hazards posed by the conflict of interest and of the 
accused's right to other counsel'" (quoting United States v Rodriguez, 
929 F 2d 747, 750 (1st Cir 1991)) 
In making this claim Petitioner essentially alleges that he did 
not "conscientiously" waive trial counsel's conflict Yet, unless 
Petitioner is able to demonstrate that an actual conflict existed that 
prejudiced him, the waiver issue is moot Thus, in order for Petitioner 
to avoid summary judgment on his claim, he must show that a genuine 
issue exists with respect to whether he was denied the effective 
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conflicting interests that adversely affected counsel's performance 
during Petitioner's trial Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has 
_suggested that in situations where an attorney is appointed tn represent 
co-defendants at different times on charges arising from the same 
criminal episode, no conflict exists, potential or otherwise, QJFP the 
charges against one co-defendant are concluded See Gardner, 888 
P 2d at 620 ,0 Thus, Petitioner cannot avoid summary judgment on his 
claim because he has failed to show that any genuine issue exists with 
respect to whether his trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest 
and that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance 
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 44 
VIII. Claims Raised in Part Two of Petitioner's Second Amended 
Petition. 
In addition to the 47 claims raised in Part 1 of Petitioner's 
second amended petition, Petitioner asked that his counsel attach to his 
Second Amended Petition a Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Part 2, apparently written by Petitioner himself, in which he raises four 
claims (1) evidence was planted at the trial proceedings by the 
'" Respondent also noted that counsel called Dan Lafferty as a witness, 
obtained admissions from Dan that he (Dan) actually committed the 
murders, and then vigorously argued during closing arguments and in the 
penalty phase that Petitioner should not receive a more severe sanction than 
Dan received, life in prison with the possibility of parole This action by 
trial counsel does not demonstrate an alliance with his prior client, Dan, but 
just the opposite 
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prosecution, (2) his second trial violated his protection against double 
jeopardy, (3) after the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated 
Petitioner's first conviction and death sentence, Respondent failed to 
arrest, re-charge, or properly arraign him on the current charges, and 
(4) his counsel erroneously advised him not to file a 120-day 
disposition request 
With respect to the first claim of Part 2, although this claim 
could have been raised on appeal, Petitioner argues that it is not 
procedurally barred because he is alleging that appellate counsel was 
ineffective m failing to raise the claim Therefore, pursuant to Section 
78-35a-106(2), this is a viable claim that the court should consider 
Respondent counters that summary judgment should be granted 
because Petitioner's claim does nothing more than repeat his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim from claim 22 
As noted above, whether an appellate counsel's performance is 
ineffective is judged by the same standard that applies to judging the 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel See Robbins, 528 U S at 285 ("[T]he 
proper standard for evaluating [petitioner's] claim that appellate 
counsel was ineffective in neglecting to file a merits brief is that 
enunciated in Strickland v Washington ") See also Bruner, 920 P 2d 
at 1157 ('The standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel is the same as the standard forjudging ineffective assistance of 
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UT 19 at THJI42-149 As a result, Petitioner's claim is procedurally 
barred T herefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment 
dismissing Petitioner's second claim in Part 2 
Petitioner's third claim is that after the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals vacated Petitioner's first conviction and death sentence, 
Respondent failed to arrest, re-charge, or properly arraign him on the 
current charges Respondent contends that summary judgment should 
be granted on this claim because no authority exists "requiring] the 
State to formally rearrest, recharge, and rearraign a defendant who has 
been convicted and is in custody, but is granted a new trial " Resp't 
Mem m Reply at 22 Petitioner does not directly address this issue in 
his opposition memorandum 
Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a 
petitioner to set forth "in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that 
form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief" UtahR Civ P 
65C(c)(3) Moreover, "the petitioner shall [also] attach to the petition 
affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the 
allegations" UtahR Civ P 65C(d)(l) Petitioner's claim cannot 
overcome his failure to provide sufficient facts which, if proven and 
believed, would warrant a grant of relief on this post-conviction claim 
By not opposing Respondent's request for summary judgment or 
attempting to cure any pleading deficiencies, the court finds with 
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trial counsel") In order to avoid summary judgment on the claim that 
appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of planted 
evidence, Petitioner must show that there is a genuine issue of matenal 
fact with respect to whether appellate counsel failed to raise an issue 
which was obvious from the tnal record and which probably would 
have resulted in reversal on appeal See Carter I, 2001 UT 96 at ^ 48 
Petitioner has alleged no facts m support of his ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim other than to state that the failure 
to raise the claim on appeal itself demonstrates that appellate counsel 
was ineffective Clearly, this is insufficient to show that appellate 
counsel's failure to raise Petitioner's claim was obvious from the tnal 
record and probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal 
Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing 
Petitioner's first claim in Part 2 
Petitioner argues in his second claim that his second trial 
violated his protection against double jeopardy Respondent argues 
that this claim is procedurally barred because this is a claim that 
Petitioner raised on appeal and lost Pursuant to Section 78-35a-
106(l)(b), a post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to relief on a 
claim that "was raised or addressed on appeal" Petitioner raised 
the double jeopardy issue before the Utah Supreme Court on direct 
appeal and the Court rejected Petitioner's claim See Lafferty II, 2001 
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respect to this claim that Petitioner has failed to show that any genuine 
issue exists with respect to the issue it raises Respondent is entitled to 
summary judgment dismissing Petitioner's third claim in Part 2 
Petitioner argues in his fourth claim that his counsel was 
ineffective because he erroneously advised Petitioner not to file a 120-
day disposition request According to Petitioner, this advice 
prejudiced him because it "allow[ed] the press to pollute the jury pool 
with negative information which led to the fact that [Petitioner] could 
not get a fair and unbiased jury" Pet Opp Mem at 22 Respondent 
argues that counsel's decision was reasonable because it allowed him 
time to prepare for both phases of Petitioner's capital trial 
For the reasons set forth by Respondent, and in light of all the 
circumstances, the court cannot conclude that counsel's advice fell 
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance 
Moreover, even if trial counsel's advice did constitute deficient 
performance, Petitioner provides no evidence that a biased juror was 
seated to hear his case and determine his punishment Petitioner has 
failed to show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different" Strickland, 466 U S at 694 Petitioner has not 
shown that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether trial 
counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner not to file a 120-day 
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disposition request Respondent is entitled to summary judgment SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
dismissing Petitioner's fourth claim in Part 2 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law" UtahR Civ P 56(c) Based upon a 
careful consideration of all the pleadings in this case, I am of the view 
that Petitioner has failed to "set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial," Utah R Civ P 56(e), with respect to any 
of the claims he raises Respondent is entitled to summary judgment 
dismissing each of Petitioner's claims, which results in a dismissal of 
Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Respondent's counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order 
DATED this 29th day of November, 2005 
BY THE COURT 
ANTHONY W 
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RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY, 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
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ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF, AND 
JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT 
JUDGE ANTHONY SCHOFIELD 
Case No. 020404472 
Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment ("Ruling"). Based on 
the papers filed, the arguments presented, and the Court's 
Ruling, which is incorporated into this order by reference; 
because petitioner has failed to "set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," as required by 
Utah R. Civ P. 56(e); and because it appears that there is good 
cause for doing so, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. 
1. The State's summary [judgment motion is GRANTED as to all 
of petitioner's post-conviction claims. Petitioner's Second 
Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus, Part I, and Petition For Writ of 
Habeas Corpus are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and the Court DENIES 
post-conviction relief on both petitions. 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary 
Judgment is before the Court. The parties have fully briefed the 
motion. On October 6, 2005, the Court heard argument on the 
motion, during which Thomas Brunker and Christopher Ballard 
represented the State, and Aric Cramer and Grant W.P Morrison 
represented petitioner Petitioner was present in Court. On 
November 29, 2005, the Court entered its Ruling on Motion to 
2 The Court orders judgment entered m the State's favor. 
DATED r^rf)((7 
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ail, postage prepaid, to petitioner's counsel, Mr. Aric Cramer, 
t 20 North Mam, Suite 313, St. George, UT 84770; and Mr. Grant 
.P. Morrison, MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C., at 352 East 900 South, 
alt Lake City, UT 84111. 
Relief, and Judgment for Respondent. A copy of the signed order 
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COMES NOW the Petitioner Ronald Watson Lafferty, by and 
through counsel, who hereby submits this Notice of Appeal pursuant 
to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Petitioner appeals from that certain final order of the Fourth 
District Court, Honorable Anthony Schofield presiding, entitled 
Order Granting Summary Judgment and Dismissing Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief, and Judgment for Respondent, entered by the 
court on January 3, 2006. The appeal is to the Utah Supreme Court 
and is taken from the entire judgment. Contemporaneously with the 
filing of this Notice of Appeal, petitioner hereby remits all 
reguired filing fees. 
DATED this 31st day of January, 2006. 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
< 
Grant IW. P.l Morrison 
Williajn P. Morrison 
Aric Cramer 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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on the 31st day of January, 2006. 
<; 
I 
2 
ADDENDUM B 
) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim counterclaim or cross claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
ay at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
jmmary judgment by the adverse party move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof 
) For defending party A party against whom a claim counterclaim or cross claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment 
sought may at any time move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof 
) Motion and proceedings thereon The motion memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7 The 
dgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings depositions answers to interrogatories and admissions on file 
gether with the affidavits if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any matenal fact and that the moving party is 
ititled to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment interlocutory in character may be rendered on the issue 
liabilty alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages 
) Case not fully adjudicated on motion If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for 
the relief asked and a trial is necessary the court at the hearing of the motion by examining the pleadings and the 
idence before it and by interrogating counsel shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
>ntroversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make an order 
>ecifymg the facts that appear without substantial controversy including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
her relief is not in controversy and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just Upon the trial of the 
tton the facts so specified shall be deemed established and the trial shall be conducted accordingly 
) Form of affidavits further testimony defense required Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
lowledge shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
)impetent to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
fidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
^positions answers to interrogatories or further affidavits When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
provided in this rule an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the plead ngs but the 
sponse by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
>ue for trial Summary judgment if appropriate shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response 
When affidavits are unavailable Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party 
innot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party s opposition the court may refuse the 
)pl cation for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
scovery to be had or may make such other order as is just 
) Affidavits made in bad faith If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for 
e purpose of delay the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the 
asonable expenses which the fil ng of the affidavits caused including reasonable attorney's fees and any offending 
arty or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt 
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j)(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the 
»quirements of this rule the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days The court 
lay grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown 
))(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post conviction petition in a case where the 
etitioner is sentenced to death 
i) Service of petitions If on review of the petition the court concludes that all or part of the petition should not be 
limmanly dismissed the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk 
i serve a copy of the petition attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent If the petition is a 
fiallenge to a felony conviction or sentence the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General 
i all other cases the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner 
) Answer or other response Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of 
copy of the petition upon the respondent or within such other penod of time as the court may allow the respondent 
lall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the 
nswer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b) Within 30 days (plus time allowed for 
arvice by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment the petitioner may respond by 
lemorandum to the motion No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court 
) Hearings After pleadings are closed the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a heanng or otherwise dispose 
f the case The court may also order a preheanng conference but the conference shall not be set so as to delay 
ireasonably the hearing on the ments of the petition At the preheanng conference the court may 
)(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues 
|(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents and 
l(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary hearing 
) Presence of the petitioner at heanngs The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the petitioner 
not represented by counsel The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video 
Dnferencing The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise 
s present in court dunng the proceeding The court may conduct any heanng at the correctional facility where the 
»titioner is confined 
I Discovery records Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a party and 
determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is 
;ely to be admissible at an evidentiary heanng The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain 
ly relevant transcript or court records 
n) Orders stay 
n)(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
i appropnate order If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction the order shall be stayed for 5 days 
/ithin the stay penod the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will 
jrsue a new tnal pursue a new sentence appeal the order or take no action Thereafter the stay of the order is 
werned by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
n)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken the stay shall expire and the 
>urt shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner 
n)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retned or resentenced the tnal court may enter any 
jpplementary orders as to arraignment tnal sentencing custody bail discharge or other matters that may be 
acessary and proper 
) Costs The court may assign the costs of the proceeding as allowed under Rule 54(d) to any party as it deems 
spropnate If the petitioner is indigent the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that 
osecuted the petitioner If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections Section 64 13 23 and 
Hftons 78 7 36 through 78 7-43 govern the manner and procedure by which the tnal court shall determine the 
nount if any to charge for fees and costs 
) Appeal Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of 
ppeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts 
(a) Scope This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann § 
78-35a 101 et seq Post Conviction Remedies Act 
(b) Commencement and venue The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the distnct 
court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered The petition should be filed on forms provided by 
the court The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county The 
court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses 
(c) Contents of the petition The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the 
conviction or sentence Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not be raised in 
subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown The petition shall state 
(c)(1) whether the petitionens incarcerated and if so the place of incarceration 
(c)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in 
which the conviction was entered together with the courts case number for those proceedings if known by the 
petitioner 
(c)(3) in plain and concise terms all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief 
(c)(4) whether the judgment of conviction the sentence or the commitment for violation of probation has been 
reviewed on appeal and if so the number and title of the appellate proceeding the issues raised on appeal and the 
results of the appeal 
(c)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any pnor post conviction or other civil 
proceeding and if so the case number and title of those proceedings the issues raised in the petition and the 
results of the pnor proceeding and 
(c)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence the reasons why the evidence 
could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the tnal the appeal or any previous 
post-conviction petition 
(d) Attachments to the petition If available to the petitioner the petitioner shall attach to the petition 
(d)(1) affidavits copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations 
(d)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's 
case 
(d)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post conviction or other civil proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence and 
(d)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court 
(e) Memorandum of authonties The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authonties in the 
petition but these may be set out in a separate memorandum two copies of which shall be filed with the petition 
(f) Assignment On the filing of the petition the derk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sentenced 
the petitioner If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available the derk shall assign the case in the normal 
course 
(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims The assigned judge s hall review the petition and if it is apparent to the court 
that any claim has been adjudicated in a pnor proceeding or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face 
the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that 
the daim is frivolous on its face The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner Proceedings on the claim shall 
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or condusions 
of law 
(g)(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and 
attachments it appears that 
(g)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a daim for relief as a matter of law 
(g)(2)(B) the daims have no arguable basis in fact or 
(g)(2)(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired pnor to the filing of the petition 
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Anc Cramer (#5460) 
CRAMER & CRAMER, LX.C 
Smith Hyatt Building 
845 South Main Street, Suite 23 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone (801) 299-9999 
Facsimile (801) 298-5161 
Grant W P Morrison (#3666) 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113 
Telephone (801) 359-7999 
Facsimile (801) 359-1774 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY, 
Petitioner, 
v 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent 
PETITIONER'S SECOND AMENDED 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PART 1 
Case No 020404472 
The Honorable Anthony W Schofield 
Petitioner, Ronald Watson Lafferty, petitions this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus/Post 
Conviction Relief, pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann §78-3 5a-101 etseq and Rule 65C of 
the Utah R Civ Pro 
INCARCERATION 
Pursuant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(l), the Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the 
Utah State Prison located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah m the custody of the Warden of the Utah 
overwhelming evidence that the Defendant was incompetent during the trial proceedings 
4 The trial court committed a reversible error in granting the State's challenges for cause 
5 Utah Code Ann § 76-3-207(3) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
6 Utah Code Ann §76-3-207(3) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under Article I 
Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution 
7 The trial court committed error in allowing the State to introduce a videotape containing 
views of victim Erica Lafferty and her wounds as she lay in her crib 
8 The tnal court erred in ruling that the law to be applied regarding aggravating and mitigating 
factors was the 1995 amendment to the Utah Code Ann § 77-3-207 
9 Comments of the State during closing argument exceeded the bounds allowed during 
argument as that material was called to the attention of jurors without the due justification 
10 The tnal court committed error by allowing the introduction of videotape of statements 
made by Ron and Dan Lafferty to the media in September of 1984 
11 The tnal court committed error by refusing to give the Defendant' s requested instruction 
that the jury could consider sympathy or mercy in reaching its decision dunng the penalty phase 
12 Utah's death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it does not provide for a review of 
proportionality of the death sentence 
13 Defendant's death sentence is not proportionate when compared with the sentence ofhis 
co-Defendant, or with other capital cases in the State of Utah 
14 Utah's capital punishment procedure violates the due process clauses of the United States 
State Prison, Hank Galetka, Warden 
TRIAL CONVICTION AND CASE NUMBER 
Pursuant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(2), the name ofthe Court in which the Petitioner was 
convicted is the Fourth District Court, in and for Utah County, in the State of Utah Petitioner was 
convicted on Apnl 10,1996 of two counts of capital homicide, two counts of conspiracy to commit 
homicide and two counts of aggravated burglary Onorabout Apnl 16,1996, thejury reconvened for the 
penalty phase ofthe case and returned the penalty of death on both counts of aggravated murder The 
Court, pursuant to the Petitioner's election, sentenced the Defendant on May 31,19% to death by firing 
squad Final Statement of Conviction, Judgment of Death and Summary of Evidence was signed by 
Honorable Judge Steven L Hansen on February 25,1997 The case number in the aforementioned case 
is case number 84-1409309 
APPEAL 
Pursuant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(4), the judgment of conviction and sentence were 
reviewed on appeal The case number on appeal was 970111 The title ofthe appellate proceeding was 
State v Lafferty Eight points were raised on appeal, some points with sub-issues Approximately eighteen 
issues in total were raised on appeal The issues were presented as follows 
1 The tnal court committed an error oflaw m failing to follow the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann § 77-15-1 atseq in the procedure ofthe competency heanng held immediately pnor to tnal 
2 The tnal court's finding that the Defendant was competent to stand tnal is clearly 
erroneous 
3 The tnal court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion for New Trial based on 
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Constitution and the Utah State Constitution by creating a burden upon the Defendant to overcome 
evidence of conviction 
15 Utah Code Ann § 76-5-202 and 76-3-207 violate the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments ofthe United States Constitution 
16 Executing the Defendant violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment since the Defendant has spent over fourteen years on death row 
17 The Utah procedure for capital sentencing is unconstitutional under the provisions of Article 
I Section 7 and 9 ofthe Utah State Constitution 
18 The eighteenth and final issue that was raised on direct appeal is that the retnal ofthe 
Defendant violated the double jeopardy clause ofthe Fifth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution 
and Article I Section 12 ofthe Utah State Constitution 
Although there were eighteen separate issues raised, they were divided into eight separate general 
categories The results ofthe appeal were given by the Utah Supreme Court in their decision of State v 
Lafferty. 20 P 3d 342 (Utah 2001) 
As to issues one through three, the Utah Supreme Court denied Lafferty's claims and affirmed the 
tnal court's denial of his Motion for a New Tnal 
As to the fourth issue of granting the State's juror challenge for cause, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the tnal court's removal of that juror 
The Supreme Court also denied the fifth and sixth issues raised by Lafferty and found that the death 
penalty was not unconstitutional and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under either the 
Federal or State Constitutions 
The Supreme Court also upheld the trial court's decision on issues seven through nine, relating to 
the impact evidence admitted during the penalty phase 
The Supreme Court also denied Lafferty's tenth issue The court found no error in admitting a 
videotape statement made by Ron and Dan Lafferty to the media in September of 1984 
The Supreme Court also upheld the trial court's refusal to grant a mercy instruction in Lafferty's 
eleventh appeal issue 
The twelfth through seventeenth issues raised by Lafferty upon direct appeal, were issues involving 
constitutional objections to the implementation of the death penalty These issues were also rejected in 
whole by the Utah Supreme Court 
The eighteenth and final issue raised was a claim of double jeopardy, which the Utah Supreme 
Court also rejected 
PRIOR POST-CONVICTION OR OTHER CIVIL CHALLENGES 
Pui suant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(5), the Petitioner has not brought any other post-
conviction or other civil proceeding in his case A number of initial and amended Requests for Wnts of 
Habeas Corpus have been filed, but they are all the instant case and there have been no other prior 
proceedings 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
Pursuant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(6), Petitioner claims relief due to newly discovered 
evidence There is new evidence of perjury or inconsistent testimony as to mental health issues by one of 
the mental health evaluators in the instant case that is in direct contradiction with what that mental health 
evaluator stated in a recent case The reason why this evidence could not have been discovered m time 
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7, 12 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
3 The instructions and verdict forms in effect directed thejury to focus on death and presume 
that a death sentence would be imposed unless a juror voted against it Thus, these statutes violated 
Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and 
his nghts under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
4 Furthermore because thejury enters the sentencing phase already having found the 
existence of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, there is a natural disposition toward 
imposing the death penalty unless and until Petitioner would be able to overcome the presumption of death 
through introduction of mitigating circumstances Therefore, the Utah death penalty scheme improperly 
shiftstheburdenofprooffromtheStateto the Petitioner Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his nghts under 
Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
5 While engaging in the process ofjury selection, the tnal court systematically precluded from 
the jury those members of the community who were prone, thought not entirely predisposed, to impose a 
life sentence rather than a death sentence Therefore, the tnal court improperly death qualified thejury 
The jurors who sentenced the Petitioner were selected through a death qualification procedure Empirical 
evidence demonstrates that death qualified junes are less neutral and more likely to convict and impose the 
death penalty than a jury which is not composed of persons who have passed through the death 
qualification process Any jury selection process which systematically excludes from thejury services a 
specific segment of the population based solely on their views of capital punishment violates a fundamental 
pnnciple which ensures that a cnminal defendant has a nght to a tnal by an impartial jury Therefore 
for the claim to be addressed at trial is that the contradictory statement was not made at that time, nor 
during the time of the initial appeal or any previous post-conviction petition (no previous petitions have been 
filed) Specifically, Dr Goldmg indicated that the Petitioner could be determined as "situationally 
competent" In other words that Mr Lafferty could be competent in certain situations and not competent 
m other situations Upon information and belief, Dr Golding has, in State v Mitchell, case no 031901884 
involving the alleged abduction of Elizabeth Smart by Mr Mitchell, that Mr Mitchell could not be 
situationally competent and that theory was an inaccurate theory 
FACTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR PETITIONER'S CLAIM TO RELIEF 
Pursuant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(3), the Defendant points out the following facts that 
form the basis of the Petitioner's claim for relief 
I. JURY ISSUES 
1 The Utah Code provides that the penalty phase deliberations cease and jurors are to be 
discharged if jurors unanimously agree to impose the death penalty, or if they decide they are unable to 
reach this unanimous agreement, the death sentence is appropnate Thus, these statutes violated 
Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and 
his nghts under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
2 The instructions and verdict forms allowed jurors to find only that death was the 
appropnate penalty, or that they were reasonably satisfied they could not do so The verdict forms and 
instructions did not give jurors the affirmative option of indicating that one or more jurors had decided that 
Petitioner deserved a life sentence Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 
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Petitioner was prejudiced by death qualification of the jurors serving in this case Thus these statutes 
violated Petitioner s Fifth Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States 
Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
6 The court violated the Defendant s nghts to a fair tnal by denying Petitioner's Motion for 
Change of Venue Petitioner's case was, at the time of the incident perhaps the most widely covered 
criminal case in LItah County history Petitioner requested that due to that extensive publicity and the fact 
that his brother and co-defendant had been convicted in the Fourth District Court of Utah, as well as the 
Petitioner having been convicted in his first tnal that the case be moved to a venue where coverage was 
not so great and there would not be as great a chance of there being a jury pool that was if not potentially, 
but irreversibly tainted The court' s denial of that request violated the Petitioner's nght to a tnal by jury 
under Article III Section 2 of the United States Constitution as well as the Sixth Amendment of the same 
Constitution and Article I Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution 
7 Petitioner claims the tnal court committed enor in granting the State's challenge of juror 
number 220 for cause despite her clear indication that she could impose the death penalty if she felt the 
aggravating factors were sufficient This action of the court violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 
7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
8 The tnal court erred in allowing victim impact evidence in the tnal during the penalty phase 
by allowing the viewing of a video of the Brenda and Enca Lafferty' s dead bodies This is in enor because 
it improperly shifts the focus from an evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors to that of an effort to 
inflame and impassion thejury and have them decide on emotional issues as opposed to proper mitigating 
and aggravating factors Thus these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 
25 of the Utah State Constitution 
9 Petitioner claims that the trial court committed error by allowing the introduction of a 
videotape made by the Petitioner to the media in September of 1984 dunng the penalty phase to show lack 
of remorse when remorse was not raised as a mitigating factor, again in violation of Petitioner's 
Constitutional rights due to the fact that under the 1984 statutory scheme, this type of evidence would not 
have been allowed Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 
25 of the Utah State Constitution 
10 Petitioner indicates that dunng the penalty phase of mitigation, the Petitioner should have 
been allowed to request an instruction that sympathy or mercy could be used to reach its determination 
under the mitigating factors allowed Thus, the denial thereof violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 
7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
11 The Petitioner indicates that due to the nature of the case being a capital case, that the trial 
court must have a need for heightened reliability for its decisions dunng the penalty phase, due to the fact 
that a number of mitigating factors were not allowed to be presented due to the tnal court and due to the 
fact that trial counsel did not do an appropriate analysis or investigation into mitigating factors The 
heightened reliability ofthis case is not met in violation of Defendant's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 7 12 24 and 
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whole did not cure this defect This error affected the fundamental structure of the trial and of the penalty 
phase and is not subject to a harmless error analysis Thus violating Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 
7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
14 The Utah death penalty statutes unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the Petitioner 
to prove that his life should be spared in violation of Article I Section 7,11,12 and 24 of the Utah State 
Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Untied States Constitution 
15 The penalty phase instructions violated the tnal court's obligation to charge properly the 
jurors on all aspects of the capital sentencing process, limited the jury's consideration of mitigating factors 
and prevented a reliable individualized sentencing determination in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitutions and Article I Section 7,9 11,12 and 24 of 
the Utah State Constitution The penalty phase instructions informed the jury that "the sole issue to be 
determined in this proceeding is the sentence or penalty to be imposed It is improper for you to again 
debate or reconsider the question of the Defendant's guilt or innocence " The effect ofthis instruction was 
to prevent the jury from considenng any residual or lingering doubt it may have had regarding Petitioner's 
guilt, a fact which clearly would have impacted the jury's decision as to the appropriateness of the death 
penalty in this case The instruction created an unacceptable probability that the jury would consider that 
it was prohibited from considering the degree as well as the fact of the Defendant's guilt and, therefore, 
improperly restncted its consideration of mitigating circumstances and the appropnateness of the sentence 
of death 
16 Instruction number seven of the penalty phase did not adequately guide the jury in the 
25 of the Utah State Constitution 
12 The tnal court erred in failing to order the sequestration of thejury as well as tnal counsel 
being ineffective in failing to request sequestration which caused one ofthejurors to be excused The juror 
in question had gone home and indicated to his ecclesiastical ambassadors, also known as home teachers, 
that he was struggling with the case He felt that he agreed with the Petitioner's views on religion and 
Constitutional areas being discussed in the tnal, to which the home teachers responded by giving him a 
"blessing" wherein they indicated in that blessing that he was not to be deceived by the Petitioner and that 
the Petitioner was an evil man Therefore, the juror felt compelled that he should go forward and quietly 
find the Petitioner guilty and sentence him to death The indicated juror disclosed this information to the 
court and counsel and the juror was excused If thejury had been sequestered, the Petitioner would have 
had the advantage of perhaps one juror who would have voted for life without parole, thereby sparing the 
Petitioner' s life Due to tnal counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to request a sequestered jury before, but 
even more so after the incident at hand, as well as the tnal court failing to, on its own accord, require that 
the j ury be sequestered either pnor to or definitely after this incident, therefore denied Petitioner the nght 
to thejury that had been selected in violation ofPetitioner' s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 25 of the 
Utah State Constitution 
13 Thejury instruction regarding reasonable doubt, both in the guilty phase and the penalty 
phase, was worded in such a way that it left out an important factor and has been rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court The effect of the defective instructions both in the guilty phase and the penalty phase was 
the failure to convey the concept of reasonable doubt correctly to thejurors The instructions taken as a 
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definition and use of mitigating circumstances and erroneously defined the role of statutory mitigating 
circumstances in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and Article I Section 7,9,11,12 and 24 of the Utah State Constitution, as well as Utah Code 
Ann § 76-3-207 The penalty phase instructions informed thejury that mitigation may include the statutory 
circumstances listed in the statute The statute states that thejury shall include those enumerated mitigating 
circumstances The penalty phase instructions also failed to inform thejury that the mitigating circumstances 
did not have to be found unanimously as well as focusing thejury' s attention on the facts of the crime rather 
than the balance of aggravation and mitigation under all the circumstances 
17 Insufficient evidence of an aggravating circumstance was not supported by sufficient 
evidence in the Petitioner's case Dunng the sentencing hearing, the prosecution relied upon an aggravating 
factor which provided that the homicide was committed in a specially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or 
exceptionally depraved manner any of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, senous physical 
abuse, or senous bodily injury of the victim before death The aggravating circumstance cannot apply in 
the absence of a showing by the prosecution that the victim was conscious at the time of the alleged 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel acts This fact must be established by the prosecution beyond a reasonable 
doubt The prosecution must have also established that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the Defendant 
intended to cause wholly unnecessary suffenng to the victim, not merely that the Petitioner or the co-
defendant was inept of an efficient murder In this case, the State's medical examiner testified he could not 
be sure how long the victims were alive but that the victim's likely died within fifteen seconds of the throat 
wounds being inflicted No evidence whatsoever was presented that either the Petitioner or the co-
defendant intended to cause wholly unnecessary suffenng to the victim, or that the pnmary purposes of the 
attempts to kill the victims was to cause unnecessary suffering and torture the victims rather than kill them 
In fact, the evidence is to the opposite Even taking the evidence presented at trial and during sentencing 
as true, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish an intent to torture either victim The 
evidence simply established that an inefficient perpetrator or perpetrators committed the homicide ofthe 
victims Trial counsel could and should have presented expert testimony at the penalty phase that the victim 
did not suffer torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury Thus, violating Petitioner's Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under 
Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 ofthe Utah State Constitution 
18 The penalty phase instructions and verdict forms did not give the jurors the affirmative 
option of indicating that one or more jurors had decided that the Petitioner deserved a life sentence The 
instructions and verdict forms in effect directed the jury to focus on death and presume that a death 
sentence would be imposed unless one juror voted against it Furthermore, because the jury enters the 
sentencing phase already having found the existence of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable 
doubt, there is a natural disposition towards imposing the death penalty, unless and until the Petitioner was 
able to overcome the presumption of death through the introduction of mitigating circumstances or 
evidence, which is in violation ofPetitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 
the United States Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 25 ofthe Utah State 
Constitution 
19 Because the jury was not required to submit a special verdict form finding each and every 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, or to specify which non-statutory aggravating factors 
it had found, there is no way for a reviewing court to determine whether the jury was unanimous in finding 
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withholding of exculpatory evidence as to Petitioner's lack of mental health, as well as the Court' s error 
when the Petitioner has a right to have his trial heard by a particular tribunal Therefore, due to the bad faith 
ofthe State in the first case in the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information, the Court may not 
proceed to try the Defendant for the second time on the same offense 
22 Trial counsel hired ineffective, or in the alternative, failed to hire effective investigators to 
go back and interview witnesses and to discovery if any ofthe evidence had been tampered with or to 
effectively find exculpatory evidence that would have assisted the Petitioner in his case Therefore, the 
Petitioner's right to effective assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States 
Constitution as well as Article I Section 12 ofthe Utah State Constitution 
23 Trial counsel both failed to hire or provide a mitigation specialist to ascertain and develop 
mitigating circumstances to place before thejury at the penalty phase in order to persuade the jury that 
there was mitigating evidence that could give them reason to, as they had for his brother and co-defendant, 
find that he should serve life in prison without parole as opposed to enforcing the death penalty Therefore, 
the Petitioner's right to effective assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States 
Constitution as well as Article I Section 12 ofthe Utah State Constitution 
24 The only mitigating evidence that was provided to thejury at the penalty phase ofthe case 
was a short series of prison officials who indicated that the Petitioner was a relatively trouble-free inmate 
and that his write ups were of a non-violent nature, a few pictures from a year book and some photographs 
ofthe Defendant with his family Some ofthe documents that could have been, but were not introduced 
in mitigation were educational records from high school and BYU, mental health records, psychological test 
results. National Guard military records showing an honorable discharge, Utah County Jail records, Utah 
every aggravating circumstance Therefore, both the trial court and the ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
as well as appellate counsel to bring this before the Utah Supreme Court is in direct violation ofthe 
Defendant's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under the United States 
Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 ofthe Utah State Constitution 
n. INEFFECTTVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT 
20 Petitioner was originally tried in 1986 for the same crimes as in the case at bar Upon 
post-conviction appeal to the 10ih Circuit Court of Appeals, that Court vacated the sentence and conviction 
due to errors committed by the trial court Petitioner's attorney at the time had drafted an Order ofRelease 
to be signed by the United States District Court Judge That document was never filed and the Petitioner 
was never arrested on a warrant, merely transferred from the Utah State Prison down to the Utah County 
Jail without having been arrested on a warrant in violation ofhis rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments ofthe United States Constitution as well as Article I Sections 12,13,14 and 21 
ofthe Utah State Constitution That seizure has continued from the ruhng by the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals in December of 1991 to the present day 
21 Petitioner's original sentence and conviction were vacated by the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals due to errors made by the court regarding Petitioner's competency to stand trial in the first case 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals also indicated in that holding that the State was free to retry the 
Petitioner However, there are limits to retrying a Defendant found under both the Fifth Amendment ofthe 
United States Constitution and Article I Section 12 ofthe Utah State Constitution In violation of those 
Constitutional guarantees, Petitioner was retried when there was prosecutorial misconduct in the deliberate 
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Department of Correction records items from Petitioner's journal as well as witnesses and family members 
who may have, at the time, been wilhngto step forward on his behalf and discuss childhood issues, family 
background physical, verbal and emotional abuse, childhood illnesses and injuries that would give perhaps 
even one juror a reason to find the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors Thus, violating 
Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and 
his rights under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 ofthe Utah State Constitution 
25 Trial counsel was not qualified under the Utah or the ABA standards as laid out by the 
Utah Supreme Court or American Bar Association at the time ofthe trial The 1989 ABA guidelines 
required that two qualified trial attorneys should be assigned to represent a Defendant, as did the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure On information and belief, neither trial attorney was qualified under the Utah 
or ABA guidelines to handle such a case at the time Therefore, the Petitioner's right to effective assistance 
of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution as well as Article I Section 
12 ofthe Utah State Constitution 
26 Counsel failed to object to the improper closing argument ofthe prosecutor when the 
prosecutor improperly stated that the punishment for the death of a 15 month old girl should be greater than 
the punishment for the death of an adult This is an improper argument and trial counsel failed to 
contemporaneously object Therefore, Petitioner was substantively denied his due process rights because 
ofthe inability to bring that argument outside of a plain error analysis upon appeal and the Petitioner's right 
to effective assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution as well 
as Article I Section 12 ofthe Utah State Constitution 
27 Appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to bring forward to the Utah Supreme Cour 
other areas of trial court error The appellate counsel failed to appeal the court's decision to deny the 
change of venue The appellate counsel in the initial appeal should have brought this to the attention of the 
Utah Supreme Court The Supreme Court cannot address any issue that is not brought properly before 
it Appellate counsel failed to include this issue in the initial appeal violating the rights to effective assistance 
of counsel under the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment protections, as well as Article I Section 
12 of the Utah State Constitution This case, as already pointed out, had a great deal of public backlash 
when the co-defendant was not given the death penalty Therefore, it was impossible for Petitioner to 
receive a fair trial in Utah County and this issue should have been appealed Therefore, the Petitioner' s 
right to effective assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
as well as Article I Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution 
28 Appellate counsel also failed to appeal the court's decision to forbid the Defendant 
from bringing, in the penalty phase, an argument that the co-defendant only received life m prison without 
parole as opposed to the death penalty in violation of the statutory mitigating factors at the time which 
allowed any other mitigating evidence Clearly, this was mitigating evidence that although the court did not 
allow it, the penalty phase should have been appealed, but was not appealed Therefore, the Petitioner's 
right to effective assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
as well as Article I Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution 
29 Appellate counsel was also not qualified to handle a death penalty appeal under the then 
existing Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or American Bar Association guidelines for the appointment and 
performance of counsel in death penalty cases established in 1989 Therefore, the Petitioner's right to 
effective assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well 
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tnal, due process of law and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment are violated by the provisions of 
Utah's death penalty statute The statutory provisions fail to narrow those who are eligible to receive the 
death penalty and are so broadly drawn as to include most, if not all, homicides The large number of 
aggravating factors for which the death penalty could be imposed give the effect ofbroad and unlimited 
categories for allowing the imposition of the death penalty This gives prosecutors overly broad discretion 
as to when the death penalty will be sought resulting in an uneven and unequal application of the penalty 
within this state Whether or not a defendant, and in this case the Petitioner, is subject to the death penalty 
is dependent upon the situs of the homicide and the belief and practice of the local county or district 
attorney as opposed to any meaningful statutory guidelines Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under 
Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
33 The Utah death penalty scheme is also unconstitutional in that it places the State in the 
position acting criminally, in that the punishment for a capital homicide is to kill the convicted For example, 
under the statutory scheme for rape, defendants who are convicted of rape or sexual assault are not, 
themselves, raped or sexually assaulted Defendants who are convicted of theft are not stolen from Those 
who are convicted of assault are not assaulted In fact, there is no violent crime, or non-violent crime, 
where the punishment is to inflict the same crime upon a defendant if convicted Thus, these statutes 
violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
3 4 The death penalty is in violation of the a vil rights of Petitioner The death penalty has been 
abolished dejure or defacto by 106 nations, thirty countries of which have abolished it since the year 
as Article I Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution 
30 The prosecution violated the Petitioner's due process rights in that it argued at the tnal of 
the co-defendant that he was the primary instigator and actor who committed the murders, and in the 
alternative at Petitioner's tnal argued that Petitioner was in fact the murderer of at least one, if not both, of 
the victims, therefore, violating his due process nghts Thus, the State violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article 
I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
31 Post-conviction appellate counsel has been unable to meet the ABA guidelines for post-
conviction counsel as outlined in the guidelines due to the following facts (1) limits on time due to the limited 
time that counsel has had to investigate a case that is over twenty years old and has gone through two tnals 
and two appeals to the Utah Supreme Court as well as an appeal to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals The 
paper trail, although almost complete, still is missing in some small areas for a complete record (2) 
counsel, due to the limitations of funding, has been forced to make the choice between mitigation 
investigation and a pn vate investigator to interview all witnesses, law enforcement personnel, prosecution, 
staff, defense staffand jurors The limited funding available to counsel for those experts has made it a legal 
and factual impossibility to fulfill the obligation as laid out in the ABA guidelines Therefore, the Petitioner 
has again been denied his nghts under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
m . DEATH PENALTY ISSUES 
32 The statutory provisions ofUtah Code Ann §76-5-202, Utah's death penalty statute, are 
unconstitutional on their face and as applied in the case of the Petitioner The Petitioner's rights to a fair 
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1990 The only other nations outside of the United States that apply the death penalty are China, Congo, 
Iran, Nigena, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Belarus and Uzbekistan No Democratic country in the 
world but the United States practices this form of punishment, therefore it violates the democratic pnnciples 
of the both Federal and State Constitutions Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under Article I 
Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
3 5 The Utah death penalty scheme as set out is unconstitutional due to the fact that the State 
is in an unequal and unfair advantage economically to that of the Petitioner The Petitioner is indigent and 
has but limited resources to resist a death penalty prosecution, wherein the State has unlimited access to 
funds, resources, manpower, and investigatory ability Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article 
I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
3 6 The Utah death penalty scheme as instituted causes cruel and unusual punishment in that 
the Petitioner has been subjected to approximately twenty years on death row with extremely limited access 
to programs available to other inmates, health care, interaction with other inmates, and being essentially 
locked down 95% of the time in his cell If the Petitioner were not under a death penalty sentence, but 
merely life without parole, he would at least have the ability to have more internal privileges than the 
Petitioner has being confined to death row Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under Article I 
Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
37 The Utah death penalty scheme as was in effect at the time of this conviction cruel and 
unusual because it is not a deterrent for homicide crimes No evidence exists that the death penalty is an 
effective deterrent against homicide crimes In fact, for those states that do not have the death penalty as 
an option, the per capita number of homicides is lower than that in states that do have death penalty options 
for homicides Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 7,12 24 and 25 of the 
Utah State Constitution 
3 8 The death penalty scheme is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in this case because 
it creates a presumption that death is the appropnate penalty in violation of Article I Section 7,9,11,12 
and 24 of the Utah State Constitution and the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution 
39 The State of Utah has acknowledged and recently changed the death penalty statute to 
allow only lethal injections to be performed on those convicted of murder and sentenced to death 
Therefore, the State ofUtah m and of itself has shown that death by firing squad is cruel and unusual, both 
under the Federal and State Constitutions and have so ratified that in the statutory set out of the acceptable 
punishments Therefore, by the State's own action through the legislative and executive branch, have 
indicated that death by firing squad is cruel and unusual Thus these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under 
Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
40 The Supreme Court of the United States has recently found it to be unconstitutional to 
execute those on death row who are mentally retarded, finding it to be cruel and unusual punishment 
Petitioner has never had the opportunity, nor has any previous counsel raised or had the opportunity to 
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homosexual spirit beings/entities with the power to inhabit bodies of living persons including courtroom 
personnel jurors witnesses and his attorneys Petitioner at that time also indicated that he believed himself 
to be a good traveler trapped inside his spint body, since he could not remember any of the "key words" 
which would allow him to travel to other bodies Petitioner at that time also had visual hallucinations of the 
word "Moroni" written in large letters on the wall of thejail Petitioner at that time also indicated that he 
used devices known as'reflector shields' and "spintual auras' to repel abrasive powers For these reasons 
and others, a number of medical mental health experts felt that the Petitioner was at that point not 
competent 1 o stand trial However the court ruled against the Petitioner and ordered that he be ordered 
to stand tnal This was a clear violation ofPetitioner' s due process nghts under the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution as well as his nghts to due process under Article I Section 7 of the Utah 
State Constitution 
44 Petitioner was not competent to waive the conflict of tnal counsel who had also 
represented his brother and co-defendant, nor should the court have allowed tnal counsel to continue due 
to the mental health issues of the Petitioner at the time Incorporating the same facts as laid out in the 
previous secti on, the Petitioner was unable to conscientiously waive any conflict and the court was in error 
in allowing trial counsel to go forward with such a conflict Therefore, the Petitioner's nght to effective 
assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as Article 
I Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution were violated as well as the Court' s actions violated Petitioner's 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts 
under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
4 5 The tnal court erred in denying Petitioner's Motion for New Tnal by ignonng the evidence 
raise this type of issue or defense and, therefore, to apply the death penalty to the Petitioner would be a 
violation ofhis constitutional nghts as set out above and be defacto cruel and unusual Thus, these statutes 
violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
41 The death penalty, as applied to the Petitioner, is a violation of the Eighth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution in that the punishment 
is excessive in that it violates human dignity and the State has no penological justification for inflicting this 
punishment The State must have at least one of two social purposes, retribution and deterrence of capital 
crimes by perspective offenders No evidence can be shown that the execution of the Petitioner is a 
deterrence of capital crime, nor can it be shown that it is an appropnate retnbution due to the fact that the 
co-defendant who has admitted to committing both murders, is serving life without parole Therefore, 
retnbution is disproportionate and violates both State and Federal Constitutional schemes 
42 In the appellate decision of the Utah Supreme Court, the court acknowledged the presence 
ofharmless errors and engaged in harmless error analysis The cumulative effect of these numerous errors, 
however, establishes prejudice efficient to deny the Petitioner his nghts to a fair tnal and due process of 
law Thus, violating Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United 
States Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
IV. MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES 
43 Dunng the competency heanng held on March 8,1996, evidence was submitted that the 
Petitioner felt he received revelations some from God some from evil spints or beings known by or 
identified by the Petitioner as "travelers' These travelers were identified by the Petitioner as consisting of 
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that Petitioner was incompetent during the trial proceedings Dunng and after the tnal counsel indicated 
to the court that Petitioner s conduct had become marked by multiple verbal outbursts extreme agitation 
and the Petitioner had complained of a buzzi ng noise in his ears which was so loud that it made it difficult 
to hear the witnesses Petitioner requested that counsel bnng a dog into the courtroom to see if the dog 
could hear the noise because Petitioner felt the dog would be able to hear the frequency of the noise as did 
he A physician was called and testified that the Petitioner's mental condition had detenorated and 
although Petitioner may have had a factual understanding about what was happening at the tnal, he did not 
have a rational understanding and could not assist counsel dunng the tnal But in all of this and other 
evidence, the tnal court wrongfully denied Petitioner his request for a new tnal and in so doing violated the 
Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and 
his nghts under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
46 Utah's insanity defense as enumerated in 1996 violated the Defendant' s nghts under the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution 
Petitioner introduced evidence of insanity and diminished capacity dunng the tnal The tnal court used the 
1995 section of the Code to determine the standard However, the appropnate statute that the Petitioner 
should have been tried under was the statute as it read in 1984 when the cnme was committed and the tnal 
court erred by using the wrong statutory scheme Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner' s Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article 
I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution 
47 The aggravating circumstances set forth in the statute are vague and overbroad on thei 
face The aggravating circumstances are to be narrowing constructions as announced by the Utah Supreme 
Court, but they do not adequately channel the juries discretion to protect against arbitrary application of 
the death penalty in that any and all conceivable murders would fit under those statutory definitions 
Therefore, the Petitioner' s rights were violated as to his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights under the United States Constitution and hi s rights under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 25 of the 
Utah State Constitution 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Therefore, Petitioner Ronald Watson Lafferty prays this court will 
1 Allow a Wnt of Habeas Corpus to have the Petitioner brought before the Court so he 
might be discharged from his illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint, and/or relieved of his 
illegal and unconstitutional sentence of death 
2 Conduct a hearing at which proof may be offered in support of the allegations contained 
in this Petition 
3 Grant Petitioner, who is indigent, sufficient funds to secure an investigator to continue 
investigating the facts alleged above 
4 Grant Petitioner, who is indigent, sufficient funds to secure any other expert assistance 
necessary to prove the facts alleged m this Petition 
5 Grant such other and further relief as the court deems appropriate 
6 Grant the required relief to amend this Petition should discovery of additional facts lead to 
additional claims 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of October, 2004 
CRAMER & CRAMER, L.L.C. 
ric Cramer 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
Grant W P Morrison 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 29th day of October, 2004,1 served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Petitioner's Second Amended Wnt of Habeas Corpus upon the following parties via U S 
mail 
Chnstopher Ballard 
Thomas Brunker 
Attorney General's Office 
P O Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Ronald Lafferty 
Inmate #17286 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P O Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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Anc Cramer (#5460) 
CRAMER & CRAMER, L.L.C 
Smith Hyatt Building 
845 South Main Street Suite 23 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone (801) 299-9999 
Facsimile (801) 298-5161 
Grant W P Mornson (#3666) 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 359-7999 
Facsimile (801) 359-1774 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY, 
Petitioner, 
v 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent 
PETITIONER'S SECOND AMENDED 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PART 2 
Case No 020404472 
The Honorable Anthony W Schofield 
Petitioner demands that counsel attach this document to the Second Amended Wnt of Habeas 
Corpus 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY, 
Defendant/ Appellant, 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ITS 
AGENCIES, CORPORATIONS, 
AND APPENDAGES ET AL , 
INCLUDING THE MORMON 
CHURCH, ALIAS- THE CHURCH 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, THE CORPORATION OF 
THE FIRST PRESIDENCY, THE 
CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDING BISHOPRIC, ETC 
Case No Q^OjO^T? 2 -
Petition For Habeas Relief 
And Redress (Habeas Corpus) 
Plaintiff/ Appellee 
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, FROM BOGUS CONVICTIONS OF CAPITAL HOMICIDE AND 
THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY BASED ONLY UPON THE 
UNFOUNDED LIES AND THE CONJECTURE OF THE STATE AND ITS COERCED 
AND TAMPERED WITH WITNESSES AND MANUFACTURED PHYSICAL 
EVIDENCE, BEFORE JUDGE STEVEN L HANSEN 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
CflARLENE BARLOW 
160 East 300 South, 6* Floor 
P O Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RONALD LAFFERTY 
P O Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Counsel for Appellee Attorney Pro Se 
Petition for relief and redress due to the fact that petitioner's sentence and convictions have been 
vacated! 
Facts of the Case 
1 Petitioner was wrongfully charged and convicted on two counts of capital 
homicide, two counts of aggravated burglary, and two counts of conspiring to 
commit capital homicide 
2 Evidence was planted at the trial proceedings by the office of the prosecution 
which they themselves did either purchase, find, manufacture, or otherwise obtain 
for the conviction of the petitioner 
3 All remedies were exhausted on appeal in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
4 On or about December 9, 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th 
Circuit vacated both the sentence and conviction of petitioner 
No 90-4010 10th Cir 
5 The state of Utah petitioned the U S Supreme Court for a rehearing An order 
was filed on January 3, 1992 denying Utah's petition for a rehearing 
6 On or about May 20, 1992, The U S Supreme Court a2am upheld the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeal's decision to vacate and denied petition for wnt of 
certiorari by Gerald Cook, Warden of the Utah State Prison 
7 Notification of denial (decision) was received by the office of Aldnch, Nelson, 
Weight and Esphn, 43 East 200 North, P O Box "L", Provo Utah 84603-0200 
on Friday, May 29 1991 
8 Petitioner has contacted said office by telephone requesting advise from Mr 
Michael D Esphn and requesting his release from custody, also informing him that 
the state had seventy-two hours in which to recharge him, which time has already 
passed1 
9 Petitioner has not been released from custody but was, in spite of orders from a 
higher court, simply transferred without proper authorization by U S P 
Transportation officers Jones and Zadunavich to the Utah County Jail on July 8, 
1992 
10 Petitioner has yet to be arrested or re-charged, or properly arraigned' 
11 On or about Sept 17, 1992, officer/deputy Lisa Schunng at the Utah County Jail, 
made a copy of an order to release petitioner and delivered it to the desk of Lt 
John Carlson of the Utah County Jail, as per his (Lt Carlson's) request 
(Response to request Grievance form #5405 ) When confronted by petitioner, Lt 
Carlson stated that he "could not find" the order on his desk Deputy Schunng 
also offered to look in petitioner's file and make him a copy of his current charges 
She later reported to petitioner that there were no charges to be found anywhere 
She seemed a bit dismayed by it all and felt that she had been "set up" by someone 
12 Petitioner remains in custody is spite of his requests, grievances, and please, and 
this last bogus, after-the-fact, double jeopardy, retrial by reversible error only 
compounds the problem1 As a result of his unlawful, illegal, and unconstitutional 
detainment, petitioner request the following 
Relief and Redress Requested 
1 My immediate release from custody as per order by Mr J Thomas Greene, United 
States District Judge (Copy enclosed ) 
2 Monetary relief and redress in the amount of $35 000 000 00 (thirty-five million 
dollars) plus expenses in punitive damages for approximately twenty years 
wrongful incarceration, loss of property loss of family, defamation of character, 
lost wages, violation of separation of powers (Church and State), refusal of 
rightful mail services, (including the use of a pen to submit and mail legal 
documents) double jeopardy, denial of speedy trial etc, etc, etc 
Terms of Payment 
$5,000,000 00 (five million dollars) in cash, tax free, upon release, payments on balance to 
be negotiated 
i K ^ i ^ X 
Signed (Ron Lafferty) 
Copies Sent To 
Aldnch, Nelson, Weight & Esphn 
43 East 200 North 
P O Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603 
United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit 
C404US Courthouse 
Denver, Colorado 50294 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capital Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
The Church of Jesus Chnst of Latter-day Saints (The Mormons) 
50 East North Temple 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
Attached Documents -
Grievance form 5405 (Utah County Jail) 
Amendments to "Facts of the case" in petition for habeas relief and redress 
2B Witnesses were tampered with by way of a plea bargin in which they were 
coerced by the prosecution to perjure themselves in exchange for a deal Total 
abuse of the judicial process. 
8B The only advise given petitioner by Mr Esphn, was not to file a 120 day 
disposition which he, (petitioner), was already in the process of filing He later 
added to that advise bv saying, "hold still while the state screws >ou [again] " Just 
another chick with a little dick' Michelle Esphn aka "Boy" Esphn' 
Copy of portions of 10* circuit court of appeals decision with notations made by 
Mr Lafferty 
Notations on last page Sentence and conviction vacated. Vacate - to annul, to set aside 
to cancel or rescrd To render an act void, as the vacate an entry of record, or a 
judgement As applied to a judgement or decree it is not synonymous with "suspend" 
which means to stay enforcement of judgement or decree 
Black's Law dictionary - sixth edition pg 1548, copynght © 1990 by West Publishing 
Co 610 Opperman Drive, P O Box 64526 St Paul, MN 55164-0526 
Copy of 10th Circuit decision denying reheanng 1/3/91 
Copy of U S Distnct Court for Utah Order to release petitioner from custody 
Copy of 120-Day Disposition and Inmate Money Transfer 
Copy of Request for Disposition of Pending Charges 
Copy of portions of Justice Zimmerman's opinion in the Utah Supreme Court decision 
from 1988 
Copy of receipt of payment to Utah State Pnson business Office 
Copy of two newspaper clippings and notation A "retrial" is ipso facto double jeopardy 
by it's own name, and who's fault it was should give great leverage to whose fault it 
wasn't, aside from the numerous other constitutional violations, blatant and inexcusable' 
Article VI (2), Amendment V, U S Constitution, Article I § 3 Utah Constitution 16* 
American Junsprudence #256 (16 256) Volume 16 Section 256 
Copy (2) of two newspaper clippings with minor notations 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
GERALD COOK, Warden of the Utah State 
Prison, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
No. 90 -4010 
ORDER 
F i l e d : J a n u a r y 3 , 19.91 
B e f o r e V.cKVY, Ch ie f J u d g e , KOtA/MAY, LOG?.H, SEYKOUR, HOOPTc, 
ANDERSOM, TACHA, EALDOCK, BRORBY and EBEL, C i r c u i t J u d g e s . 
The c o u r t h a s f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g 
a n d s u g g e s t - . . e n f o r rohcar i .K: en botr.c f:.l-id b \ t h e respond-*:-. t . 
G e r a l d CooJc, Warden of t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n . 
Upon c o n s i d e r a t i o n -whereof, t h e p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g i s 
d e n i e d by t h e p a n e l t h ^ t rt:nd<»rcd t h e d e c i s i o n . J u d g e B r o r b y 
v o t e d t o g r a n t r e h e a r i n g . 
P u r s u a n t t o Ru le 3 5 ( b ) , F e d e r a l R u l e s of A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e , 
t h e s u g g e s t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g en b a n c was t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e 
members o f t h e p a n e l and t o a l l j u d g e s of t h e c o u r t who a r e i n 
r e g u l a r a c t i v e s e r v i c e . A p o l l was t a k e n and t h e c o u r t was e v e n l y 
d i v i d e d on t h e g u e s t i o n of r e h e a r i n g en b a n c . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e 
s u g g e s t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g en banc i s d e n i e d . See Fed . R. App. P . 
3 5 ( a ) . C i r c u i t J u d g e s Moore, Ande r son , Tacha , B a l d o c k , and B r o r b y 
v o t e d t o g r a n t r e h e a r i n g en b a n c . 
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MATERIAL, UNDISPUTED FACTS1 
1 Petitioner was an active member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the 
LDS Church) and the product of a strictly religious family State v Lafferty, 2001 UT 19 f3, 20 
P 3d 342, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001) 
2 Shortly after returning from his LDS mission, petitioner married Diana Sayer They had 
six children Id 
3 Those who knew petitioner prior to 1982 described him as a strong family man 
Petitioner wis also a prominent member of his community, serving for a time on the city council in 
Highland, Utah Id 
4 Between 1982 and 1983, petitioner spent increasingly large amounts of time with his 
brother Dan Lafferty Dan had been m constant trouble for failing to pay taxes and disobeying the 
licensing regulations that governed his chiropractic practice Id at ^4 
5 Petitioner began to meet regularly with Dan, as well as with his brothers Tim, Mark, and 
Watson, to discuss politics and religion Petitioner became increasingly converted to Dan's 
philosophies on government intervention Those who knew petitioner well remarked that he seemed 
to have changed drastically in both his beliefs and his personality Petitioner strayed further and 
further from mainstream society Id at ^4 -5 
6 In 1983, the LDS Church excommunicated petitioner for violating the law, refusing to 
support his children, failing to sustain the church leaders, and teaching and advocating doctrine 
contrary to the LDS church's Id at \5 and n 2 
7 The following year, petitioner's wife Diana filed for and obtained a divorce and moved 
with their six children to Florida Id at \6 
8 Defendant felt his excommunication was unjust and was distraught over the dissolution of 
his marriage Id 
9 Petitioner and his brothers met Robert Crossfield when they opened their religious and 
political discussions to others According to Mr Crossfield, God instructed him to teach the Lafferty 
brothers how to receive revelation and to organize themselves into the "School of the Prophets " 
The brothers claimed that they began to receive communications from God and would meet as a 
group to discuss these "revelations " Id at ^ |7 
10 Allen, the youngest Lafferty brother, and the husband and father to the murder victims, 
had no direct involvement with the School of the Prophets Dan testified, "I don't think Allen 
necessarily showed an interest He wasn't called We were all called by revelation, and he wasn't 
called " Id at f7 n 3 
11 Petitioner told his brothers that he had received a revelation that his ex-wife Diana had 
been the wife of the devil in a previous world Petitioner believed their union angered the devil 
According to petitioner, the devil's jealousy led him to cause petitioner trouble in this world Id at 
18 
For purposes of this motion only, the State does not dispute the facts recited in this section 
and the individual argument sections However, the State does not concede the ultimate veracity of 
all the facts recited 
12 In the spring of 1984, petitioner claimed to have received the "removal revelation " 
\ccording to petitioner, God ordered the "removal" of Allen's wife, Brenda, their fifteen-month-old 
laughter, Erica, Richard Stowe, and Chloe Low Id 
13 Prior to receiving the "removal revelation," petitioner had expressed negative feelings 
ibout the four named persons to family members and friends Petitioner believed that all four in 
ome way either had helped his wife obtain a divorce or played a part in his excommunication from 
he LDS Church Id at ^9 
14 Petitioner thought that Brenda had encouraged Diana to divorce him On several 
tccasions before the removal revelation, petitioner called Brenda a "bitch " Petitioner told Allen 
hat Brenda "had better stop talking to Diana," that "people weren't safe in meddling in his affairs 
inymore," and that "he felt justified in taking action of some sort against people who crossed him " 
d and n 5 
15 After the removal revelation, petitioner explained that fifteen-month-old Erica needed to 
>e removed because "she would grow up to be a bitch just like her mother" Id 
16 Chloe Low, Diana's friend, helped and encouraged Diana to leave petitioner Id 
17 Richard Stowe, petitioner's and Diana's ecclesiastical leader, served on the church 
ouncil that excommunicated petitioner He also counseled Diana during the divorce proceedings 
jid helped her obtain financial aid from the LDS Church Id 
18 Petitioner claimed to have received another revelation on 13 March 1984 commanding 
hat he and the School of the Prophets "consecrate" an "instrument" for removing the four named 
lersons Only Dan and Watson agreed The others involved with the School of the Prophets felt 
hat this and the removal revelation were not of God and disassociated themselves from the 
3 
Brenda screaming, "Don't hurt my baby Please don't hurt my baby " He could also hear the baby 
rying, "Mommy, mommy, mommy " The apartment then became quiet Id 
26 A few minutes later, petitioner and Dan exited from the rear of the apartment and 
eturned to the car, their clothes covered in blood Id 
27 The men next drove to the Low home On the way, petitioner commented that Chloe 
^ow's small size would make her an easy target Id at ^14 
28 When they reached the Low home and determined that no one was there, the men broke 
nto the home and took numerous items As they left, petitioner began talking about going on to 
lichard Stowe's home Id 
29 The men accidentally missed the turnoff to the Stowe home Petitioner and Dan decided 
o abandon trying to fulfill the rest of the revelation They stopped at a service station and then 
leaded toward Wendover Id a t f l5 
30 Mr Carnes testified that, on the way, petitioner pulled a knife out of his boot, started to 
)ang it on his knee, and said, "I killed her I killed her I killed the bitch I can't believe I killed 
ler " He then handed the knife to Dan, and said, "Thank you, Brother, for doing the baby because I 
lon't think I had it in me " Dan replied, "It was no problem " Id at ^15 
31 In Wendover, the four men rented a small kitchenette apartment where they cleaned up, 
ite, and spent the night The next night, Mr Knapp and Mr Carnes, afraid of what the Lafferty 
>rothers said that they had done, quietly left the apartment and drove away in the car While 
raveling along Interstate 80, they found the knife in the car They rolled the knife in a towel and 
hrew it out the window Later in Twin Falls, Idaho, they disposed of a bag of bloody clothing and 
revelations The School of the Prophets disbanded as a result of the disagreement Petitioner and 
Dan continued m their belief that the revelations needed to be fulfilled Id at \\Q 
19 On the morning of 24 July 1984, petitioner, Dan, and their friends Charles Carnes and 
Ricky Knapp planned to go to Salt Lake City for the day Before leaving, petitioner told the group 
that he felt impressed that they should go to his brother Mark's house to pick up a rifle Id at \\1 
20 Mark asked what they planned to do with the gun because petitioner had quit hunting 
years earlier Petitioner replied that he was going hunting for "[a]ny fucking thing that gets in my 
way " Id 
21 From Mark's home, the men headed to Allen's apartment, apparently to look for another 
rifle On the way, petitioner and Dan began discussing whether they should fulfill the "removal 
revelation" that day Id 
22 At Allen's apartment, petitioner left the car and knocked on the door When no one 
answered, petitioner returned to the car and drove away, heading toward Salt Lake City Id at % 12 
23 Before they had traveled far, Dan said that he felt impressed to turn around and return to 
Allen's apartment When they arrived, Dan went to the door and knocked This time, Brenda 
Lafferty answered the door Id 
24 Dan pushed past Brenda into the apartment and remained inside alone with Brenda for a 
few minutes The men in the car heard the two fighting inside the apartment Petitioner left the car 
and entered the apartment Id at ^ [13 
25 Mr Carnes testified that, once petitioner entered the apartment, he could hear petitioner 
calling Brenda a ' bitch" and a "liar," and that he could hear Brenda being beaten Mr Cames heard 
4 
other personal effects belonging to petitioner and Dan They then proceeded to Mr Cames' brother's 
house in Cheyenne, Wyoming, where they were arrested on 30 July 1984 Id at ^ [16 
32 On 17 August 1984 FBI agents arrested petitioner and Dan in Reno, Nevada Id 
33 When Allen Lafferty arrived home from work on the evening of 24 July 1984 he found 
his wife and fifteen month-old daughter dead Id at ^17 
34 Brenda was m the kitchen lying in a pool of blood She had suffered a severe beating 
and had contusions and bruises on her face, head, shoulders, arms, thigh, knees, and back Evidence 
established that a vacuum cord had been tightly and repeatedly wrapped around her neck A six-
inch long incision had sliced through her trachea, both jugular veins, and both carotid arteries and 
left a cut on her spinal column Blood was smeared on the walls, drapes, door, and light switches 
There was evidence throughout the apartment of a major struggle Id 
35 Fifteen month-old Erica lay in a puddle of her own blood and propped against the back 
of her crib with her head slumped over Erica's throat was cut from ear to ear The incision sliced 
through both her carotid arteries, both jugular veins, and her esophagus and cut her cervical spinal 
column Only bone and a little tissue attached her head to her body Id at ^18 
36 Both Brenda and Erica were alive when their throats were slit Id 
37 The State charged petitioner with capital murder and related crimes A jury convicted 
him and sentenced him to death on the capital murder charges The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
State v Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239 (Utah 1988) 
38 Petitioner, did not seek collateral relief lnthe Statecouxts^mstead, he proceeded directly 
to federal collateral review The United States District for the District of Utah denied relief 
Cook, 949 F 2d 1546 (10th Cir 1991) The Tenth Circuit ordered petitioner's convictions and 
sentences vacated, however, it elaborated that "[t]he state is of course free to retry Lafferty " Id at 
1557 
39 The State chose to retry petitioner A second jury convicted petitioner and sentenced 
him to death The Utah Supreme Court again affirmed,-^ate-vUL4#ec^^ 
The UintedJStatejJsupreme Court denied review^ggfezj»x^jto^534IJ^ljl 8 (2001) 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Several of petitioner's claims repeat claims that he raised and lost on direct appeal 
Petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing these previously litigated claims See UTAH CODE 
ANN §78-35a-106(l)(b) (West 2004) ("A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon 
any ground that was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal") Therefore, the State is entitled to 
summary judgment on these claims See id, Utah R Civ P 56(c) ("the judgment sought shall be 
rendered if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law") 
In some instances, petitioner raises claims that he could have, but did not raise at tnal or on 
direct appeal The State is also entitled to summary judgment on these substantive claims because 
petitioner is likewise procedurally barred from pursuing them See UTAH CODE ANN § 78 35a-
106(l)(c) ("A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that could have 
been but was not raised at trial or on appeal") (West 2004)/ The Court may grant relief only if 
7 
828 (1995) The Court must grant summary judgment on previously litigated claims without 
addressing their merits Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96, \ 6 
Petitioner claims that 1) Utah law unconstitutionally shifted the burden to him at the penalty 
phase because the State has already proven at least one aggravator by the time the penalty phase 
begins (claims 4, 14, and 18(partial)), 2) the Court erroneously removed juror 220 for cause (claim 
7), 3) the Court erroneously admitted at the penalty phase a videotape of the crime scene showing 
the victims' bodies (claim 8), 4) the Court erroneously admitted a videotape of petitioner's media 
interview (claim 9), 5) the Court erroneously denied petitioner's request for a penalty-phase 
sympathy instruction (claim 10), 6) petitioner's retrial violated double jeopardy (claim 21), 7) the 
large numbei of aggravators gives prosecutors unlimited discretion in choosing whether to charge 
capital murder (claim 32 partial), 9) the Court erroneously found petitioner competent to stand trial 
(claim 43), and 10) the Court erroneously denied petitioner's motion for a new trial (claim 45) 
These claims repeat claims that petitioner raised and lost on direct appeal See State v Lafferty, 20 
P 3d 342, 2001 UT 19, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001)2 
Petitioner also claims that Utah's death penalty statutes unconstitutionally create a 
presumption of death (claim 38) Petitioner provides no specifics To the extent petitioner claims 
that the presumption arises because the penalty phase begins with at least one aggravating 
2
 In addition, petitioner supports his claim concerning juror 220 by distorting the record to 
the point of misrepresentation Petitioner contends that juror 220 gave the Court a "clear indication 
that she could impose the death penalty if she felt the aggravating factors were sufficient" Juror 220 
answered "yes" to that question in her pre-voir dire questionnaire During voir dire, however, juror 
220 stated that she could only impose the death penalty if petitioner had killed someone in her own 
family Id at ^ 5 8 - 6 4 He did not Consequently, juror 220 unequivocally denounced her ability to 
petitioner can demonstrate that his tnal and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to raise 
those claims UTAH CODE ANN 78-35a-106(l)(c) and (2) (West 2004) 
As to the remaining claims, Utah R Civ P 65C(c)(3) requires petitioner to plead "all of the 
facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim[s] to relief" As detailed in the argument sections 
below, petitioner supports none of these claims with facts that, if proven and believed, would be 
sufficient to entitle him to post-conviction relief Therefore, the Court should dismiss these claims 
for failure to state a claim for relief UtahR Civ P 12(b)(6) 
Also as detailed below, the record and controlling law demonstrate that some of petitioner's 
claims fail as a matter of law As to those claims, the Court must grant summary judgment See 
Utah R Civ P 56(c), Utah R Civ P 12(b) (when a party files a 12(b)(6) motion and relies on 
matters outside the pleadings, the Court may treat the motion as one for summary judgment) 
I. THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS 
PETITIONER ALREADY RAISED AND LOST ON DIRECT APPEAL (claims 
4,7-10,14,18(partial), 21,23,32(partial), 38,41,43,45) 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") bars collateral relief on claims that petitioner 
pursued, but lost on direct appeal UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a-106(l)(b) (West 2004) Attempts to 
rehtigate previously failed claims abuse the post-conviction process See e g Carter v Galetka, 
2001 UT 96 ffl[6-9, 4 4 P 3d 626 (affirming the dismissal of sixteen claims, some with multiple 
subclaims, under the "abuse of the writ" procedural bar because they had been previously addressed 
on direct appeal) Petitioner also may not rehtigate claims lost on direct appeal merely by relabeling 
them ineffective assistance of counsel claims See Gaidner v Holden, 888 P 2d 608, 615-16 (Utah) 
(petitioner cannot avoid the procedural bar to a previously litigated substantive claim by recasting it 
in post-conviction proceedings as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim), cert denied, 516 U S 
8 
circumstance already proven, this claim also repeats a claim that petitioner raised and lost on direct 
appeal Id 
Petitioner challenges his death sentence on the basis that his brother and co-defendant 
received a life sentence even though he committed the murders (claim 41) Although petitioner uses 
different labels for this claim than those used on direct appeal, the Utah Supreme Court already 
resolved its substance against him On direct appeal, petitioner contended that his sentence was 
unconstitutionally disproportionate to his brother's sentence and to his level of culpability based on 
the same factual allegations The Utah Supreme Court rejected that argument Id at ^ 116-17, 122-
23 Because the supreme court has resolved the claim's substance against petitioner, he may not 
rehtigate the claims in this proceeding 
Petitioner also alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to hire a mitigation 
specialist (claim 23) He alleges no specific facts about how the failure affected him other than to 
point out that his brother Dan received a life sentence To the extent petitioner repeats his direct 
appeal claim that he should have received the same sentence his brother received, he already lost the 
claim on direct appeal Id 
II. THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS 
THAT PETITIONER COULD HAVE, BUT DID NOT RAISE ON DIRECT 
APPEAL (claims 1-3, 5-6, ll(partial), 12(partial), 13,15-17,18(partial) 19, 
20(partial), 30,32(partial), 33-35,37-38,42, 46-47) 
The PCRA also bars collateral relief based on claims that petitioner could have, but did not 
raise on direct appeal See UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a-l 06(1 )(c) (West 2004) The claims identified 
in the heading all depend on facts available to petitioner during his direct appeal Petitioner could 
lave, but did not raise them on direct appeal Therefore, the Court may not grant relief on them and 
.hould grant summary judgment m the State's favor3 
II. THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT "NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE" 
JUSTIFIES POST-CONVICTION RELIEF4 
Petitioner contends that he has learned of new evidence related to Stephen Goldmg, Ph D , 
hat justifies post-conviction relief Dr Goldmg was one of four evaluators who found petitioner 
ompetent to stand trial State v Lafferty, 2001 UT 19 ff23-26, 20 P 3d 342, cert denied, 534 U S 
018 (2001) According to petitioner, Dr Goldmg "indicated that the Petitioner could be determined 
s 'situationally competent'" Petitioner asserts on "information and belief that Dr Goldmg 
ecently testified in an unrelated case that the defendant in that case "could not be situationally 
ompetent and that theory was inaccurate " Amended Petition at 5-6 
The PCRA prohibits post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence when the 
lew evidence is "mere[] impeachment evidence" evidence UTAH CODE ANN § 78 35a-104(e)(in) 
West 2004) Petitioner appears to allege that Dr Goldmg recently offered testimony in an unrelated 
ase that contradicts the testimony he offered in petitioner's case At most, petitioner's newly 
3
 On these claims, petitioner may obtain post-conviction relief only if he can demonstrate 
neffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise them at trial or on direct appeal UTAH CODE 
>LNN §78-35a 106(21 (West 20041 As to most of the claims, petitioner has not alle^d that r.oi)ny».l 
kias-meffbctrvertet-aione pled all the facts necessary to support such a claim The State separately 
ddresses those as to which petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective 
4
 Petitioner has not numbered the claim It appears on pages five and six of his amended 
etition 
11 
Petitioner would have had the advantage of perhaps one juror who would have voted for life without 
)arole, thereby sparing the petitioner's life " Second Am Pet at 10 
To prevail on a claim that trial counsel's performance denied petitioner his Sixth Amendment 
ight to the effective assistance of counsel, petitioner must prove two elements First, petitioner must 
stabhsh constitutionally deficient performance He must prove that specific acts or omissions fell 
>elow an objective standard of reasonableness Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668,687 88,690 
1984), Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert denied, 513 U S 966 (1994) He must 
>vercome a strong presumption that trial counsel rendered constitutionally adequate assistance 
Strickland v Washington, 466 U S at 690, State v Taylor, 947 P 2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997), cert 
iemed, 525 U S 833 (1998), Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d at 522 
Second, petitioner must prove prejudice Petitioner must prove that any constitutionally 
leficient performance undermines confidence in the outcome of his trial Strickland v Washington, 
6^6 U S at 695, Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d at 522 
Petitioner must prove the claimed ineffective assistance to a "demonstrable reality", he 
annot rely on mere speculation or mere repetition of the legal standard Parsons v Barnes, 871 
> 2d at 526, Fernandez v Cook, 870 P 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) 
Petitioner only had the right to trial by an impartial jury U S Const Amend 6, Utah Const 
S.rt I, § 7, State v Wach, 2001 UT 35 \16, 24 P 3d 948, State v Baker, 935 P 2d 503, 509 (Utah 
997) Cf State v Menzies, 889 P 2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) ("so long as the jury that sits is 
mpartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does 
lot mean the [Constitution] was violated") (quoting Ross v Oklahoma, 487 U S 81, 88 (1988), cert 
discovered evidence in "mere[] impeachment" The claim fails as a matter of law, and the Court 
should grant summary judgment in the State's favor5 
IV. PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HIS COUNSEL HAD A CONSTITUTIONAL 
DUTY TO MOVE TO SEQUESTER THE JURY FAILS AS A MATTER OF 
LAW (claim 12) 
Petitioner complains that his counsel should have moved to sequester the jury For factual 
support, he alleges that, dunng the tnal, a juror expressed to religious teachers that he agreed with 
petitioner's religious and constitutional views The leaders gave the juror a blessing, instructing the 
juror that petitioner was evil and admonishing the juror not to be deceived by petitioner According 
to petitioner, the juror felt compelled to find petitioner guilty and sentence him to death 
Petitioner admits that the juror disclosed this episode and that the tnal court excused the 
juror Nevertheless, petitioner contends that he had a constitutional right to counsel who would have 
moved to sequester the jury According to petitioner, "[i]f the jury had been sequestered, the 
5
 Petitioner's vague and unsupported allegations make it impossible to determine whether the 
recent testimony actually contradicted the testimony offered in petitioner's case Petitioner has not 
attached the testimony from the unrelated case Dr Goldmg may have testified only that the 
"situational competency" theory did not fit the facts of that case, and not that it was an invalid theory 
in all circumstances 
In addition, the State, by focusing on the "mere[] impeachment" element of a newly 
discovered evidence claim, does not concede that petitioner's allegations satisfy the other elements 
For example, the Court may grant post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence only 
when the new evidence, "viewed with all the other evidence, demonstrates that no reasonable 
trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received " 
UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a-104(e)(iv) (West 2004) Because petitioner has not included the 
testimony, it is impossible to determine whether the new evidence would have so undermined Dr 
Golding's testimony that a reasonable fact-finder would have rejected his conclusions as well as 
those of the other three mental health evaluators who found petitioner competent 
12 
resulted in trial by a biased jury He alleges only that failing to sequester the jury resulted in the loss 
of a juror he considered sympathetic to him Counsel's failure to move to sequester the jury 
deprived petitioner of no right, therefore, the claim fails as a matter of law See Strickland v 
Washington, 466 U S at 695 (petitioner is not entitled to the luck of a lawless sentencer or to 
consideration of individual juror idiosyncrasies)6 
V. PETITIONER'S SUGGESTION OF AN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
CLAIM FOR FAILING TO FILE A RELEASE ORDER IN FEDERAL 
COURT IS FRIVOLOUS (claim 20) 
In claim 20, petitioner alleges that his federal habeas corpus counsel prepared a release order, 
but never filed it with the federal court To the extent petitioner intends this allegation to be a claim 
that the failure to file the order violated his constitutional rights, the claim is frivolous 
First, petitioner had a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel during the 
criminal proceedings U S Const Amend VI, Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668,687-88,690 
(1984) Petitioner cites to no authonty, and State's counsel is aware of none, demonstrating that he 
had the right to the effective assistance of federal habeas corpus counsel Cf e g Coleman v 
6
 Alternatively, petitioner fails to state a claim for relief To the contrary, petitioner asks the 
Court to assess counsel's conduct with the benefit of hindsight Strickland forbids such an 
assessment Strickland v Washington, 466 U S at 689 (the Court must evaluate counsel's conduct 
from counsel s perspective at the time, making every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight) Petitioner identifies no facts demonstrating that counsel should have moved for jury 
sequestration before the incident on which he relies to support this claim He complains only that 
the failure to request sequestration resulted in losing a juror he considers favorable Unless 
petitioner can identify facts demonstrating that counsel had a constitutional obligation to ask for 
sequestration before the incident about which he complains, he cannot demonstrate deficient 
performance 
Similarly, petitioner has not established prejudice His failure to identify facts and law 
Qiinnnrtino nirv cpnupctrntinn nlcr\ failc tn r\m\7iAf> a kaeie for ^/-.n/^lii/linn tViot <•»- ol /*« «o^1 r.^ \A l,„» „ 
Thompson, 501 U S 722, 755 (1991) (Coleman could not excuse his procedural default based on 
state post-conviction counsel's "ineffectiveness" for because Coleman had no Sixth Amendment 
right to post conviction counsel) 
Second, it would have been inappropriate for federal habeas corpus counsel to file the release 
order The Tenth Circuit plainly held that the State was "free to retry" petitioner Lafferty v Cook, 
949 F 2d 1546, 1557 (10th Cir 1991) When the State chose that option, petitioner was not entitled 
to be released 
The claim is frivolous and the Court should grant summary judgment m the State's favor 
VI. PETITIONER FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM BASED ON COUNSEL'S 
FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE OR UNSPECIFIED EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE TAMPERING 
(claim 22) 
Petitioner contends that his counsel inadequately investigated exculpatory evidence or the 
possibility of evidence tampering However, petitioner has not identified any facts known to 
counsel, or that counsel had a constitutional duty to discover, that would have triggered a 
constitutional duty to investigate exculpatory evidence or the possibility of evidence tampering 
Petitioner also has not identified what evidence his counsel would have found, let alone that they 
would have found evidence so significant that it would have made a more favorable outcome 
reasonably likely 
Petitioner fails to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief, and the Court should 
dismiss the claim 
VII. PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION AND 
PRESENTATION OF MITIGATING EVIDENCE AT THE PENALTY PHASE 
FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW (claim 24) 
Petitioner claims that his counsel failed to introduce relevant mitigation evidence at the 
penalty phase of his trial He specifically alleges that the only mitigating evidence his trial counsel 
presented at the penalty phase "was a short series of pnson officials who indicated that the Petitioner 
was a relatively trouble-free inmate and that his write ups were of a non-violent nature, a few 
pictures from a year book and some photographs of the Defendant with his family " Second Am 
Pet at 15 16 Petitioner contends that his counsel should have introduced additional mitigation 
evidence from various sources and attaches a "Social History" report detailing that evidence 7 
Although petitioner correctly lists the evidence that his counsel introduced at the penalty 
phase, that evidence was not the full extent of the mitigation case that his counsel presented As 
demonstrated in the following statement of additional undisputed facts, most of the evidence that 
petitioner's trial counsel relied on at the penalty phase was presented during the guilt phase, and re-
argued to the jury at penalty phase In fact, all of the additional mitigation evidence that petitioner 
now alleges that his trial counsel should have introduced, with the exception of petitioner's 
insignificant National Guard records, was introduced and argued to the jury over the course of 
7
 Petitioner's claim 11 alleges that his counsel failed to adequately investigate unspecified 
mitigating evidence To the extent claim 11 repeats the same challenges alleged in this claim, that 
portion of claim 11 fails for the reasons explained below 
If petitioner's allegation in claim 11 is broader than the allegation in this claim, then the 
Court should dismiss that broader portion of claim 11 for failure to state a claim Petitioner alleges 
no additional facts that, if proven, would demonstrate that trial counsel ineffectively presented 
mitigation evidence 
16 
petitioner's trial Therefore, petitioner fails to demonstrate that his counsel overlooked any relevant 
mitigation evidence 
A Additional Material, Undisputed Facts 
1 Petitioner now argues that his trial counsel should have introduced evidence of his 
[a)] educational records from high school and BYU, 
[b)] mental health records [and] psychological test results, 
[c)] National Guard military records showing an honorable discharge, 
[d)] Utah County Jail records, 
[e)] Utah Department of Corrections records, 
[f)] items from Petitioner's journal, 
[g)] as well as witnesses and family members who may have, at the time, been 
willing to step forward on his behalf and discuss 
[i)] childhood issues, 
[H)] family background, 
[in)] physical, verbal and emotional abuse, [and] 
[iv)] childhood illnesses and injuries 
Second Am Pet at 15-16 
2 Petitioner provides a "Social History" prepared by his currently retained mitigation 
specialist, detailing the following facts that he alleges his trial counsel should have presented 
Childhood Issues & Family Background 
3 Petitioner was born 4 November 1941 to Watson and Claudine Jones Lafferty Petitioner 
was the eldest of eight children, his siblings, listed in order by age, were Dan, Mark, Tim, Watson, 
Jr , Allen, Colleen and Kathleen Social History at 1, 3 
4 Petitioner claimed that "Mark was dad[']s favorite child Either myself out of petty 
jealousy alone would be his least favorite or my youngest sister, Kathleen " Social History at 1 
5 Watson had a barber shop in Salt Lake City, but later became a chiropractor He died 10 
September 1983 due to untreated diabetes His wife Claudine called an ambulance when Watson 
lapsed into a coma, even though Watson "left strict orders that under no circumstance should he be 
taken to the hospital " Social History at 1-2 
6 "Watson was described as controlling of family members and firmly rooted in the LDS 
faith " He was also described "as being fundamentalist in his approach to LDS philosophy " Ron 
described his father as "extremely abusive both physically, mentally, and verbally[,] especially to my 
mother ' Social History at 2 
7 Family members described Claudine "as having been subservient to her husband, but a 
good mother " Petitioner described her as "mostly a brood mare for a cantankerous male She was 
always an excellent cook and a meticulous housekeeper, nevertheless, she was my mother and I 
dearly loved her " Social History at 2 
8 "Watson and his sons studied "Constitutional issues of the United States government and 
fundamental issues of the LDS religion " Watson also studied and accepted the teachings of the 
John Birch Society "This type of activity brought attention to the family by neighbors, religious 
9 Watson would not allow his children to see medical doctors so the Lafferty children had 
3 get medical treatment surreptitiously Colleen Lafferty nearly died from a ruptured appendix and 
Mil suffer from related complications for the rest of her life because she was not promptly treated 
Watson [Lafferty], Jr fell from the roof of the house and his father allowed him to lay unconscious 
vernight, refusing to take him to the doctor " "One Sunday, Mark accidentally shot himself m the 
tomach with an arrow His father told him he would have to suffer throughout the evening, because 
e'd broken the Sabbath " Social History at 2-3 
10 "[Petitioner] describes his family as being basically a good family, well integrated into 
le community He lived with his natural parents and siblings until the age of 19 [Petitioner's] 
lother indicated that he was a good and easy child to raise, suffering from no abnormalities " She 
dded that '"[h]e seemed to progress through the normal stages of growth and development with no 
omphcations '" Social History at 3-4 
Physical Verbal & Emotional Abuse 
11 Petitioner described his father "as being difficult to get along with and quite dogmatic 
/ith rather extreme medical, religious and political views, in regards to his control of his family " 
etitioner described his father as "using strict and physical discipline " He also believed "his father 
ad a 'possessiveness' and 'jealousy' concerning affection demonstrated toward his mother " Social 
listory at 4 
12 Petitioner was raised "in a family in which strict controls, physical punishment, and 
trongly or fervently held beliefs about health issues, religion, and politics were the norm " Social 
listory at 4 
19 
tnved for their acceptance and his father[']s, even when it meant becoming deeply involved in an 
nvironment of socially deviant behavior " Social History at 28 
18 The "Conclusion" section of the Social History also states that petitioner's mother was 
bviously "supportive of [her son's] actions throughout their childhood and adult years " It also 
otes that Claudine did nothing to stop the fulfillment of the "Removal Revelation" even though she 
new of the "revelation" and her sons' involvement The History surmises that "[n]ot only was 
petitioner] not shunned for these ideas [the removal revelation], he was strongly supported by 
everal of his brothers, and his mother " The History concludes that "[t]he concept of learning right 
rom wrong is acquired in the early years of life, having a mother who allowed her daughter-in-law 
nd granddaughter to be killed, implies that the concept of right and wrong was not valued in their 
ome " Social History at 29 
19 The Social History also observes that "[w]ith the exception of Ron's brother, Dan, none 
f the other siblings have had antisocial behavior sufficient enough to bring them to the attention of 
ie legal authorities Ron's sisters are currently married And his brothers appear to be integrated 
ltizens in the community " Social History at 3 
Childhood Illnesses Medical Issues & Injuries 
20 Petitioner's parents opposed immunizations and therefore did not immunize any of their 
hildren Petitioner "experienced the typical childhood illnesses with no complications " Social 
hstory at 5 
21 "The only documented serious illness [petitioner] suffered was in 1979 when he was 
ospitahzed for kidney stone complications While in the hospital he suffered a brief catatonic 
13 Watson eventually became physically abusive with Claudine "Later in life when 
Claudine witnessed her own sons being physically and mentally abusive to their wives and children, 
she wouldn't say a word " Social History at 5 
14 "One afternoon Watson and Claudine got into an argument, because Claudine continued 
to refuse his sexual advances, a problem he faced their entire marriage Following the argument, 
Watson picked up a baseball bat and beat the family dog to death Over the years, other family pets 
met the same fate " Social History at 5 
15 Claudine used her sons "to push their father away " She told her family that "perhaps 
they had once been a 'royal family during a pre-earth life '" One family member said, "'Mom 
Lafferty really leaned on [petitioner], it was almost as if [petitioner] were her husband and Watson 
didn't exist'" As petitioner grew older, "his mother turned to him for advise to help settle family 
arguments and to be the 'true' leader of the family " Social History at 5 
16 Petitioner enjoyed woodworking and shop in high school, but claimed that "[a]ny other 
attempt at hobbies or projects at home were quickly destroyed, sold, or discouraged by the son-of-a-
bitch who called himself my dad " Social History at 13 
17 The "Conclusion" section of the Social History states "[petitioner's] father was 
extremely jealous of the close relationship [petitioner] had with his mother, Claudine, and he often 
abused [petitioner] both physically and verbally because of this jealousy Claudine used [petitioner] 
to push her husband away, [petitioner] was the shield she imposed to protect herself from 
[petitioner's] abuse [Petitioner's] mother often treated him as if he were the head of their family 
H[e] was given the responsibility to teach, protect, and educate his younger brothers [Petitioner] 
20 
episode which lasted only a few minutes The stone passed without requiring surgery, and he has 
been free of any further complications " Social History at 6 
22 After talking with petitioner's ex-wife, Dianna, Dr Peter Heinbecker believed that 
petitioner had an apparent manic episode m early 1983 lasting about 45 days, just before the break-
up of his marriage and following the failure of some financial projects Social History at 6 
Educational Records 
23 The Social History reports that petitioner "seemed to be well accepted by his peer group 
and was able to formulate strong relationships He was well accepted into school programs and 
social activities, he performed with no difficulty m the educational setting " Petitioner "played 
football and was the captain of the wrestling team at Payson High School" Social History at 4 
24 Petitioner graduated from Payson High School with a 3 2 grade point average 
"Teachers described him as 'well-behaved' and a 'well-adjusted young man '" Social History at 6 
25 Petitioner completed twelve credit hours at BYU and "[h]is grades were significantly 
lower than those he'd achieved in highschool" Social History at 6 
26 Petitioner had "no significant difficulties surrounding his relationships during the dating 
years " Social History at 4 
Items From Petitioner s Journal 
27 After Dianna filed for divorce from petitioner, he recorded in his journal "Called 
Dianna and found that she had been to a lawyer and filed for divorce—devastating feeling—rough 
night" Petitioner's journal also contained his feelings after delivering a "Writ of Divorcement" to 
Dianna, and from 28 October 1983, the day his divorce was final Social History at 9-10 
28 Petitioner's journal also records his feelings on 7 August 1983, the day of his LDS 
Church disciplinary hearing Social History at 11 -12 
29 On 25 October 1983 petitioner recorded in his journal that he had a "strong desire to 
have a couple of beers" but that he hadn't "so much as tasted a beer for over 20 years " He also 
recorded, "Guess I could say the beer was for medicinal purposes " Social History at 14 
National Guard Military Records 
30 Petitioner was a private m the Army National Guard from 9 November 1959 to 4 
February 1961 The Social History reports that "[Petitioner's] time spen[t] in the National Guard is 
rather unremarkable as part of this social history " Social History at 13 
Mental Health Records & Psychological Test Results 
31 Prior to 1984, petitioner had never received any form of mental health treatment or 
psychological evaluation The only counseling petitioner received prior to 1984 was through 
religious leaders in connection with his excommunication Social History at 14 
32 The Social History also reports that "[petitioner] denies any family history of psychiatric 
problems, although he admits that his father was quite overbearing and that there is considerable 
resentment toward the father from several of his siblings " Social History at 15 
33 The Social History states "[a]rchival evidence indicates that almost a decade before the 
"Removal" revelation, many members of [petitioner's] family were involved in a series of 
organizations and activities that challenged the legitimacy of the Constitution on religious and 
political grounds [Petitioner] and several other family members were intimately involved in protest 
actions and group meetings with others outside his family that shared most or all of his political and 
religious views It is important to reemphasize this historical information, because it places 
23 
40 "[Petitioner] considered his wife to be the ideal mate " "This marital union was viewed 
as being an excellent one by most people who were familiar with it, up until early 1981 " Social 
History at 8 
41 During petitioner's twenty-year marriage, "examples of [his] positive and productive 
adjustment in the community include his having been a City Councilman in Highland, Utah and 
serving as a counselor in three different Bishoprics for the LDS Church [Petitioner] described 
himself as bung a 'good, outstanding citizen ' The records from this time period suggest the same " 
Social History at 8 
42 1 he Social History reports that petitioner became physically abusive with his wife in late 
1982 on two occasions Social History at 9 
Petitioner s Employment 
43 F rom age 21 to 41 petitioner worked in "heavy equipment operations, particularly as an 
overhead crane operator " After age 41 petitioner devoted most of his time to his constitutional and 
fundamental religious issues, and worked odd jobs that provided minimal income "[Petitioner's] 
former employers have indicated that prior to 1981, he was a model employee and was skilled at 
operating equipment as well as supervising and managing jobs " Social History at 12-13 
Petitioner s Involvement With His Brothers 
44 In early 1980 and throughout 1981, petitioner became "obsessively supportive of his 
brothers," and eventually involved himself in constitutional and fundamentalist religious issues 
Petitioner became rebellious towards the LDS Church and started to alienate himself from neighbors 
and family "His intense desire for autonomy caused him to become highly involved with 
[petitioner's] belief system into perspective and also illustrates the nature of the social support and 
'social validation' of that system " Social History at 26 
Utah County Jail & Utah Department Of Corrections Records 
34 The Social History reports that "[o]ther than a few incidences of minor traffic violations, 
there is no history of any juvenile or adult criminal behavior or charges " Social History at 14 
Petitioner s Marriage & Family 
35 At 19, petitioner served an LDS mission from 1960-62 in Flonda and Georgia 
Petitioner met his wife, Dianna Sayre, in Flonda, she was a convert to the church After his mission, 
petitioner returned to Florida Social History at 7 
36 Petitioner and Dianna were mamed 5 July 1963 in the LDS Church's Manti, Utah 
temple The couple ultimately settled in Highland, Utah Social History at 7 
37 Petitioner and Dianna had seven children Their second child, Cindy, died shortly after 
birth Social History at 7 
38 Petitioner has stated, '"As the oldest of eight children and two quarrelsome parents 
mostly due to a short sighted, short tempered and self centered and extremely jealous earthly father, 
albeit a good provider, I experienced that stress from a tot I solemnly committed that because of the 
stressful experience I would raise the perfect family and felt that that was in progress '" Social 
History at 7 
39 "From 1963 until the early part of 1981, Ron and his family are described as being the 
ideal citizens, exemplifying the 'Ideal Mormon Family '" Petitioner's yearly salary was between 
$30,000-35,000, which was considered upper-middle class Social History at 7 
24 
45 Shortly before Chnstmas, 1982, Petitioner wanted his brothers and their families to 
picket the home of a judge who had sentenced Dan to prison for using force to escape the highway 
patrol When their wives refused, the brothers spent Chnstmas with Dan, leaving their families 
alone most of the day Social History at 8 
Events Following Petitioner s Divorce 
46 After his divorce, petitioner lost interest in his employment and quit showing up for 
work Petitioner also became more involved in pursuing his religious and political ideas and 
challenging the authonty of the LDS Church, which he blamed for the loss of his wife and children 
Social History at 10 
47 In February of 1984 petitioner marned a nineteen-year-old girl named Rebecca in a 
marriage ceremony he performed himself The marriage lasted only a few months Rebecca left 
petitioner "because of lack of financial support and discontent relative to [petitioner's] preoccupation 
with religious and Constitutional issues " Social History at 12 
Petitioner s Involvement With The School Of The Prophets & His Revelations 
48 The Social History details petitioner's introduction to and involvement in the School of 
the Prophets Social History at 15-17 
49 The Social History contains a "revelation" received around 9 March 1984 entitled, "A 
vision given to Mosiah Hancock " Mosiah Hancock is understood to be petitioner Id at 18 The 
"revelation" explains petitioner's version of LDS theology regarding the pre-mortal existence and 
the war in heaven Social History at 18 22 
50 The Social History also contains a "revelation" dated 9 March 1984 explaining 
jattled with Satan and "cast Satan down" during the war m heaven Petitioner was then given first 
hoice of "the lone females" (those females who had followed Satan but had not been "cast down" 
vith him) and he chose Dianna, who had been Satan's mate However, Dianna was second to 
)etitioner's first mate, Rebecca Social History at 22-23 
51 The Social History also includes the "removal revelation," and another "revelation" 
eceived 18 March 1984 explaining that the Laffertys were to take over the "School of the Prophets " 
)an and Watson, Jr supported petitioner's claim to take over leadership of the School When the 
ither members of the School voted against the idea, petitioner and his brothers left the School 
>ocial History at 23-25 
Petitioner s Fundamentalist Travels 
52 The Social History also details petitioner's travels as a "missionary" to other 
undamentahst groups throughout the United States and Canada It also details petitioner's travels 
nd some of the events leading up to the 24 July 1984 murders Social History at 26-27 
Trial Counsel s Mitigation Case 
53 At trial, petitioner's counsel introduced the following evidence 
Childhood Issues Family Background (Including Physical Verbal & Emotional Abuse) 
54 Mark Lafferty is one of petitioner's younger brothers Mark testified that petitioner 
stuck up [for his brothers and sisters] like any good brother would" and described petitioner as "a 
vonderful brother," a "mother hen-type" brother Vol II at 57-58, 85, 86 
55 Dan Lafferty is another of petitioner's younger brothers and petitioner's co-defendant 
)an agreed that, as the oldest sibling, petitioner took a "nurturing" role in the family, Dan explained 
27 
11" Dr Howell also opined that petitioner's sister and possibly one other brother "ha[ve] a bipolar 
hsorder " Vol VII at 49, 56-57 
63 Dr Howell also stated that when he told petitioner he was going to testify that petitioner 
uffered from a diminished mental capacity, petitioner said, "Well, I think that's true That's 
>ecause of how cruel my father was, and that's what I've been trying to free myself from " Vol VII 
t74 
64 Dr Jess Groesbeck is a psychiatrist who evaluated petitioner In providing background 
or his testimony regarding petitioner's mental health, Dr Groesbeck testified that he believed 
[petitioner] came from a family in which there was a great deal of violence and emotional 
[isturbance and dysfunction " Dr Groesbeck testified that petitioner's father was violent and "had a 
reat problem in having anyone do better than him in the family " Dr Groesbeck believed that 
from early life, [petitioner] had a feeling of competition with his father " Vol VII at 160,168-169 
65 Dr Groesbeck also explained that petitioner "came into the position of kind of being the 
•avior for the family and the problems " Vol VII at 169 
66 Dr Richard Wooten was a psychologist who evaluated petitioner and testified for the 
>tate On cross-examination by defense counsel, Dr Wooten disagreed that petitioner's change in 
ehgious and personal views began around 1982 Rather, Dr Wooten believed that petitioner's 
jnger and negative views of women and marital relationships could be traced to his childhood 
xpenences where petitioner "observed a lot of violence even within his own primary home " Vol 
X at 99-100 
67 Dr Wooten recounted specific violent events that petitioner experienced, including 
that he believed petitioner "felt a certain responsibility, being the oldest, to encourage us to follow 
the path he felt was right, as he had been taught" Vol V at 120-22,133 
56 Dan recounted several events that exemplified his father's extreme views on traditional 
medicine and religion Dan recalled an incident when his sister, Colleen, suffered a ruptured 
appendix, but their father refused to get medical help until it was almost too late Vol V at 126-30 
57 Dan also recalled an incident where he ran into a tree sledding and suffered "a hell of a 
head injury " Although the collision rendered Dan unconscious, his father determined that he did 
not require medical attention Vol V at 127 
58 Dan testified that his father was probably abusive "by society's definitions" and 
sometimes physically disciplined his children Vol V at 123 
59 Dan agreed that his father "had a fairly deep-seated disdain for the medical profession" 
and that many believe his father died because he refused medical treatment for his diabetes Vol V 
at 128-29 
60 Dan explained that his father was strict to see that his family attended church services 
and other church meetings Dan agreed that "the LDS church and activity in that organization was a 
point of focus with [his] family " Vol V at 130-31 
61 Dan testified that Watson physically abused Claudine on "a number of occasions " Vol 
Vat 124-25 
62 Dr Robert Howell is a psychologist who evaluated petitioner He testified that based 
upon his interviews with petitioner's mother, family members, and others, he was "convinced that 
[petitioner's] father was mentally ill," and that "[petitioner's] brother [presumably Dan] is mentally 
28 
affectionate He also recounted that after petitioner witnessed his father hit his mother, petitioner 
became so angry "that he wished he could have been big enough to have kicked his father's ass " 
According to Dr Wooten, these violent events became a "model for [petitioner] a pattern by 
which he kind of handled difficult, mistrustful situations " Vol IX at 100 
68 Dr Wooten also described that petitioner and Dan seem to have been "pitted almost 
against each other, the mother being the advocate of [petitioner], and the father being more the 
advocate of Dan because of his having gone to chiropractic school " Vol IX at 99 
Illnesses And Injuries 
69 Dr Hembecker testified that Diana recalled petitioner suffering a manic episode 
sometime in 1980 or 1981 Vol VII at 13 Drs Howell and Groesbeck also testified regarding the 
same manic episode, explaining that it was purported to have lasted forty-five days Vol VII at 73, 
116-17,219 
70 On cross-examination by defense counsel, Dr Wooten discussed petitioner's episode 
He testified that he had spoken with Diana less than a month before trial, and that she had described 
the episode as lasting' several days " Dr Wooten explained that some people who have talked with 
Diana believe that she originally said the episode lasted "four to five days," and the forty-five day 
figure was a misinterpretation of her account Vol IX at 93-94 
71 Dr Howell testified that petitioner had been hospitalized for kidney stones On cross-
examination by the State, Dr Howell explained that petitioner had suffered a toxic reaction to a 
painkiller during his hospitalization and that this reaction was evidence of a manic disorder Vol 
VII at 73, 115-17 
72 Dr Groesbeck also testified regarding petitioner's hospitalization for kidney stones He 
explained that petitioner had suffered intense pain in the hospital, eventually became catatonic, and 
was "in a very depressed state at that time " Vol VII at 170 
Educational Records 
73 Mark Lafferty testified that petitioner was a "great wrestler" and did well in school Vol 
II at 86 
74 Dan Lafferty agreed that petitioner was a good student in high school and a good athlete 
Vol Vat 133 
75 Mac Carter, one of petitioner's childhood friends, recalled that petitioner played football 
in high school Vol VI at 172 
76 Lynn Jacobsen, another of petitioner's childhood friends, characterized petitioner as a 
"good student," "a 'B ' student" He also recalled that petitioner played football, "excelled in 
wresting," was the wrestling team captain, and a popular student Vol VI at 182 
Mental Health Records & Psychological Test Results 
11 Defense counsel presented Dr Peter Heinbecker's testimony regarding his various 
psychological evaluations of petitioner Dr Hembecker is a psychiatrist Vol VII at 5-48 
78 Dr Hembecker found that petitioner did not have a mental illness and was competent to 
stand trial in 1984 Vol VII at 7-8 
79 He found petitioner to be incompetent after the suicide attempt "because he had damaged 
his ability to think and to remember " Vol VII at 9 
31 
89 While petitioner was in prison, petitioner's delusions included believing that Satan 
possessed the body of a fellow inmate, causing the inmate's water and electricity to quit working 
Petitioner also believed that prison officials placed this inmate next to petitioner because they 
realized that petitioner had spiritual powers, and from then on this inmate's water and electricity 
worked fine Petitioner could also read this inmate's mind Petitioner also believed that he saw 
Satan masturbating in prison Vol VII at 58-59 
90 Dr Howell believed that petitioner's delusional characteristics had deteriorated but also 
crystallized over time For example, petitioner began talking about Lucifer, "then it became Lucifer, 
Satan and Beezelbub " "[Petitioner also] talked about travelers, how they could travel to another 
body, and to the host body " Vol VII at 61-62 
91 Dr Howell believed that petitioner "was mentally ill at least a year prior to [24 July 
1984]," that petitioner was mentally ill on 24 July 1984, and that petitioner "continues to be mentally 
ill today " He also believed that although petitioner could form the intent to kill on 24 July 1984, 
petitioner's capacity to recognize the wrongfulness of his actions was diminished and remains 
diminished Dr Howell agreed that mental illness impaired petitioner's judgment and ability to 
conform his actions to the law at the time of the murders Vol VII at 68-69 
92 Dr Howell testified that petitioner was mentally ill at the time of trial, suffering from 
"[s]chizo-affective disorder of the bipolar type" Vol VII at 54, 70 
93 He opined that petitioner did not have a personality disorder, rather, petitioner's 
personality prior to his mental illness was well-established as being kind, tender, and considerate 
Dr Howell also opined that "there is absolutely no evidence of malingering in [petitioner] " Vol 
80 In 1992, Dr Hembecker believed petitioner was psychotic but hiding it well He 
believed petitioner was competent m 1994 and that medication had an effect on petitioner's 
competency Vol VII at 11-12 
81 Dr Hembecker also believed that petitioner's "judgment was impaired" on 24 July 1984 
and he would have diagnosed petitioner with "manic depressive illness" in 1984 Vol VII at 13 
82 Dr Hembecker opined that petitioner was suffering from "schizo-affective disorder 
bipolar type" at the time of trial Vol VII at 14 
83 He related that petitioner has delusional ideas, including believing in "travelers," "being 
assaulted in his cell by evil spirits," seeing "some of his relatives from his earlier life," and hearing 
"buzzing sounds when the evil spirits are around " Vol VII at 15-17 
84 Defense counsel presented Dr Robert Howell's testimony regarding his various 
psychological evaluations of petitioner Vol VII at 48-74 
85 Although Dr Howell was ashamed to admit it, he acknowledged that he found petitioner 
was not suffering from a mental illness m 1984 Vol VII at 52 
86 When he evaluated petitioner following the hanging, it became obvious that petitioner 
had a mental illness, specifically a delusional disorder that pre-dated the hanging incident Vol VII 
at 53-54 
87 Dr Howell explained that petitioner's delusions involve Satan, Lucifer, Beelzebub, 
Moroni, and Mormon, that petitioner sometimes believes Christ is talking to him, and that petitioner 
hears a buzzing sound when spirits talk to him Vol VII at 55-56 
88 Petitioner's neuro-psychological tests after the hanging showed that he suffered from 
brain damage and a thinking disorder Vol VII at 58 
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94 Defense counsel also presented Dr C Jess Groesbeck's testimony regarding his various 
psychological evaluations of petitioner Vol VII at 159-91 
95 When he first evaluated petitioner in 1984, Dr Groesbeck believed that petitioner was 
incompetent to stand trial and suffered from a delusional disorder and a bipolar or manic depressive 
affective disorder Dr Groesbeck found petitioner to be competent after a second 1984 examination 
However, Dr Groesbeck later concluded that this competency finding was incorrect Vol VII at 
163, 165 
96 Petitioner developed the symptoms of bipolar or manic depressive disorder beginning in 
1980 up through 1983 when the divorce occurred He would have highs and lows, "[h]e would go 
into mountaintops and pray for two days One time he was found by his wife in the garage in a fetal 
position, doubled up in a catatonic, depressed state " Vol VII at 171 
97 One example of petitioner's delusional thinking is when he claimed to have had a 
revelation, drawing on LDS theology, in which he substituted himself for Christ during the war m 
heaven, and also characterized Diana as Satan's wife Vol VII at 177 
98 Dr Groesbeck testified that petitioner was mentally ill in July of 1984, but he did not 
believe that petitioner's mental illness prevented him from understanding his actions Vol VII at 
186 
99 Dr Groesbeck agreed that petitioner's mental illness created a belief that he had a moral 
duty as a prophet to carry out God's will and that his victims stood in the way Vol VII at 186 
100 Dr Groesbeck opined that petitioner suffered from "a schizo-affective disorder 
along with the manic depressive bipolar condition" at the time of trial He also diagnosed petitioner 
nemory He believed that petitioner had "thought disorganization" and hallucinations including 
tearing an "electrical buzzing " He also cited petitioner's homosexual fears as evidence of his 
lelusional thinking Dr Groesbeck concluded that petitioner's homosexual image of Moroni from 
J3S theology "is really a tragic, alternate self-image of how [petitioner] sees himself today " 
/o\ VII at 167-68, 188-89, 190 
101 On cross-examination by the State, Dr Groesbeck testified that petitioner's psychotic 
eaction to medication while he was m the hospital for a kidney stone in 1979 was evidence that 
etitioner was becoming mentally ill On redirect, Dr Groesbeck explained that this conclusion was 
ased on information from petitioner's ex-wife, Diana, that petitioner's depression remained for 
orty five days Vol VII at 198-200, 219 
102 Also on cross-examination by the State, Dr Groesbeck testified that he believed 
etitioner was genuinely trying to dnve away evil spirits by shouting "Fuck you" in court Vol VII 
1211 
103 On redirect, Dr Groesbeck testified that petitioner also attempts to repel evil spirits in 
le courtroom by writing notes Dr Groesbeck explained that petitioner's notes are "saturated with 
omosexual innuendoes and statements" and fit the pattern of his delusional, paranoid thinking, 
;ehng, and responses Vol VII at 221-22 
104 Defense counsel also presented the testimony of Dr Phillip Washburn, a psychiatrist, 
•gardinghis various evaluations of petitioner Vol VIII at 5-65 
105 Dr Washburn believed that petitioner suffered from a paranoid delusional disorder in 
984 He also believed that petitioner's disorder had an affective, or mood disorder component, 
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DS] mission " According to Dr Washburn, petitioner's "major problems did not occur until he 
/as nearly around 40 years of age " Vol VIII at 30, 33 
National Guard Military Records 
111 Petitioner's trial counsel did not introduce any evidence of petitioner's military service 
ee Record, generally 
Items From Petitioner s Journal 
112 Through Dr Robert Howell, defense counsel introduced a copy of petitioner's journal 
lat began 12 April 1983 and continued to November, 1983 The trial court received that volume of 
etitioner's journal as Defense Exhibit 92 Vol VII at 63-64 
113 All of petitioner's journal entries referenced in the Social History come from this 
olume of petitioner's journal Compare Vol VII at 63-64 with Social History at 9-12 
114 Dr Groesbeck testified to some of the statements of petitioner's journal Dr 
rroesbeck stated that after Diana filed for divorce, petitioner wrote "Devastating feeling Rough 
lght Called Dianna to tell her I love her " Petitioner also wrote "I love Dianna and my kids 
early She hurts so much This hurts me Unable to rest" Vol VII at 171-72 
115 Petitioner's counsel introduced, and the trial court received as Defense Exhibit 93, the 
Mosiah Hancock revelation" describing petitioner's version of LDS theology regarding the pre-
lortal existence and the war in heaven The exhibit also including the "revelation" dated 9 March 
984 which added further details to the "Mosiah Hancock revelation" and described Dianna as 
ucifer's mate and Rebecca as petitioner's first mate Vol VI at 27-29, Vol VII at 64-66 
because petitioner was "rather talkative, had pressured speech, garrulous" and "very grandiose " 
Vol VIII at 8-9, 10-11 
106 In 1992, Dr Washburn believed that petitioner suffered from a severe mental disorder 
with an affective component Dr Washburn was "leaning more toward a diagnosis of schizo-
affective disorder bi-polar type " He explained that petitioner was sent to the State Hospital for 
treatment to restore his competency Vol VIII at 14 
107 Dr Washburn "has never felt that [petitioner] malingers or has malingered " He 
believed that petitioner's suicide attempt was the product of a psychotic depressive episode, rather 
than malingering Vol VIII at 17-18 
108 Dr Washburn viewed petitioner's beliefs about traveling spirits as evidence of his 
delusional thinking and schizo affective disorder Petitioner's description of a robot-like person that 
approached him in his cell was consistent with a hallucination, and petitioner's belief that he could 
use protector shields to protect himself from the travelers was evidence of his delusional system 
Vol VIII at 22-23, 25 
109 In Dr Washburn's opinion, petitioner suffered from a major schizo-affective disorder at 
the time of the crime Vol VIII at 29 Although petitioner was capable of forming an intent to kill, 
that intent was "a direct product of the delusion of mental illness " Vol VIII at 29 
110 Dr Washburn believed that petitioner still suffered from a schizo-affective disorder at 
trial He did not believe that petitioner suffered from a personality disorder because personality 
disorders have their onset in late adolescence or early adulthood and during this time in petitioner's 
life, petitioner "did really quite well as a young person He did well in school sports [and his 
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116 The trial court admitted the "removal revelation" as State's Exhibit 44 and both parties 
referred to it often throughout trial See, e g, Vol I 127, Vol II 13-14,16, 25, 29, 50, 59, 64, 77, 
Vol VI at 33, 63, 100, 103 
Petitioner s Character 
117 Petitioner's brother Mark described petitioner as a "good family man" who was "very 
much" involved in the lives of his children Vol II at 88, 89 
118 Mark also testified that petitioner was very active in the LDS Church and had served in 
three bishoprics He related that petitioner had served on the Highland, Utah City Council and took 
great pride in having built his own home Vol II at 89-90 
119 Mark agreed that prior to the early 1980's, petitioner had been "a good brother, a good 
son, a good father, a good family man, active in his church and community, and by all definitions 
completely mainstream and right down the line " Vol II at 91 
120 Richard Stowe testified that he and petitioner had attended the same LDS ward in 
Highland Utah for approximately 10 years Vol V at 12 
121 Stowe agreed that prior to 1983, petitioner "was an active, solid member of the 
community" and a "fine neighbor " Vol V at 12 
122 Stowe explained that petitioner worked with the scouting program in the ward and got 
along "very well" with the youth In Stowe's mind, petitioner was "well respected " Vol V at 12 
123 Stowe testified that petitioner served on the Highland City counsel Vol V at 13 
124 Stowe agreed that petitioner "was pretty much mainstream until approximately 1983 " 
Vol Vat 13 
125 Stowe believed that a change occurred in petitioner during the early 1980's Stowe 
testified that petitioner "was somewhat of an eccentric, but I liked [him] as an individual I trusted 
him But things did become very entangled as he started to reach out for what he referred to as a 
search for truth " Vol V at 18-19 
126 Stowe was one of the four individuals named in the "removal revelation " Vol II page 
15 
127 Low testified that her family moved into their home approximately the same time that 
petitioner and his family moved m Vol V at 48 
128 Petitioner served as a counselor to Low's husband in the LDS ward bishopric 
Petitioner was "very diligent" m fulfilling his responsibilities Vol V at 48, 64, 66 
129 Low agreed that petitioner had been a good father and a "very, very helpful" neighbor 
She had a great respect for petitioner and even viewed him as "a pillar of the church in that 
community" prior to 1982 Vol V at 65-66, 69, 71 
130 Low agreed that a negative change occurred in petitioner's life, "he had a change in his 
religious views, he had a change in his political views, and he became even more domineering in his 
home " Vol V at 67-68 
131 Low was also one of the four individuals named in the "removal revelation " Vol II 
page 15 
132 Randy Oakland worked with petitioner at Oakland Construction Oakland remembered 
petitioner to be "an excellent worker [Petitioner] worked as a crane operator and as equipment 
operator for us, and was very dependable the whole time he was there " Vol VI at 159-160 
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141 Carter noticed a change in petitioner when he visited with petitioner several months 
prior to 24 July 1984 Carter explained that petitioner expressed concerns about the church and the 
Constitution, had grown his hair long, and was unshaven Vol VI at 174-76 
142 Lynn Jacobsen was petitioner's "best" childhood friend Jacobsen and petitioner 
attended church, elementary school, and junior high school together They also corresponded while 
serving LDS missions and saw each other occasionally when they returned from their missions Vol 
VI at 180-83 
143 Jacobsen did not notice anything unusual or out of the ordinary with petitioner's 
religious views Vol VI at 183 
144 Jacobsen also believed that petitioner "had a very good and very close marriage " Vol 
VI at 183 
145 Jacobsen became concerned about petitioner around 1983 when petitioner began to take 
"a lot of issues with religious behe[f]s, that he had espoused previously " Petitioner also went from 
being "a clean-cut guy" to wearing a beard Jacobsen agreed that petitioner had previously been 
"basically a pretty normal individual " Vol VI at 184 86 
146 Donald LeBaron had been the mayor of Highland, Utah and had served on the Highland 
City Council with petitioner He and petitioner were friends prior to their public service together 
Vol VI at 188-89 
147 LeBaron agreed that petitioner was "a strong family man " Vol VI at 190 
148 LeBaron chose petitioner to serve on the city council because "[petitioner] was 
regarded as a leader in the community [LeBaron] knew [petitioner] was concerned about the way 
133 Oakland's and petitioner's families would socialize on occasion when they both lived 
m Colorado Springs in connection with a construction job Vol VI at 160-61 
134 Oakland testified that petitioner served m the bishopric of a Colorado Springs LDS 
ward during that time Vol VI at 162 
135 After Oakland and petitioner returned to Salt Lake, petitioner continued to work for the 
company and received "good reports " Vol VI at 162 
136 During their association, Oakland did not notice anything that led him "to believe 
[petitioner] was anything other than a normal, mainstream type of individual " Vol VI at 163 
137 Dr Lynn Scoresby served an LDS mission with petitioner in Albany, Georgia At the 
time of trial, Dr Scoresby was a psychologist Dr Scoresby explained that petitioner "was very 
personable, well-liked, a very friendly individual, liked by his peers, [and] by the people who knew 
him" in the mission field He also remembered petitioner to be "a very successful" missionary Vol 
VI at 165-67 
138 Both petitioner and Dr Scoresby settled in Highland, Utah and ran into each other 
occasionally after their missions Dr Scoresby remembered that petitioner was still "very friendly" 
and outgoing Vol VI at 167 
139 Mac Carter was one of petitioner's childhood friends He and petitioner "did a lot of 
things together" including hunting, fishing, camping, and attending school and church Vol VI at 
171 
140 Petitioner and Carter associated occasionally after their LDS missions Carter agreed 
that petitioner was "pretty much just mainstream, a normal-type person" during this time Vol VI at 
173 
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the community was developing, and he represented the views of many of the citizens " Vol VI at 
190 
149 In describing petitioner's service on the city council, LeBaron explained that petitioner 
"was always interested He did his work well He was conscientious He was a good 
councilman " Vol VI at 191 
150 LeBaron explained that although petitioner held to his own views, he was willing to 
listen to others and "would consider other viewpoints " Vol VI at 191 
151 During their association, LeBaron viewed petitioner as a "very normal person " Vol 
VI at 192 93 
152 Kevin Branch was petitioner's home teaching companion in an LDS ward in Highland, 
Utah Vol VI at 197 
153 Branch immediately liked petitioner when the two first met Branch ' was very 
impressed with [petitioner] [Petitioner] was just a very likable, friendly, outgoing person It was 
a joy to be around him " Vol VI at 197-98 
154 Branch described petitioner as an "excellent" neighbor Vol VI at 198 
155 Branch found petitioner to be "very much what we might say a mainstream member of 
the church, very actively involved in what we were doing " Vol VI at 198 
156 In July of 1982, Branch noticed that petitioner was particularly impressed with a 
priesthood lesson on the Constitution and thereafter "show[ed] increased devotion to temple 
attendance, [and] other kinds of things m the church that typically reflectQ devotion [and] 
dedication" Vol VI at 198-99 
157 When Branch met with petitioner m the summer of 1983, Branch "became aware that 
here had been some major changes in [petitioner's] thinking particularly, and to some extent m his 
ersonality " Vol VI at 200 
Dan s Influence On Petitioner 
158 Mark Lafferty testified that, in approximately 1982, petitioner started visiting with Dan 
D persuade him to disavow his anti-government beliefs However, these conversations resulted m 
etitioner becoming "less mainstream" and adopting some of Dan's philosophies Vol II at 96-99 
159 Dan Lafferty testified that when petitioner came to "straighten out" Dan and his other 
rothers regarding their extreme religious and political views, petitioner "wasn't there too awfully 
ang before he said, 'What you guys are doing is right, and everyone else is wrong '" Vol V at 166-
8 
160 Dr Groesbeck testified that petitioner's role as a savior for his family drew him into 
amily problems involving Dan and his other brothers Dr Groesbeck opined that "instead of 
5scuing and solving the problem, the problems increased because [petitioner] became more allied 
/ith Dan And Dan's unusual beliefs began to convince [petitioner] that that was the way to go " 
rol VII at 170 
161 On cross-examination by defense counsel, Dr Wooten explained that petitioner's 
octnnal extremes "really erupted" and became "most evident" after petitioner began meeting with 
)an and his other brothers Vol IX at 103-04 
The State s Penalty Phase Case 
162 The State presented the following evidence at the penalty phase 
43 
efusing to wear an inmate armband—the jail's armband policy was eventually discontinued, and 4) 
ising foul and abusive language The jailer who testified about petitioner's disciplinary proceedings 
greed that four proceedings in two years was "not very many" for an inmate Pen Vol I at 33, 35-
7,39 
168 Defense counsel also called Lieutenant Jay Colledge at the penalty phase Lt Colledge 
vas in charge of day-to-day operations and inmate care at the Utah County Jail He testified that 
etitioner's stay at the jail had been "remarkably uneventful" and that petitioner had not posed any 
ecurity concerns or any risk to other inmates or staff Pen Vol I at 40-41 
169 Defense counsel also called Deputy Danny Nez at the penalty phase Deputy Nez was 
he recreation coordinator at the Utah County Jail during petitioner's incarceration there He played 
asketball and a lot of scrabble games with petitioner He described petitioner as "very 
ooperative," "very courteous," and "compliant" He also explained that petitioner was "one of the 
etter inmates that [he] associate[d] with because [petitioner] never gave [him] any problems Pen 
'ol I at 42-45 
Utah Department of Corrections Records 
170 At the penalty phase, defense counsel introduced information from petitioner's Utah 
tate Prison file The information included "chronological notes, and information as to 
petitioner's] daily routine sometimes daily, sometimes weekly, notes made by staff at the Utah 
tate Prison" Pen Vol I at 77-78 
171 Defense counsel also introduced monthly reports of petitioner's performance on 
ssigned jobs during his incarceration in the Utah State Prison as exhibits at the penalty phase Pen 
163 The State played an excerpt from a videotape of petitioner's news conference held m 
September of 1984 in American Fork, Utah The excerpt demonstrated how "the [petitioner] acts 
when he is given an opportunity to show remorse about what has happened " Penalty Phase 
Transcript Volume I ("Pen Vol I") at 18, 26 
164 The State also played excerpts from the crime scene videotape showing some of the 
areas of the apartment that the jury did not originally see, and specifically showing "how Erica 
Lafferty was found lying in her crib that day " Pen Vol I at 18-19,29 
Trial Counsel s Penalty Phase Case 
165 In opening statement to the jury at penalty phase, trial counsel explained that "[m]ost of 
our mitigation evidence has already been presented during the other portion of the trial " Counsel 
continued, "[w]hen we chose to present to you evidence of mental illness and so forth, we 
necessarily had to show instances in [petitioner's] life that contributed to that So you already know 
a good deal more about [petitioner] than a jury sitting in any other kind of case would have " 
Counsel further explained that "[w]e intend to draw from that and from your exposure to those other 
witnesses as we argue the case toward the end " Penalty Phase Transcript Volume I ("Pen Vol I") 
at 21 
Utah County Jail Records 
166 At the penalty phase, defense counsel introduced evidence of petitioner's conduct while 
incarcerated in the Utah County Jail Pen Vol I at 30-45 
167 Petitioner had a total of four disciplinary proceedings during his two years in the Utah 
County Jail The disciplinary proceedings involved minor infractions, specifically, 1) swatting a 
female officer on the rear end with a rolled up piece of paper, 2) making an alcoholic beverage, 3) 
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Other Penalty Phase Evidence 
172 Also at the penalty phase, counsel called an official from the Board of Pardons to 
explain the factors that determine whether an inmate will be paroled, and the Warden of the Utah 
State Prison, to describe the security levels and conditions of confinement at the prison Pen Vol I 
at 45-75 
173 Petitioner's counsel also introduced one of petitioner's family photo albums, 
petitioner's high school yearbook photo, and, although not petitioner's actual high school yearbook, 
a copy of that yearbook with tabs indicating the pages on which petitioner was mentioned Pen Vol 
I at 30, 75-78 
Counsel s Penalty Phase Argument 
174 Trial counsel argued the following evidence in mitigation of petitioner's punishment 
during the closing argument at the penalty phase 
175 No criminal history. Petitioner had no prior criminal convictions, or even arrests 
Pen Vol II at 22 
176 Petitioner acted under duress and Dan's domination. Counsel argued that petitioner 
acted under duress, and the domination of his brother Dan Counsel reminded the jury of the 
substantial evidence they had heard dunng the guilt phase detailing petitioner's life prior to the early 
1980's Counsel highlighted evidence that petitioner was a good student and friend, was on the 
football team and captain of the wrestling team at Payson High School, served an honorable LDS 
mission, was married in the LDS temple, raised six children, was a hard worker, served in the LDS 
Church in three bishoprics, was a scout leader, was a good and helpful neighbor, served as a 
177 Counsel then argued that something happened to change petitioner, specifically, "Dan 
happened, mental illness happened, a combination of factors happened all at once " Counsel 
reminded the jury that "[ejvery male member of this family has the same preoccupation with defying 
government, with extreme religious views" and that this ideolody "was a family commitment" 
Counsel argued that "Dan took it the furthest" Pen Vol II at 24 
178 Counsel reminding the jury of Dan's testimony, and what counsel characterized as 
Dan's "magnetism," "quiet menace," and "menacing lunacy " Counsel also emphasized the 
evidence of Dan's total control over his wife and children, including controlling what his wife wore 
and preventing his children from talking to other children Counsel then argued that "[petitioner] was 
influenced by Dan, and that[,] coupled with the emotional disturbances that were at play in his life 
[petitioner's loss of his family, his wife, and his church], was more than he could fight" Although 
petitioner "made choices that resulted in those losses those choices were engineered and 
influenced by Dan Lafferty " Pen Vol II at 25-27 
179 Counsel summarized that "[petitioner] acted under the domination of Dan Lafferty and 
under the duress of the situation that he himself was involved in, the emotional influence of his 
failed marriage, loss of his family, loss of his church" Pen Vol II at 25-27 
180 Petitioner was an accomplice to Dan's murders Counsel next counsel argued that 
petitioner "was an accomplice in the homicides committed by another person, and his participation 
was relatively minor " Counsel claimed that based on Dan's testimony, petitioner only beat Brenda 
and actually wanted to leave her apartment before the killing Counsel emphasized that although 
petitioner's knife was the murder weapon, "Dan cut two throats " Counsel claimed that while 
petitioner acted out of anger, Dan acted out of religious fanaticism She reminded the jury that Dan 
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bat, and that he also refused to seek medical attention for petitioner's sister when her appendix burst 
Counsel argued that the family's dysfunction was exacerbated because petitioner's mother "was 
passive and indulgent [and] taught her sons, her special sons, that they were the six mighty and 
strong" Pen Vol II at 31-33 
185 Counsel observed that "all of the male members of [petitioner's] family" had extreme 
beliefs regarding government and religion "They all joined the School of the Prophets They 
essentially all put their families second to their brothers and their own particular brand of 
God They refused driver's licenses, registration, payment of taxes They all sought a self-
sufficient lifestyle, and all centered their lives around religion This all began with Watson and 
Claudme Lafferty, a father who was strict, unbending and extreme " Pen Vol II at 32-33 
186 Counsel argued that petitioner broke away for a while from his family's extreme 
stances on the government and religion, "[b]ut the pull of that family influence was too strong " 
Pen Vol II at 32 
187 Counsel summarized "[petitioner] is the product of a dysfunctional family, the product 
of an abusive father and an overly indulgent mother, the product of Dan Lafferty's psychopathic 
thinking, the product of [petitioner's] own mental illness You cannot separate the mental illness 
from [petitioner] " Counsel argued that petitioner did not choose to be abused, or become mentally 
ill Counsel then argued, "[i]s it then appropriate to punish with death the abused child, the 
controlled and manipulated man, the deserted husband, the excommunicated missionary, the man 
who believes travelers inhabit the bodies of weak and willing hosts, the man who believes he has a 
reflector shield to repel evil influences, the man who believes he has the capability to destroy [] the 
did not receive the death penalty and argued that it would be unfair to punish petitioner more 
severely than Dan because Dan actually did the killing Pen Vol II at 27-28 
181 Petitioner's mental illness. Counsel argued that mental illness impaired petitioner's 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and conform his conduct to the law Counsel 
argued that if petitioner was mentally ill at the time of the murders, then he was not completely 
responsible and should not be executed Counsel also argued that if petitioner was mentally ill at 
trial, then he could not understand why he was being punished, and should not be executed Pen 
Vol II at 28-31 
182 As evidence of petitioner's mental illness, counsel asked the jury to consider 
petitioner's detachment and failure to pay attention during trial Counsel argued that petitioner's 
"mental illness prevents him from appreciating the magnitude of the decision you will make or the 
potential of his own death " Pen Vol II at 29 30 
183 Counsel also referred the jury to the lengthy expert testimony from all of petitioner's 
evaluators and argued that they all either diagnosed petitioner with a mental illness or personality 
disorder Counsel then argued that "[w]hether it's a mental illness or personality disorder, it's 
impairment for purposes of this hearing and for purposes of mitigation" Pen Vol II at 30 
184 Petitioner's dysfunctional family. Counsel argued that petitioner "came from and 
was influenced by a dysfunctional family " Counsel reminded the jury that "[petitioner's] father was 
strict, abusive and extreme" and that even Dan characterized "his own father as extreme " Counsel 
emphasized that petitioner's father "had extreme religious views, extreme nutritional views, [and 
extreme] medical views," and that he dominated his submissive wife Counsel also reminded the 
jury that petitioner's father once became so angry that he beat the family dog to death with a baseball 
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earth[?] [Petitioner] is the product of a dysfunctional family, and abusive father, and that's a 
mitigation factor " Pen Vol II at 35 
188 Petitioner's remorse. Counsel also argued that petitioner had demonstrated remorse 
for the murders She asserted that petitioner demonstrated remorse when he stated during the news 
conference video that he "felt compassion for [his brother] Allen " She also asserted that petitioner 
expressed remorse to Dr Howell at the State Hospital, and that his suicide attempt also demonstrated 
remorse Finally, counsel related that she and petitioner had "sat in an interview room on more than 
one occasion and cried over the needless losses in this case, over the losses of Brenda and Erica, 
over the losses of [petitioner] himself " Pen Vol II at 35-37,45 
189 Petitioner's behavior while incarcerated. Counsel urged the jury to consider 
petitioner's good behavior while incarcerated at the Utah County Jail and the Utah State Pnson 
Counsel argued that petitioner "does not pose a risk to the safety of staff members or to other 
inmates or to himself" Pen Vol II at 37-41 
190 Dan, not petitioner, was the killer. As a final mitigation factor, counsel argued that 
"[petitioner] killed no one by his own hand, [but] Dan admitted to killing two people, and he's 
serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole " Counsel argued "that fairness dictates that 
[petitioner] should not die for what Dan Lafferty did " Counsel reasoned that if they jury felt 
compelled to punish petitioner more severely than Dan, it could impose a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole Pen Vol II at 42 
191 Death was not the appropriate penalty. In arguing the second, or "appropriateness" 
prong of the Wood standard, counsel argued that death was not the appropriate penalty given 
Dehavior while incarcerated Counsel also asked the jury to consider whether, based on their 
onscience and value system, death was the appropriate penalty Counsel also argued that the jurors 
hemselves would have to accept responsibility for petitioner's death if they imposed the death 
>enalty Counsel argued "[d]on't assume you can distance yourself from the act if you make the 
lecision" Pen Vol II at 43-48 
192 In closing, counsel related her experience of waiting outside the prison the night 
Vilham Andrews was executed She described two groups of people, one which "was silent and 
tunned" when Andrews' death was announced, and another which "cheered, applauded and 
elebrated " She closed her argument with a plea to "vote for the humane preservation of life, rather 
han the celebration of death " Pen Vol II at 48-49 
B Argument 
Petitioner cannot demonstrate that his counsel overlooked any relevant mitigating evidence 
dl of the evidence that petitioner now proffers in his Social History, with the exception of 
etitioner's National Guard records, was presented to the jury and argued as mitigating evidence at 
le penalty phase Moreover, petitioner's National Guard records were inconsequential Even 
etitioner's current mitigation specialist admits that petitioner's "time spen[t] in the National Guard 
> rather unremarkable as part of this social history " Social History at 13 Therefore, petitioner 
annot demonstrate that his counsel ineffectively investigated or presented mitigating evidence 
ecause his counsel presented and argued all of the mitigating evidence that petitioner now proffers 
ee Strickland v Washington, 466 U S at 668, 695 
Even if petitioner's Social History contained some additional mitigation evidence, that 
dditional evidence is not materially distinguishable from the evidence that was presented to the 
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X. THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 
OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT (claim 26) 
Petitioner complains that his counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's closing argument 
eference to killing a fifteen-month-old girl, which resulted in the supreme court reviewing the claim 
inly for plain error 
In order to succeed on a preserved prosecutorial misconduct claim, appellate counsel would 
ave had to convince the Utah Supreme Court that 1) the prosecutor called to the jury's attention 
natters that it should not consider in reaching a verdict, and 2) absent the prosecutor's improper 
tatements, there would exist a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result See State v 
afferty, 2001 UT 191186-87, 20 P 3d 342, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001) To succeed on the 
npreserved claim, petitioner also had to convince the supreme court that the prosecutor's comments 
/ere obviously improper See e g State v Kell, 2002 UT 106132, 61 P 3d 1019 
Although the supreme court noted that petitioner's trial counsel failed to preserve the claim, 
refused to reverse because it found neither error nor prejudice the two elements petitioner would 
ave had to satisfy even on a preserved claim State v Lafferty, 2001 UT 19 at 1186-87, 89-93 
rial counsel's failure to preserve the claim did not affect the appellate outcome, therefore, 
etitioner's claim fails as a matter of law See e g Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668, 695 
1984) (to prove ineffective assistance of counsel petitioner must prove, in part, that any 
onstitutionally deficient performance undermines confidence in the outcome of his trial), Carter v 
raletka, 2001 UT 96,148,44 P 3d 626 (to prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel a post-
onviction petitioner must prove, in part, that the overlooked claim probably would have resulted in 
jury Proffering marginal, largely cumulative additional mitigation evidence is insufficient to 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel Cf Castro v Ward, 138 F 3d 810, 828-29 (10th Cir) 
(proffered post conviction evidence from a different mental health expert, although more detailed 
and adding an organic brain damage diagnosis not previously provided, was insufficient to 
demonstrate a due process violation where the additional evidence was not different "in kind" from 
that which the sentencing jury heard), cert denied, 525 U S 971 (1998) Consequently, the State is 
entitled to summary judgment on this claim 
VIII. PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO COUNSEL'S QUALIFICATIONS FAILS 
AS A MATTER OF LAW (claims 25 and 29) 
Petitioner complains that his trial and appellate counsel did not meet the qualifications 
established in Utah R Cnm P 8 and by the American Bar Association Guidelines for representing 
capital defendants 8 Petitioner had a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during 
the criminal proceedings Petitioner had no constitutional right to counsel who met certain 
qualifications 9 
The claims fail as a matter of law, and the Court should grant summary judgment in the 
State's favor 
8
 Petitioner makes the allegation on "information and belief" In this proceeding, Utah R 
Civ P 65C requires petitioner to plead all the facts supporting his claim Utah R Civ P 8 notice 
pleading does not apply, and vague references to "information and belief will not suffice 
9
 Utah R Cnm P 8(f) specifically disavows that the failure to comply with the rule's 
qualification provisions supports a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel 
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X. PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO APPELLATE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 
RAISE THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S VENUE CHANGE MOTION 
FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH THE COURT MAY GRANT 
RELIEF (claim 27) 
Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel performed deficiently for failing to seek reversal 
based on the denial of petitioner's pre-trial venue change motion For support, petitioner relies on 
allegations about pre trial publicity 
In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, petitioner must 
prove that appellate counsel overlooked a "dead-bang" winning argument Carter v Galetka, 2001 
UT 96,148, 44 P 3d 626 That is, petitioner must prove that his appellate counsel overlooked a 
claim that was obvious from the record, and that probably would have resulted in reversal Id 
After trial, the only relevant inquiry remaining on a denied venue change motion was 
whether petitioner was denied his right to a constitutionally impartial jury State v Widdison, 2001 
UT 60 H37-39, 28 P 3d 1278 (refusing to reverse for the denial of a venue change where Widdison 
failed to prove that any juror was biased) Petitioner has not alleged that any juror was biased, let 
alone pleaded facts demonstrating that a biased jury convicted and sentenced him Therefore, 
petitioner alleges no facts demonstrating that his appellate counsel overlooked a dead-bang winner, 
and the Court should dismiss the claim 
XI. PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT APPELLATE COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE 
SOUGHT REVERSAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DENIED HIS 
REQUEST TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF DAN LAFFERTY'S 
SENTENCE FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW (claim 28) 
A Additional Material, Undisputed Facts 
1 Petitioner's counsel called Dan Lafferty as a witness during petitioner's case-in-chief 
life sentence Vol V at 120-21 He also testified that he killed both Brenda and Erica by slitting mitigation of petitioner's sentence, all without objection Therefore, the claim fails as a matter of 
their throats Vol VI at 81-83 
2 At the penalty phase, petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner was merely an accomplice 
to murders that Dan committed Counsel reminded the jury that Dan had been convicted of 
murdering Brenda and Erica, had testified in petitioner's case that he had done the actual killing, and 
had received only a life sentence Counsel then reasoned that it would be unfair to punish petitioner 
more severely than Dan Pen Vol II at 27-28 
3 Petitioner's counsel later argued that "[petitioner] killed no one by his own hand, [but] 
Dan admitted to killing two people, and he's serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole " 
Counsel contended "that fairness dictates that [petitioner] should not die for what Dan Lafferty did " 
Counsel reasoned that if they jury felt compelled to punish petitioner more severely than Dan, it 
could impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole Pen Vol II at 42 
B Argument 
Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel should have sought reversal because the trial 
court excluded penalty-phase evidence of Dan's sentence 10 Petitioner's claim fails because it is 
based on a misunderstanding of the record 
Contrary to petitioner's representation, the trial court did not exclude evidence of Dan's 
sentence Trial counsel introduced evidence of Dan's life sentence and argued that evidence in 
10
 Petitioner incorrectly asserts that Dan was sentenced to life without parole The sentence 
of life without parole was not available until 27 Apnl 1992 See Laws of Utah 1992 ch 142, § 2 
(amending UTAH CODE ANN § 76 3-206 to include the sentence of life in prison without parole) 
When Dan Lafferty was tried and convicted, the only available sentences for aggravated murder 
were life imprisonment, or death See UTAH CODE ANN §76-3-206(1985) 
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permits setting aside a criminal conviction or sentence because petitioner's counsel cannot meet 
American Bar Association requirements for prosecuting a post conviction case ' 
The claim fails as a matter of law, and the Court should grant summary judgment in the 
State's favor 
XIII. PETITIONER'S DISSATISFACTION WITH CONDITIONS ON DEATH 
ROW DOES NOT JUSTIFY POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (claim 36) 
Petitioner contends that his death sentence is unconstitutional because he has spent twenty 
years on death row with limited access to programs available to other inmates "If Petitioner were 
not under a death penalty sentence, but merely life without parole, he would at least have the ability 
to have more internal privileges than the Petitioner has being confined on death row " Second Am 
Pet at 20 
The PCRA permits post-conviction relief for constitutional defects in how a conviction is 
obtained or a sentence is imposed UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a 104 (West 2004) Petitioner's 
complaint that his death sentence and housing on death row limits his access to certain pnvileges has 
nothing to do with either 
The claim fails as a matter of law, and the Court should grant summary judgment in the 
State's favor 
12
 In addition, petitioner assumes without support that he has a right to counsel who can 
comply with the American Bar Association Guidelines The State knows of nothing to support that 
law, and the Court should grant summary judgment in the State's favor " 
XII. COUNSEL'S INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH THE ABA GUIDELINES IN 
THIS PROCEEDING DEMONSTRATES NO DEFECT IN PETITIONER'S 
CONVICTION OR DEATH SENTENCE; CONSEQUENTLY, THE CLAIM 
FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW (claim 31) 
Petitioner claims that his counsel cannot comply with the American Bar Association 
Guidelines m this post-conviction case He asserts that his counsel has had a limited time to 
investigate this twenty-year-old case, that the "paper trail" is almost complete, but is still "missing 
some small areas for a complete record," and that the limited funding required his counsel to make 
choices about what to investigate 
The PCRA permits relief from a criminal conviction or sentence based on specified defects in 
either UTAH CODE ANN 78-3 5a-104 (West 2004) Nothing in the PCRA or in the common law 
11
 Even if the trial court had excluded evidence of Dan's sentence, petitioner still identifies 
no "dead bang" winning argument that appellate counsel overlooked Evidence of Dan's sentence 
could have been properly excluded as irrelevant The only constitutionally relevant sentencing 
considerations were petitioner's character and the crime circumstances See e g Tuilaepa v 
California, 512 U S 967,972(1994) Dan's sentence shed no light on either See State v Gardner, 
789 P 2d 273, 285-86 (Utah 1989) (excluding proffered evidence of other capital cases that resulted 
in life sentences and that the murder victim's friends opposed the death penalty did not require 
reversal because the proffered evidence shed no light on Gardner's character or the crime 
circumstances), cert denied, 494 U S 1090(1990) 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim that Dan's life sentence made 
petitioner's death sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate, holding that "case-by-case 
proportionality review is not required under the United States or Utah Constitution " State v 
Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342, 2001 UT 19 ^  122-24, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001) If the supreme 
court refused to grant relief based on comparing petitioner's sentence to Dan's, then it would not 
have reversed the trial court for refusing to allow the sentencing jury to make the same comparison 
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XIV. PETITIONER WAIVED ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE 
FIRING SQUAD WHEN HE CHOSE THAT METHOD OF EXECUTION 
(claim 39) 
Petitioner contends that the Utah Legislature's decision to abolish execution by firing squad 
amounts to a determination that the firing squad is cruel and unusual punishment This claim fails as 
a matter of law 
At the time petitioner was sentenced, Utah law permitted death by firing squad only if the 
condemned selected that method UTAH CODE ANN § 77-18-5 5 (Supp 2001) A person cannot 
select an execution method, then challenge its constitutionality Stewart v LeGrand, 526 US 115 
(1999)I3 
The claim fails as a matter of law, and the Court should grant summary judgment in the 
State's favor 
XV. PETITIONER'S CLAIM CONCERNING MENTAL RETARDATION FAILS 
TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH THE COURT MAY GRANT RELIEF 
(claim 40) 
After petitioner's retrial and appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Atkins v 
Virginia, 536 U S 304 (2002) The Supreme Court held that mentally retarded persons could not be 
subject to the death penalty Petitioner contends that, because the Supreme Court decided Atkins 
after his criminal case ended, he was denied due process because he lost the opportunity to raise a 
mental retardation defense to his death sentence 
13
 In addition, petitioner bases the claim on a factual misrepresentation The legislature 
abolished the method because it draws too much media attention, not because the legislature 
However, petitioner has not claimed let alone alleged facts demonstrating that he is mentally 
etarded He fails to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief because he has identified no 
onstitutional error that has harmed him 
£VI. PETITIONER'S ALLEGATION THAT HE LACKED THE MENTAL 
COMPETENCE TO WAIVE HIS ATTORNEY'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH THE COURT MAY GRANT 
PETITIONER RELIEF (claim 44) 
Petitioner contends that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest because he represented 
>etitioner's brother and co-defendant Dan Lafferty Petitioner contends that he lacked sufficient 
nental competence to waive the conflict 
Petitioner pleads insufficient facts to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief 
rrespective of whether petitioner had the mental competence to waive any conflict of interest, 
letitioner has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to 
onflict-free counsel 
To demonstrate a conflict of interest that infringed his constitutional rights, petitioner must 
stablish both 1) an actual conflict of interest, and 2) that the conflict adversely affected counsel's 
•erformance See eg Stricklandv Washington,466 U S at 692, Edens v Hannigan, 87 F 3d 
109, 1114 (10th Cir 1996), State v Lovell, 1999 UT 401(22, 984 P 2d 382, 387, cert denied, 528 
J S 1083 (2000), State v Taylor, 947 P 2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997), cert denied, 525 U S 833 (1998) 
o demonstrate an actual conflict of interest, petitioner must prove that trial counsel was forced to 
nake choices that advanced other interests to the detriment of petitioner's See United States v 
llvarez, 137 F 3d 1249,1252 (10th Cir 1998), State v Taylor, 947 P 2d at 686 To demonstrate that 
Sixth Amendment conflict adversely affected trial counsel's performance, petitioner must prove 
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Petitioner's first claim is procedurally barred because petitioner could have raised it at trial or 
>n direct appeal See UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (West 2004) Therefore, the State is 
ntitled to summary judgment 
Petitioner may obtain post-conviction relief on this claim only if he can demonstrate 
neffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise it at trial or on appeal See UTAH CODE ANN § 
8-35a-106(2) (West 2004) However, petitioner has not alleged that his counsel was ineffective for 
ailing to raise the claim, nor has he alleged any facts to support an ineffectiveness claim 
Petitioner's second claim, alleging a violation of double jeopardy, repeats claim twenty-one 
rom the first part of the petition As explained above in Point I, the State is entitled to summary 
udgment on this claim because it is procedurally barred—petitioner litigated his double jeopardy 
laim on appeal and lost See id 
Petitioner's third claim, alleging that he has yet to be arrested, re-charged or properly 
rraigned on the current charges, fails as a matter of law Even assuming that these allegations are 
^e , "an error at the preliminary stage is cured if the defendant is later convicted beyond a 
sasonable doubt" See State v Quas, 837 P 2d 565, 566 (Utah Ct App 1992), see also State v 
chreuder, 712 P 2d 264,272 (Utah 1985) (holding that a defect in probable cause statement does 
ot invalidate subsequent conviction), United States v Crews, 445 U S 463,474 (1980) ("An illegal 
rrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a 
ahd conviction") (citing Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103, 119 (1975) (additional citations omitted)) 
he State is entitled to summary judgment on this claim 
Finally, petitioner's fourth claim, alleging that his counsel was ineffective for advising him 
that trial counsel actually compromised petitioner's interests for someone else's benefit United 
States v Alvarez, 137 F 3d at 1252, State v Lovell, 1999 UT 40 \72 Petitioner alleges no facts 
addressing either element Petitioner's lack of competence to waive a conflict is irrelevant unless he 
can establish that one existed in the first place 
Most likely, petitioner cannot demonstrate a constitutional conflict of interest By the time 
the State retried petitioner, Dan's case had been concluded See Gardner v Holden, 888 P 2d 608, 
620 (Utah 1994) (no conflict where appellate counsel previously represented Gardner's co-defendant 
because, "by the time [counsel] was appointed to represent Gardner, the charges against [his co-
defendant] were concluded, and a conflict, potential or otherwise, no longer existed between the two 
defendants"), cert denied, 516 U S 828 (1995) Petitioner alleges nothing to suggest that his 
counsel had any ongoing duty to Dan when counsel represented petitioner, let alone a duty that 
caused counsel to impair petitioner's interests to promote Dan's 
Petitioner's allegations fail to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief, therefore, the 
Court should dismiss the claim 
XVII. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ALLEGED IN PART TWO EITHER FAIL AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, OR FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM 
In "part two" of his second amended petition, petitioner claims that (1) the prosecution 
planted evidence "at the trial proceedings," and witnesses "were tampered with by way of a plea 
barg[a]in," (2) his second trial violated his protection against double jeopardy, (3) he has yet to be 
arrested, re-charged or properly arraigned on the current charges, and (4) that his counsel 
erroneously advised him not to file a 120-day disposition request These claims are all either 
procedurally barred of fail as a matter of law 
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petitioner not to file the request, that advice was reasonable, and petitioner cannot demonstrate that 
he suffered any prejudice as a result of the advice See Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668, 687-
88, 690, 695 (1984) Counsel's advice was reasonable because it allowed counsel sufficient time to 
prepare for trial, including investigating and preparing to present the extensive expert testimony and 
the mitigation evidence that counsel introduced Moreover, petitioner cannot demonstrate that he 
was prejudiced by allowing counsel sufficient time to prepare and present his case Therefore, the 
Court should grant summary judgment on this claim in the State's favor 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the State summary judgment on all of 
petitioner's claims, with the exception of claims 22, 27,40, and 44, which the Court should dismiss 
for failure to state a claim for relief 
DATED this 2X~ day of February 2005 
MARKL SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
THOMASB BRUNKER 
CHRISTOPHER D BALLARD 
Assistant Attorneys General 
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342, ceit denied 534 U S 1018(2001) 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph one of the State's Motion 
2 Shortly after returning from his LDS mission, petitioner married Diana Sayer They had 
six children Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph two of the State's Motion 
3 Those who knew petitioner prior to 1982 described him as a strong family man Petitioner 
was also a prominent member of his community, serving for a time on the city council in Highland, Utah 
Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph three of the State's Motion However, 
Petitioner can be characterized as a prominent member of the community only prior to 1982 
4 Between 1982 and 1983, petitioner spent increasingly large amounts of time with his 
brother Dan Lafferty Dan had been in constant trouble for failing to pay taxes and disobeying the licensing 
regulations that governed his chiropractic practice Id at ^4 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph four of the State's Motion 
5 Petitioner began to meet regularly with Dan, as well as with his brothers Tim, Mark, and 
Watson, to discuss politics and religion Petitioner became increasingly converted to Dan's philosophies 
on government intervention Those who knew petitioner well remarked that he seemed to have changed 
drastically in both his beliefs and his personality Petitioner strayed further and further from mainstream 
society Id at TJ4-5 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph five of the State's Motion 
6 In 1983, the LDS Church excommunicated petitioner for violating the law, refusing to 
support his children failing to sustain the church leaders and teaching and advocating doctrjne contrary to 
the LDS church's Id at \S and n 2 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph six of the State's Motion 
7 The following year petitioner's wife Diana filed for and obtained a divorce and moved with 
their six children to Florida Id at ^ [6 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph seven of the State's Motion 
8 Defendant felt his excommunication was unjust and was distraught over the dissolution of 
his marriage Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph eight of the State's Motion 
9 Petitioner and his brothers met Robert Crossfield when they opened their religious and 
political discussions to others According to Mr Crossfield, God instructed him to teach the Lafferty 
brothers how to receive revelation and to organize themselves into the "School of the Prophets " The 
brothers claimed that they began to receive communications from God and would meet as a group to 
discuss these "revelations " Id at f7 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph nine of the State's Motion 
10 Allen, the youngest Lafferty brother, and the husband and father to the murder victims, had 
no direct involvement with the School of the Prophets Dan testified,' I don't think Allen necessarily 
showed an interest He wasn't called We were all called by revelation and he wasn't called Id at \1 
n3 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph ten of the State's Motion 
11 Petitioner told his brothers that he had received a revelation that his ex-wife Diana had 
been the wife of the devil in a previous world Petitioner believed their union angered the devil According 
to petitioner, the devil's jealousy led him to cause petitioner trouble in this world Id at ^8 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph eleven of the State's Motion 
12 In the spring of 1984, petitioner claimed to have received the "removal revelation " 
According to petitioner, God ordered the "removal" of Allen's wife, Brenda, their fifteen -month-old 
daughter, Erica, Richard Stowe, and Chloe Low Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twelve of the State's Motion 
13 Prior to receiving the "removal revelation," petitioner had expressed negative feelings about 
the four named persons to family members and friends Petitioner believed that all four in some way either 
had helped his wife obtain a divorce or played a part in his excommunication from the LDS Church Id at 
19 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirteen of the State's Motion 
14 Petitioner thought that Brenda had encouraged Diana to divorce him On several 
occasions before the removal revelation, petitioner called Brenda a "bitch " Petitioner told Allen that 
Brendan "had better stop talking to Diana," that "people weren't safe in meddling in his affairs anymore," 
and that "he felt justified in taking action of some sort against people who crossed him " Id and n 5 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph fourteen of the State's Motion 
15 After the removal revelation, petitioner explained that fifteen-month-old Erica needed to 
3 
>e removed because "she would grow up to be a bitch just like her mother" Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph fifteen of the State's Motion 
16 Chloe Low, Diana's friend, helped and encouraged Diana to leave petitioner Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph sixteen of the State's Motion 
17 Richard Stowe, petitioner's and Diana's ecclesiastical leader, served on the church council 
hat excommunicated petitioner He also counseled Diana during the divorce proceedings and helped her 
obtain financial aid from the LDS Church Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph seventeen of the State's Motion 
18 Petitioner claimed to have received another revelation on 13 March 1984 commanding that 
tie and the School of the Prophets "consecrate" an "instrument" for removing the four named persons Only 
Dan and Watson agreed The others involved with the School of the Prophets felt that this and the removal 
revelation were not of God and disassociated themselves from the revelations The School of the Prophets 
disbanded as a result of the disagreement Petitioner and Dan continued in their belief that the revelations 
needed to be fulfilled Id at ]\0 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph seventeen of the State's Motion 
19 On the morning of 24 July 1984, petitioner, Dan, and their friends Charles Carnes and 
Ricky Knapp planned to go to Salt Lake City for the day Before leaving, petitioner told the group that 
he felt impressed that they should go to his brother Mark's house to pick up a rifle Id at TJ11 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph nineteen of the State's Motion 
20 Mark asked what they planned to do with the gun because petitioner had quit hunting years 
earlier Petitioner replied that he was going hunting for "[a]ny fucking thing that gets in my way " Id 
4 
26 A few minutes later, petitioner and Dan exited from the rear of the apartment and returned 
o the car, their clothes covered in blood Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-six of the State's Motion 
27 The men next drove to the Low home On the way, petitioner commented that Chloe 
.ow's small size would make her an easy target Id at TJ14 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-seven of the State's Motion 
28 When they reached the Low home and determined that no one was there the men broke 
nto the home and took numerous items As they left, petitioner began talking about going on to Richard 
>towe'shome Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-eight of the State's Motion 
29 The men accidentally missed the turnoff to the Stowe home Petitioner and Dan decided 
o abandon trying to fulfill the rest of the revelation They stopped at a service station and then headed 
oward Wendover Id at 1J15 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-nine of the State's Motion 
30 Mr Carnes testified that, on the way, petitioner pulled a knife out of his boot, started to 
>ang it on his knee, and said, "I killed her I killed her I killed the bitch I can't believe I killed her " He 
hen handed the knife to Dan, and said, "Thank you, Brother, for doing the baby because I don't think I 
md it in me " Dan replied, " It was no problem " Id at %\5 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty of the State's Motion 
31 In Wendover, the four men rented a small kitchenette apartment where they cleaned up, 
ite, and spent the night The next night, Mr Knapp and Mr Carnes, afraid of what the Lafferty brothers 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty of the State's Motion 
21 From Mark's home, the men headed to Allen's apartment, apparently to look for another 
rifle On the way, petitioner and Dan began discussing whether they should fulfill the "removal revelation" 
that day Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-one of the State's Motion 
22 At Allen's apartment, petitioner left the car and knocked on the door When no one 
answered, petitioner returned to the car and drove away, heading toward Salt Lake City Id at f 12 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-two of the State's Motion 
23 Before they had traveled far, Dan said that he felt impressed to turn around and return to 
Allen's apartment When they arrived, Dan went to the door and knocked This time, Brenda Lafferty 
answered the door Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-three of the State's Motion 
24 Dan pushed past Brenda into the apartment and remained inside alone with Brenda for a 
few minutes The men in the car heard the two fighting inside the apartment Petitioner left the car and 
entered the apartment Id at 1J13 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-four of the State's Motion 
25 Mr Carnes testified that, once petitioner entered the apartment, hecould hear petitioner 
calling Brenda a "bitch" and a "liar," and that he could hear Brenda being beaten Mr Carnes heard 
Brenda screaming, "Don't hurt my baby Please don't hurt my baby " He could also hear the baby crying, 
"Mommy, mommy, mommy " The apartment then became quiet Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-five of the State's Motion 
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said that they had done, quietly left the apartment and drove away in the car While traveling along 
Interstate 80, they found the knife in the car They rolled the knife in a towel and threw it out the window 
Later in Twin Falls, Idaho, they disposed of a bag ofbloody clothing and other personal effects belonging 
to petitioner and Dan They then proceeded to Mr Carnes' brother's house in Cheyenne, Wyoming, 
where they were arrested on 30 July 1984 Id at T|16 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-one of the State's Motion 
32 On 17 August 1984 FBI agents arrested petitioner and Dan in Reno, Nevada Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-two of the State's Motion 
33 When Allen Lafferty arrived home from work on the evening of 24 July 1984 he found his 
wife and fifteen-month-old daughter dead Id at f 17 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-three of the State's Motion 
3 4 Brenda was in the kitchen lying in a pool of blood She had suffered a severe beating and 
had contusions and bruises on her face, head, shoulders, arms, thigh, knees, and back Evidence 
established that a vacuum cord had been tightly and repeatedly wrapped around her neck A six-inch-long 
incision had sliced through her trachea, both jugular veins, and both carotid arteries and left a cut on her 
spinal column Blood was smeared on the walls, drapes, door, and light switches There was evidence 
throughout the apartment of a major struggle Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-four of the State's Motion 
3 5 Fifteen-month-old Enca lay m a puddle of her own blood and propped against the back 
of her cnb with her head slumped over Enca's throat was cut from ear to ear The incision sliced through 
both her carotid arteries, both jugular veins, and her esophagus and cut her cervical spinal column Only 
bone and a little tissue attached her head to her body Id at |18 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-five of the State's Motion 
36 Both Brenda and Enca were alive when their throats were slit Id 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-six of the State's Motion 
3 7 The State charged petitioner with capital murder and related crimes Ajury convicted him 
and sentenced him to death on the capital murder charges The Utah Supreme Court affirmed State v 
Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239 (Utah 1988) 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-seven of the State's Motion 
3 8 Petitioner did not seek collateral relief in the State courts, instead, he proceeded directly 
to federal collateral review The United States District for the District of Utah denied relief However, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed on the ground that the trial court had applied 
the incorrect legal standard for evaluating petitioner's competency Lafferty v Cook, 949 F 2d 1546 
(10th Cir 1991) The Tenth Circuit ordered petitioner's convictions and sentences vacated, however, it 
elaborated that "[t]he state is of course free to retry Lafferty " Id at 1557 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-eight of the State's Motion 
3 9 The State chose to retry petitioner A second jury convicted petitioner and sentenced him 
to death The Utah Supreme Court again affirmed State v Laffet ty, 2001 UT 19,20 P 3d 342 The 
United States Supreme Court denied review Laffet ty v Utah 534 U S 1018 (2001) 
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-nine of the State's Motion 
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due to ineffective assistance of counsel See §78-3 5a-106(2) Effective assistance of counsel allows the 
defendant not only to raise the claims that were previously litigated, but also the ones that were not raised 
on direct appeal and the ones that the State believes are insufficient 
On appeal, the Petitioner raised eight separate challenges 
(1) whetherthe trial court erred in determining that he was competent to stand trial, (2) 
whether the trial court erred in granting the State's challenge for cause to remove Juror 
220, (3) whether Utah's insanity defense, section 76-2-305 of the Utah Code, violates the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Utah 
Constitution, (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting victim impact evidence during 
the penalty phase, (5) whether the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of 
statements made by defendant and his brother Dan Lafferty to the media, (6) whether the 
trial court erred by refusing to give defendant's requested instruction that the jury could 
consider sympathy or mercy in reaching its verdict during the penalty phase, (7) whether 
Utah's death penalty statute, section 76-3-207 of the Utah Code, is unconstitutional under 
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 9 of 
the Utah Constitution, and (8) whether the retrial of defendant violated the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
See State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342 (Utah 2001) 
In his Writ of Habeas Corpus, however, Petitioner raised the following claims 
1) Utah law unconstitutionally shifted the burden to him at the penalty phase because the 
State has already proven at least one aggravator by the time the penalty phase begins 
(claims 4, 14, and 18 (partial)), 2) the Court erroneously removed juror 220 for cause 
(claim 7), 3) the Court erroneously admitted at the penalty phase a videotape of the crime 
scene showing the victims' bodies (claim 8), 4) the Court erroneously admitted a videotape 
of petitioner's media interview (claim 9), 5) the Court erroneously denied petitioner's 
request for a penalty-phase sympathy instruction (claim 10), 6) petitioner's retrial violated 
double jeopardy (claim 21), 7) the large number ofaggravators gives prosecutors unlimited 
discretion in choosing whether to charge capital murder (claim 32 partial), 9) the Court 
erroneously found petitioner competent to stand trial (claim 43), and 10) the Court 
erroneously denied petitioner's motion for a new trial (claim 45) These claims repeat 
claims that petitioner raised and lost on direct appeal See State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d 
342, 2001 UT 19, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001) 
ARGUMENT 
I. STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE ITS 
ARGUMENTS FAIL ON THE FACE OF LAW. 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law See Rule 56(c) Utah R Civ Pro There are 
genuine issues of material fact which preclude entry of summary judgment If summaryjudgment is granted, 
then Petitioner has no opportunity to present his case to the court Because summaryjudgment prevents 
litigants from fully presenting their case to the court, courts are, and should be, reluctant to evoke this 
remedy Brandt v Sptmgvdle Banking Co, 353 P 2d 460 (1960) 
n . STATE DID NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH R. CTV. P. RULE 7(c)(2). 
Pursuant to Utah R Civ P Rule 7(c)(2), a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment cannot exceed ten pages of the argument without leave of the court The State did not apply for 
permission to file an overlength memorandum and, thus, any pages over the allowed page limit should not 
be considered Without waiving this objection to the overlength memorandum, Petitioner filed his 
memorandum in opposition to all arguments advanced by the State / 2 / V - J 7 II ~l0? 
rHI. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RAISE THE CLAIMS FOR 7-10,14,18, 21, 23, 32, tf"2 28, 41, 43, 45 DUE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND DUE TO THE q j FACT THAT SOME OF THE CLAIMS WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY RAISED. 
I The State argues that the claims should not be considered because some of them were previously 
litigated, some of them were not raised at trial or on direct appeal, and some are simply not sufficient to 
entitle the defendant to a post-conviction relief (See State's Memorandum at ffl]8-12) These arguments 
should fail since the Utah Post Conviction Remedies Act allows to raise claims if failure to raise them was 
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(See State's Memorandum at \ 9 ) 
Even the cursory comparison between the claims on appeal and in the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shows that the only claims that even remotely can be considered similar are the following claims number 
1 (shifting the burden of the penalty phase to the Petitioner), number 2 (removal of juror 220 for cause), 
number 3 (admission of a videotape at the penalty phase), number 4 (erroneous admission of the videotape 
of Petitioner's media interview), number 9 (competency to stand trial issue), and number 10 (denial of the 
Petitioner's motion for new trial) 
However, claims of shifting of the burden at the penalty phase, claim 4,14 and 18 (partial), 5, 
penalty phase sympathy instruction 6, double jeopardy claim 21, or discretion to choose to charge with 
capital murder claim 32 (partial), were not raised dunng the appeal Therefore, the State's argument fails 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in December 1991 vacated the Petitioner's original sentence and 
conviction and indicated that the State was free to retry the Petitioner The reversal was made due to 
errors made by the courts regarding the Petitioner's competency to stand trial in the first case which is a 
pr una facie case of the ineffective assistance of counsel According to the Stncklandtest, Petitioner has 
to demonstrate that the counsel wasn't functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
should have and that his "defense was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance to the extent that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial " See Strickland v 
Washington 466 U S 668, 690 (1984), Fernandez v Cook, 870 P 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) The 
defendant did not receive the benefit of counsel that was functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment and he was prejudiced by the counsel's deficient performance Any proper functioning 
counsel would not allow a biased jury to be sitting on a death penalty case Such jury deprived Petitioner 
>f his chance to a fair trial Therefore, the State's arguments should fail 
Also, the court in Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d 516 (Utah 1994) stated that 
absent the existence of unusual circumstances, a 'party may not raise the issues in a habeas 
corpus petition that could or should have been raised on direct appeal' We have held 
that unusual circumstances exist when trial counsel represented the defendant on direct 
appeal and the defendant in a subsequent habeas proceeding contends that he had 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, on appeal, or both 
See id 
This is exactly the circumstances of the Lafferty case where the same counsel represented 
Defendant at trial and on appeal Thus, the Petitioner has such unusual circumstances that would allow him 
o raise the issue of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
Moreover, pursuant to §78-3 5 a-106(2), 
[notwithstanding Subsection (1 )(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the 
ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that 
ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel 
See id 
In this case, due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the claims as referred to supra have not been 
raised and therefore entitle the Petitioner to argue these clanris in his Habeas Corpus Writ 
On page 10 of its Memorandum, the State acknowledges that Petitioner's habeas corpus claim 41, 
i e his brother and co-defendant's life sentence, entitled Petitioner to challenge his death sentence The 
State acknowledges that Petitioner uses a different label for the claim However, the State argues that in 
substance it has already been litigated However, the State does not explain where in the appeal Petitioner 
raised that issue In fact, that issue has not been raised on appeal and only in the Habeas Corpus petition 
Therefore, this State'sargumentalsofails FinaUy,thePeutioner'sHabeasCorpusclaim23,i e failureof 
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the previous counsel for the Petitioner to hire a mitigation specialist, is a brand new claim not raised on 
appeal Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to raise that claim in his Habeas Corpus petition 
TV. PETITIONER DID NOT RAISE THE CLAIMS ON APPEAL DUE TO INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. THEREFORE, HE IS ENTITLED TO RAISE THEM IN 
HIS HABEAS CORPUS PETITION. 
The StateacknowledgesthatPetitioner'sHabeasCorpus claims 1-3,5-6,11 (partial), 12 (partial), 
13,15-17,18 (partial), 19,20 (partial), 30,32 (partial), 33-35,37-38,42,46-47 have not been raised 
on appeal Failure of the Petitioner's previous counsel to raise those claims is a direct evidence of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel Therefore, m accordance with §78-3 5a-106(2), Petitioner is entitled to 
raise them in his Habeas Corpus petition at this time / / | ( - / V r * / 4' \JT\ 
Moreover, pursuant to §78-35a-107(3) ^*- " ' KS\_ U^-f 
[i]f the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's 
failure to file within the time limitations 
It is obvious that when the legislature drafted the statute it was very concerned with giving all 
opportunities to Petitioners like Mr Lafferty to advance their claims Therefore, State's arguments should 
fail 
V. EVIDENCE IN REGARDS TO STEVEN GOLDING, PH.D'S TESTIMONY IS NOT 
JUST AN IMPEACHMENT OF EVIDENCE, BUT NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
THAT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED PREVIOUSLY. 
The State argues that Steven Goldmg, Ph D's testimony is merely an impeachment of evidence 
(See State's Memorandum at 11) However, the evidence offered by Dr Golding in his recent testimony 
at State v Mitchell, Third Distirct Court Case No 031901884, contradicts the testimony he offered in 
Petitioner's case and clearly falls within §78-35a-104(e)(i) that states that the court is required to vacate 
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le conviction or sentence where 
newly discovered material evidence exists [that] 
(l) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of [the evidence] at the time of trial 
or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-tnal motion or 
post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence 
Neither Petitioner nor Petitioner's counsel knew, or could have known ofthis new opinion ofDr 
joldmg at the time of the mental health hearing in 2004 and 2005 Therefore, the State's argument fails 
VI. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY. THIS OPPORTUNITY 
HAS NOT BEEN PROVIDED TO HIM. 
The State objects to Petitioner's claim that his Sixth Amendment right to an effective assistance of 
ounsel was violated in where the counsel did not move to sequester the jury when one of the jurors 
lisclosed the fact that he had been given an instruction by his religious teachers The State argues that 
'etitioner's only right is the right to trial by an impartial jury (See State's Memorandum at TJ13) 
Where Lafferty's defense counsel has allowed to have a jury where every member was in favor 
if the death penalty, such jury was not an impartial jury It was ajury biased in favor of the death penalty 
The only juror that was against the death penalty was dismissed 
Vn. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE SAME EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WHETHER REPRESENTATION IS IN TRIAL COURT, ON APPEAL, OR 
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS. 
The State argues that the Petitioner is not entitled to an effective assistance of counsel in habeas 
-orpus proceedings This argument is totally without ment It is absurd to suggest that Petitioner is entitled 
o a substandard representation in habeas corpus that falls short the requirements of the Str ickland test 
]ee Stucklandv Washington, 466 U S 668, 690 (1984) 
Any diligent counsel would have investigated exculpatory evidence and any facts of evidence 
tampering Failure to do so would render a deficient performance that would fall below the objective 
standards of a reasonable professional judgment Failure to discover exculpatory evidence or facts of 
evidence tampering would prejudice the defendant at the trial and at sentencing See Par sons v Barnes, 
871P 2d516(Utahl994) Therefore, the State's argument fails The United States Supreme Court in 
the recent case of Wiggins v Smith, 539 U S 510,123 S Ct 2527,156 L Ed 2d 471 (U S 2003), holds 
that the absence of a thorough mitigation investigation is per se ineffective assistance of counsel 
VIII. THE TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO PRESENT RELEVANT MITIGATION 
EVIDENCE WHICH IS NOT SIMPLY CUMULATIVE BUT MATERIAL TO THE TRIAL 
AND SENTENCING. 
The State argues that the social history that was prepared by the currently retained mitigation 
specialist, Manssa Sandall, and additional material facts listed in Petitioner's Writ are just cumulative 
evidence (See State's Memorandum at If 16) The State relies on Castro v Ward, 13 8 F 3 d 810,828-
29 (10th Cir) However, in Castro, the counsel for defendant argued mainly additional evidence about drug 
and alcohol abuse in Mr Castro's family, I e hisbrother'spredatoryandabusivebehaviortowardwomen, 
evidence of organic brain damage and drug and alcohol abuse in the family In the present case, mitigation 
expert actually researched and uncovered the records pertaining to the Petitioner himself, I e educational 
records from high school and B YU, mental health records and psychological test results, Utah County Jail 
records, Utah Department of Corrections records, items from Petitioner's journal, as well as broader social 
history that shows Petitioner being influenced by the fundamentalist LDS philosophy as well as his 
childhood illnesses, medical issues and mjunes 
Petitioner's educational records and employment records show particularly Petitioner's good 
adaptability and getting along with other people around him and provide mitigating factors for the penalty 
phase Therefore, pursuant to Castto there is a probability that those circumstances would lead to a 
different outcome when weighing in aggravating and mitigating factors 
DC PETITIONER DOES NOT BASE HIS CHALLENGE TO HIS FORMER COUNSEL 
ONLY ON RULE 8. 
The State argues that Rule 8(f) of the Utah R Cnm P states that mere non-compliance with Rule 
8 certification shall not be "of itself' grounds for the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the 
Petitioner does not have a right to claim such ineffective assistance (See State's Memorandum at \ 52) 
However, Petitioner is not solely relying on Rule 8 when arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, but rather 
gives a variety of circumstances as listed supra Therefore, the State's argument fails 
X. TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO RAISE OBJECTION TO PROSECUTOR'S 
CLOSING ARGUMENT AFFECTED OUTCOME OF THE APPEAL. 
The State argues that even despite the fact that the Supreme Court noted that the trial counsel failed 
to preserve the claim of prosecutorial misconduct at the closing argument, such misconduct, nevertheless, 
has not affected the appellate outcome (See State's Memorandum at U 53) The State is relying in its 
argument on State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001) and on State v Kell, 
61 P 3d 1019 (2002) However, in Kell, the prosecutor made certain inappropriate jokes, which 
however, did not add up to the misconduct resulting in plain error See State v Kell, id This is quite 
different from the facts in Lafferty case where the Supreme Court acknowledged that the prosecutor 
indeed made improper comments by acknowledging that the trial counsel failed to preserve the claim 
Failure of the previous Lafferty counsel to preserve the claim affected further reviewability of the claim 
Moreover, the cumulative effect of the ineffective assistance of counsel satisfies Strickland test 
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2001) As the court stated m Lafferty and Widdison, "the ultimate test of whether a failure to change 
venue constitutes an abuse of discretion is whether the defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury " 
See State v Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239, 1250 (Utah 1988) See also Widdison, id In the Petitioner's 
case, the counsel failed to request that the jury be sequestered All jurors were pro death sentence biased 
Therefore, failure to request a change of venue and failure to preserve the issue of change of venue on 
appeal significantly prejudices the Petitioner 
XII. COUNSEL'S INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH ABA GUIDELINES AMOUNTS TO 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The State argues in its Memorandum that Petitioner's argument that failure of the Petitioner's 
counsel to comply with the ABA guidelines in a post conviction case has no merit under Utah Code Ann 
§78-35a-104 (West 2004) (See State's Memorandum at \ 56) Although §78-35a-104 does not 
specifically refer to the ABA guidelines, in subsection (d) it refers to the ineffective assistance of counsel 
Merely a failure to comply with the ABA guidelines may have been insufficient However, the fatality of 
all the mistakes and omissions made by the Petitioner's counsel amounts to the ineffective assistance and 
falls within the above-referenced sections of §78-35a-104 Therefore, the State's argument should fail 
In addition, m Wiggmsv Smith, 539U S 510,123 S Ct 2527,156 L Ed 2d 471 (U S 2003), 
the Supreme Court of the United States stated that the ABA guidelines on the standards for capital aefense 
work serve as " guides to determining what is reasonable '" See id Thus, the ABA guidelines list the 
minimum requirements that the defense counsel should meet in death penalty cases Since the Petitioner's 
former counsel does not meet the ABA guidelines, he does not meet even the minimum requirements for 
handling such cases 
See Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668,695(1984) Even if trial counsel's failure to object to 
prosecutor's closing argument by itself does not raise to the Strickland standard which the Petitioner claims 
it is, then the cumulative evidence of the misconduct does rise to the Strickland'level Moreover, the court 
stated in Galetka that "to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Carter must rebut the strong 
presumption that 'under the circumstances, the challenged action' might be considered sound trial strategy " 
Id at 689 Failure to object to the damaging prosecutor's closing argument cannot possibly be considered 
a sound trial strategy but clearly is a serious omission Such omission, if preserved on appeal, could have 
resulted in reversal Therefore, the State's argument should fail and its reliance on Car ter v Galetka is 
misplaced See Carter v Galetka, 44 P 3d 626 
XI. APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE DENIAL OF THE CHANGE 
OF VENUE MOTION. 
The State argues that since Petitioner didn't allege that any juror was biased and didn't plea any 
facts demonstrating the biased jury, then his argument should fail as to any challenges to impartiality of the 
jury and any challenges to the venue (See State's Memorandum at H 54) In accordance with State v 
James, 75 7 P 2d 549 (Utah 1989), the four factors need to be considered when making a change of venue 
request First, defendant has to have little standing in the community Second, the crime should take place 
in a small community Third, the nature and the gravity of the offense has to be extreme And fourth, there 
has to be an extensive trial publicity and gossip about the defendant See id Surely the Petitioner's case 
meets all four requirements in where the Petitioner had little standing in the community, the community was 
small, Petitioner had a negative reputation as the killer of a mother and the child which was an offense of 
an extreme nature and the pretrial publicity was extreme See also State v Widdison, 28 P 3d 1278 (Utah 
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Xffl. PETITIONER'S DISSATISFACTION WITH CONDITIONS ON DEATH ROW. 
Petitioner, is dissatisfied with the conditions on death row However, he argues that pursuant to 
the United States Constitution Amendment VIII and Utah Constitution Article I §9 (1896), the fact that 
he has been held on death row for twenty years is cruel and unusual punishment in itself 
XIV. THE PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE WAIVED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGE IF HE WAS INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL AND INCOMPETENT AT 
THE TIME OF SENTENCING. 
The State argues that since the Petitioner, at the time of sentencing, chose his method of execution 
by firing squad, he cannot now argue that that was a cruel and unusual punishment firing squad was legally 
present as a choice at that time and that by choosing his own execution method, Petitioner waived any 
further challenges to the method (See State's Memorandum at ^  58) In its argument, the State relies on 
Stewart v LeGrand, 526 U S 115 (1999) The State's reliance would be valid if the defendant was 
afforded an effective representation of counsel and if he was competent to stand trial and during the 
sentencing phase However, Petitioner argued ineffective assistance of counsel and his lack of competency 
Therefore, Petitioner's ability to choose his own method of execution and his counsel' s assistance has been 
questioned 
XV. PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF MENTAL RETARDATION WARRANTS RELIEF. 
The State argues that Petitioner's reliance on Atkins v Virginia is misplaced because Petitioner 
did not claim that he was mentally retarded and didn't allege any facts that would demonstrate that 
(See State's Memorandum at Tffl 58-59) InAtkinsv Virginia, 536V S 304 (2002), the Supreme Court 
reasoned that mental retardation requires not only sub-average intellectual functioning, but also significant 
limitations m adaptive skills See id The Court stated that mentally retarded defendants have "diminished 
opacity to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from 
'xpenence, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand others reactions " See 
d Moreover, the Court stated that "mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful 
issistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted 
mpression of lack of remorse for their crimes " See id 
In the present case, although Petitioner has not been labeled as mentally retarded, based on the 
facts uncovered in his social history and even facts already presented to the court, he had a diminished 
capacity to communicate, to make conclusions from his mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, or to 
control his impulses Therefore, the claim is valid In addition, Petitioner is advancing his claims for inability 
to stand trial due to his insanity and ineffective assistance of counsel Cumulatively, all those claims warrant 
close consideration by the court 
XVI. THE STATE DID NOT PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE THAT A CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST WAS ABSENT. 
The State argues that the Petitioner didn't show an actual conflict of interest and that such conflict 
adversely effected counsel's performance 
Pursuant to Rule 1 9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, 
/ [a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter 
J (a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially factually related matter in which 
that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client consents after consultation, or 
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client 
except as Rule 1 6 would permit with respect to a client or when the information has 
become generally known 
The former counsel ofRon Lafferty, Mr Esplm represented him in the same matter as Dan Lafferty 
2D 
The interest of co-defendants were adverse as the issue was co-defendants' guilt in committing the crime 
This clearly points to the fact that the interests of the two clients were materially adverse 
" Moreover, the State did not show at what time on the time-line of representation Mr Esplm 
/withdrew from representing Dan Lafferty and if he withdrew at all Therefore, the State's allegation that 
Dan's representation was concluded by the time the counsel was representing Ronald Lafferty is not 
supported by evidence The State's argument about the conclusion of the representation on the co-
Defendant does not mean that there was not a conflict still remaining and Petitioner has an absolute right 
to conflict free counsel The mere finalization of one case does not remove the possible conflict in the 
companion case Especially when there are still appellate and post-conviction remedies available as were 
available to Dan Lafferty at the time / 
XVTI. PLANTED EVIDENCE 
The State argues that the Petitioner's claim that the prosecution planted evidence at the trial 
proceeding should have been raised at trial or on direct appeal and that at this time this claim is time barred 
However, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise this issue Therefore, 
pursuant to §78-3 5a-106(2) (West 2004), the Petitioner's claim falls within the exception for the ineffective 
assistance of counsel and the general time bar does not apply 
XVHI. DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
The State also argues that Petitioner's claim for doublejeopardy was litigated on appeal and lost, 
therefore, it should not be re-litigated again The State also argues that because the probable cause 
statement is questioned, the subsequent conviction should not be invalidated (See State's Memorandum 
at TJ 61) The State is relying on cases like UmtedStatesv Gen's, 445 U S 463,474 (1980), Statev 
21 
2uas, 837P 2d 565 (Utah 1992), and Statev Schreuder, 712P 2d 264 (Utah 1985) In all those cases 
here was an unlawful arrest and a subsequent charge, a trial and a conviction The Petitioner is arguing 
hat he has not even been re-arrested, re-charged, or properly re-arraigned on the current charges 
See Petitioner's Writ at H 4) This is a crucial distinction in the facts of the cases cited by the State and 
the facts of the case at bar Therefore, the State's argument fails 
XIX. 120 DAY DISPOSITION REQUEST 
Finally, the State argues that the failure of Petitioner's counsel to file a 120 day disposition request 
did not prejudice the Petitioner and therefore, Petitioner's claim should fail (See State's Memorandum 
at TI61) The Petitioner is prejudiced by not filing the 120 day disposition request because it allows the 
press to pollute the jury pool with negative information which led to the fact that the Plaintiff could not get 
a fair and unbiased jury 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner's claims should stay 
DATED this IQ day of May, 2005 
CRAMER & CRAMER, L.L.C. 
Cramer ' 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ONALD WATSON LAFFERTY, 
Petitioner 
TATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No 020404472 
Judge Anthony W Schofield 
The State, through counsel, submits the following reply memorandum in support of its 
Dtion to dismiss the amended petition and for partial summary judgment 
I PETITIONER HAS NOT OPPOSED THE STATE'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 28 AND 31, THE COURT SHOULD GRANT 
JUDGMENT IN THE STATE'S FAVOR ON THOSE CLAIMS (OPENING 
MEMORANDUM POINTS XI AND XII) 
II THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
CLAIMS PETITIONER ALREADY RAISED AND LOST ON DIRECT 
APPEAL (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT I, OPPOSITION 
MEMORANDUM POINT III) 
III THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
CLAIMS THAT PETITIONER COULD HAVE, BUT DID NOT RAISE ON 
DIRECT APPEAL (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT II, OPPOSITION 
MEMORANDUM POINT IV) 
IV THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
PETITIONER'S NEWLY-DISCOVERED-EVIDENCE CLAIM (OPENING 
MEMORANDUM POINT III, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT V) 
V PETITIONER HAS NOT ALLEGED FACTS OR CITED LEGAL 
PRECEDENT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS COUNSEL 
COST HIM HIS RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY (OPENING 
MEMORANDUM POINT IV, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT VI) 
VI PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HE HAS THE RIGHT TO THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS COUNSEL 
FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT V, 
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT VII) 
IX 
VII PETITIONER STILL FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM BASED ON 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED 
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE OR UNSPECIFIED EVIDENCE OF 
EVIDENCE TAMPERING, THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JUDGMENT 
IN THE STATE'S FAVOR (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT VI, 
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT VII) 
VIII PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO 
INTRODUCE RELEVANT MITIGATING EVIDENCE LACKS ANY 
FACTUAL BASIS AND THEREFORE FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
(OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT VII, OPPOSITION 
MEMORANDUM POINT VIII) 
PETITIONER DOES NOT ARGUE AGAINST GRANTING JUDGMENT 
TO THE STATE ON HIS CHALLENGES TO HIS TRIAL AND 
APPELLATE COUNSEL'S QUALIFICATIONS (OPENING 
MEMORANDUM POINT VIII, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT 
IX) 
THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON PETITIONER'S CLAIM 
THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE OBJECTED TO THE 
PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT (OPENING MEMORANDUM 
POINT IX, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT X) 
PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT A BIASED JUROR SAT, 
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN THE STATE'S FAVOR 
ON PETITIONER'S CLAIMS THAT HIS APPELLATE COUNSEL 
SHOULD HAVE SOUGHT REVERSAL BECAUSE THE COURT DENIED 
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO CHANGE THE TRIAL VENUE (OPENING 
MEMORANDUM POINT X, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT XI) 
XI 
XII 
XIII THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON PETITIONER'S 
CHALLENGE TO HIS CHOSEN EXECUTION METHOD (OPENING 
MEMORANDUM AT XIV, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM AT XIV) 
XIV PETITIONER STILL FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM THAT THE STATE 
CANNOT EXECUTE HIM BECAUSE HE IS MENTALLY RETARDED 
(OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT XV, OPPOSITION 
MEMORANDUM POINT XV) 
XV PETITIONER STILL ALLEGES NO FACTS TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM 
THAT HIS COUNSEL HAD A SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST, THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN THE 
STATE'S FAVOR (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT XVI, 
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT XVI) 
XVI THE CLAIMS IN "PART TWO" OF THE SECOND AMENDED PETITION 
FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT 
XVII, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINTS XVII-XIX) 
CONCLUSION 23 
14 
PETITIONER'S DISSATISFACTION WITH DEATH-ROW CONDITIONS 
DOES NOT JUSTIFY POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, HE HAS ALREADY 
LITIGATED AND LOST HIS CLAIM THAT HOLDING HIM ON DEATH 
ROW FOR TWENTY YEARS IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
(OPENING MEMORANDUM AT POINT XIII, OPPOSITION 
MEMORANDUM AT POINT XIII) 15 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER HAS NOT OPPOSED THE STATE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON CLAIMS 28 AND 31, THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN 
THE STATE'S FAVOR ON THOSE CLAIMS (OPENING MEMORANDUM 
POINTS XI AND XII) 
Petitioner has not opposed the State's motion on his post-conviction claims that 1) appellate 
counsel should have argued that the Court erroneously excluded evidence of Dan Lafferty's sentence 
(claim 28), and 2) his counsel in this proceeding cannot meet his obligations under the American Bar 
Association guidelines (claim 31) ! Because petitioner has not opposed the motion the Court should 
grant judgment in the State's favor on those claims 
II. THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS 
PETITIONER ALREADY RAISED AND LOST ON DIRECT APPEAL 
(OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT I, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM 
POINT HI) 
The State moved for summary judgment on claims that petitioner litigated and lost on direct 
appeal Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment 
("Opening Memorandum") point I Petitioner responds that 1) not all of the claims that the State 
Petitioner purports to oppose summary judgment on the latter claim Opposition 
Memorandum at 18 However, petitioner argues only that the ABA Guidelines apply in assessing 
whether his trial and appellate counsel satisfied their constitutional obligations Id These 
arguments do not rebut the State's argument that petitioner cannot obtain post-conviction relief if his 
post-conviction counsel cannot comply with the ABA Guidelines 
Moreover, petitioner misstates that the "ABA guidelines list the minimum requirements that 
the defense counsel should meet in death penalty cases " Id The ABA Guidelines provide a 
"guide" in assessing the reasonableness of counsel's performance See e g Wiggins v Smith, 539 
U S 510, 525 (2003) They do not establish minimum performance standards 
Petitioner also asserts that his former counsel did "not meet even the minimum requirements 
identified were litigated on direct appeal, and 2) he may proceed under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act ("PCRA") procedural bar exception for ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
Memorandum m Opposition to State's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss ("Opposition 
Memorandum") point III 
Petitioner contends that the direct appeal did not address his post-conviction claims that 1) 
the Court erroneously admitted at the penalty phase a videotape of the victims' bodies (claim 8), 2) 
the Court erroneously denied petitioner's request for a penalty-phase sympathy instruction (claim 
10), 3) petitioner's retrial violated double jeopardy (claim 21), and 4) Utah's death statutes give 
prosecutors unlimited discretion in choosing whether to charge capital murder (claim 32 partial) 
Opposition Memorandum at 11 Petitioner appears both to concede and to contest whether the direct 
appeal disposed of his post-conviction burden shifting claims (claims 4,14, and 18 (partial)) Id 
Petitioner's argument is false The Utah Supreme Court rejected on direct appeal all of the 
claims that petitioner contends it did not The supreme court held that 1) the Court properly 
admitted at the penalty phase a videotape that showed the murder victims' bodies, State v Lafferty, 
20 P 3d 342, 2001 UT 19, ffl[79-84, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001), 2) controlling federal law 
foreclosed giving the jury a sympathy instruction, Id at ^108-12, 3) petitioner's retrial did not 
violate double jeopardy, Id at ^142-49, 4) Utah's death statutes did not give prosecutors 
unconstitutionally broad charging discretion, Id at ^140-41, and 5) Utah's death statutes do not 
shift the penalty phase burden to the defendant, Id at fflJ125 28 Petitioner litigated and lost on 
direct appeal all of the claims that the State identified in its opening memorandum 
Petitioner misstates that he may rely on the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel exception to a 
en, but were not raised on direct appeal Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-106(2) (West 2004) 
lotwithstanding Subsection (l)(c) [precluding post-conviction relief based on a ground that could 
ve been, but was not raised at tnal or on direct appeal]_a_person may be eligible for relief on a 
sis that the ground could have been but was not raised at tnal or on appeal, if the failure to raise 
it ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel") It does not apply to claims that were 
sed and lost on direcrappeaMJtah Code Ann § 78-35a-106(l)(b) (West 2004) See also 
irdner v Holden, 888 P 2d 608, 615-16 (Utah) (petitioner cannot avoid the procedural bar to a 
Piously litigated substantive claim by recasting it in post-conviction proceedings as an ineffective 
.istance of counsel claim), cert denied, 516 U S 828 (1995) 
The Court must grant summary judgment without addressing the merits of the claims 
titioner litigated and lost on direct appeal Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96 f6, 44 P 3d 626 
THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS 
THAT PETITIONER COULD HAVE, BUT DID NOT RAISE ON DIRECT 
APPEAL (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT II; OPPOSITION 
MEMORANDUM POINT IV) 
Petitioner does not dispute that the PCRA bars collateral relief for claims that petitioner 
aid have, but did not raise on direct appeal Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-l 06(1 )(c) (West 2004) 
titioner also does not dispute that he could have, but did not raise claims 1-3, 5-6,11 (partial), 
[partial), 13,15-17,19, 20(partial), 30, 32(partial), 33-35, 37-38, 42, and 46-47 on direct appeal 
tead, petitioner claims that the Court should excuse his default 
The Court may excuse the default if petitioner's counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
claims on direct appeal Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-106(2) (West 2004) Because respondent 
sed the procedural bar defense, petitioner bears the burden of disproving it Utah Code Ann § 78-
3 
the omitted claims probably would have succeed That failure alone requires dismissing the 
lms that petitioner's counsel did not raise on direct appeal2 
THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
PETITIONER'S NEWLY-DISCOVERED-EVIDENCE CLAIM (OPENING 
MEMORANDUM POINT III; OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT V) 
Petitioner claims that he has learned of new evidence related to Stephen Golding, Ph D , that 
tifies post-conviction relief The State moved for summary judgment on the claim because the 
,v evidence was, at most, impeachment evidence Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-104(e)(in) (West 
34) (post-conviction relief unavailable for newly discovered evidence that is "mere[] 
peachment evidence") 
Petitioner responds only that he could not have discovered the evidence in time for trial The 
te did not argue that petitioner could have discovered the evidence sooner4 Petitioner has not 
puted the State's argument that the new evidence is "mere[] impeachment evidence" for which 
Petitioner also states that, pursuant to § 78 35a 107(3), the Court may excuse an untimely 
ng in the interests of justice Opposition Memorandum at 13 Respondent has not argued that 
ltioner filed an untimely petition, the exception does not apply 
Petitioner contends further that "it is obvious that when the legislature drafted the statute it 
s very concerned with giving all opportunities to Petitioners like Mr Lafferty to advance their 
lms Therefore, State's arguments should fail" Id "It is obvious" that the legislature intended to 
it post-conviction review of claims that could have been, but were not raised on direct appeal to 
.umstances where appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise them Utah Code Ann § 
35a-106(l)(c) and (2) (West 2004) Petitioner has not attempted to meet that standard, the Court 
•uld grant judgment m the State's favor on the procedurally barred claims 
3Dr Golding was one of four evaluators who found petitioner competent to stand trial State 
Mfferty, 20 P 3d 342, 2001 UT 19 1Hf23-26, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001) 
4The State did not waive its right to challenge that assertion at a later time if necessary 
35a-105 (West 2004) To avoid the procedural bar under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
exception, petitioner has the burden of proving that his appellate counsel was ineffective because the 
omitted claims 1) were obvious from the record, and 2) probably would have resulted in reversal 
Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96148,44 P 3d 626 
Petitioner makes no attempt to demonstrate how any of the barred claims meet that standard 
Instead, he states only that "failure of Petitioner's previous counsel to raise those claims is a direct 
evidence of the ineffective assistance of counsel " Petitioner's mere statement that his counsel was 
ineffective does not satisfy his burden of proving it to a demonstrable reality See eg Parsons v 
Barnes, 871 P 2d 516, 526 (Utah), cert denied, 513 U S 966 (1994), and Fernandez v Cook, 870 
P 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) (petitioner must prove ineffective assistance to a demonstrable reality, 
mere repetition of the legal standard will not suffice) 
To the extent petitioner intends to argue that he had a constitutional right to counsel who 
would raise every non-frivolous appellate claim, he misstates the law See e g Jones v Barnes, 
463 U S 745, 751 (1983) (indigent appellants have no constitutional right "to compel appointed 
counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional 
judgment, decides not to present those points"), Cargyle v Mullin, 317 F 3d 1196,1202 (10th Cir 
2003) ("counsel 'need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select 
from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal'") (quoting Smith v 
Robbins, 528 U S 259,288 (2000)) 
Moreover, even if he had such a right, he still cannot succeed without proving prejudice that 
the omitted claims probably would have resulted in reversal Smith v Robbins, 528 U S 259, 285-
86 (2000), Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96 J48 Petitioner has not attempted to demonstrate that any 
4 
the PCRA prohibits post-conviction relief The claim fails as a matter of law, and the Court should 
enter judgment in the State's favor on it 
V. PETITIONER HAS NOT ALLEGED FACTS OR CITED LEGAL 
PRECEDENT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS COUNSEL 
COST HIM HIS RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY (OPENING 
MEMORANDUM POINT IV, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT VI) 
Petitioner's challenge to counsel's failure to move to sequester the jury centers on the Court's 
dismissal of a juror during the trial Second Amended Petition at 10 Petitioner contends that "if the 
jury had been sequestered, the Petitioner would have had the advantage of perhaps one juror who 
would have voted for life without parole, thereby sparing the petitioner's life " Id 
The State moved for summary judgment on this claim because petitioner had the right only to 
an impartial jury Petitioner responds that counsel "allowed a jury where every member was in 
favor of the death penalty, such jury was not an impartial jury The only juror that was against 
the death penalty was dismissed " Opposition Memorandum at 14 
Petitioner provides no support for his legal and factual conclusions First, to the extent 
petitioner means that every remaining juror had a pre-disposition to sentence him to death, he cites 
nothing to support that conclusion To the extent petitioner means that the dismissed juror had a pre-
disposition to spare his life, he also cites nothing to support that conclusion Even the allegation in 
his petition establish only that the juror agreed with petitioner's religious and constitutional views 
Second Amended Petition at 10 Despite that agreement, the dismissed juror may have agreed to 
sentence petitioner to death for masterminding the murders of a young mother and her fifteen-
month-old daughter 
Second, to the extent petitioner argues that the jury lacked the requisite impartiality because 
each juror approved of the death penalty in the abstract, the claim fails as a matter of law '"On the 
issue of capital punishment, the object of voir dire is to obtain a jury that can hear the evidence and 
apply the law without legal partiality for or against capital punishment Approval of or opposition to 
capital punishment in general is not legal partiality for this purpose '" State v Lafferty, 749 
P 2d 1239,1252 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, 949 F 2d 
1546 (10th Cir 1991) 
Petitioner had no right to jurors who opposed the death penalty He had no right to jurors 
pre-disposed to spare his life He only had the right to jurors who could hear the evidence and apply 
the law impartially He has not argued and points to nothing to suggest any juror who sat could not 
or did not fulfill that responsibility Therefore, he alleges nothing to demonstrate that counsel's 
conduct cost him the "opportunity" for trial by "an impartial jury " 
Petitioner has not addressed the State's other arguments in support of summary judgment 
He still cites to no facts that would have required counsel to move to sequester the jury before the 
Court dismissed one juror whom he now considers sympathetic He still cites to no facts or authority 
demonstrating a reasonable probability that the Court would have granted the motion Opening 
Memorandum at 41 n 6 
Petitioner's claim fails as a matter of law on the undisputed facts The Court should enter 
judgment in the State's favor on it 
7 
option, petitioner was not entitled to be released It would have been inappropriate for federal 
habeas corpus counsel to file a release order 
The claim is frivolous, and the Court should grant judgment in the State's favor 
VII. PETITIONER STILL FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM BASED ON COUNSEL'S 
FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE OR UNSPECIFIED EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE TAMPERING; 
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN THE STATE'S FAVOR 
(OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT VI; OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM 
POINT VII) 
Petitioner contends that his counsel inadequately investigated exculpatory evidence or the 
possibility of evidence tampering The State moved to dismiss this claim because petitioner 1) 
identified no facts known to counsel that would have triggered a constitutional duty to investigate 
exculpatory evidence or the possibility of evidence tampering, and 2) identified no exculpatory 
evidence or evidence of evidence tampering that his counsel would have found, let alone that they 
would have found evidence so significant that it would have made a more favorable outcome 
reasonably likely Opening Memorandum at 15 
Petitioner responds that "any diligent counsel would have investigated exculpatory evidence 
and any facts of evidence tampering " He continues that "failure to do so" constitutes deficient 
performance, and that the "failure to discover exculpatory evidence or facts of evidence tampering 
would prejudice the defendant at the trial and sentencing " Opposition Memorandum at 15 
Petitioner proffers no evidence and alleges no facts that would prove his ineffective 
assistance claim to a demonstrable reality He still has not identified what should have triggered the 
investigation he contends counsel omitted or what counsel could have discovered, let alone that it 
VI. PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HE HAS THE RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS COUNSEL FAILS AS A 
MATTER OF LAW (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT V; OPPOSITION 
MEMORANDUM POINT VII) 
In claim 20, petitioner challenged his federal habeas corpus counsel's failure to file a release 
order after the federal court granted habeas corpus relief The State argued, in part, that petitioner 
cited to no cases demonstrating that he had the nght to the effective assistance of federal habeas 
corpus counsel 
Petitioner responds that the State's argument "is totally without merit" He continues that "it 
is absurd to suggest that Petitioner is entitled to a substandard representation in habeas corpus that 
falls short [of] the requirements of the Strickland test" Opposition Memorandum at 14 Petitioner 
relies solely on Strickland to support his conclusions Id 
Strickland delineates the criteria for determining when a violation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel has occurred Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668,687-88,690(1984) The 
Sixth Amendment only guarantees counsel during the criminal proceedings U S Const Amend 
VI Petitioner has no Sixth Amendment right to federal habeas counsel, Strickland does not apply to 
federal habeas counsel's performance Because petitioner had no right to the effective assistance of 
federal habeas counsel, he has not established a constitutional violation that would entitle him to 
post-conviction relief Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-104 (West 2004) 
Moreover, even if petitioner had such a right, he cannot established that it was violated 
The Tenth Circuit plainly held that the State was "free to retry" petitioner Lafferty v Cook, 949 
F 2d 1546, 1557 (10th Cir 1991), cert denied, 504 U S 911 (1992) When the State chose that 
8 
he merely restates the legal standard he must satisfy in order to prevail on this claim Petitioner 
cannot prevail merely by reciting that standard See e g Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d 516, 526 
(Utah), cert denied, 513 U S 966 (1994), and Fernandez v Cook, 870 P 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) 
As petitioner apparently cannot meet the burden he recites, the Court should grant judgment 
in the State's favor 
VIII. PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO 
INTRODUCE RELEVANT MITIGATING EVIDENCE LACKS ANY 
FACTUAL BASIS AND THEREFORE FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
(OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT VII, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM 
POINT VIII) 
Petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce relevant 
mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of his trial Second Amended Petition claim 24 He 
included a "Social History" report detailing the evidence that he contends his trial counsel omitted 
The State responded that trial counsel did introduce all of the evidence that petitioner contended 
should have been introduced—with the exception of petitioner's insignificant National Guard 
records Opening Memorandum at 16 17, 51-52 Twenty pages of the State's memorandum detail 
the mitigating evidence that trial counsel introduced during both phases of petitioner's trial, and 
argued to the jury in the penalty phase Id at 27-46 
Alternatively, the State asserted that even if petitioner's "Social History" contained some 
additional evidence that trial counsel did not present, petitioner still could not demonstrate that 
counsel was ineffective because the additional evidence, if any, was not materially distinguishable 
from the evidence that was presented to the jury Opening Memorandum at 51 -52 The State relied 
on Castro v Ward, 138 F 3d 810, 828 29 (10th Cir 1998), to support its alternative argument Id 
In his opposition, petitioner ignores the State's primary argument and addresses only its 
eraative argument Opposition Memorandum at 15-16 Petitioner fails to acknowledge any of the 
tigating evidence that trial counsel introduced He makes no attempt to explain how that evidence 
s insufficient, or what additional evidence counsel should have presented, but did not Petitioner 
>vides no factual support for his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce 
ditional mitigation evidence Therefore, the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this 
nm 
Petitioner's response to the State's alternative argument is unpersuasive because he fails to 
tmguish Castro v Ward Petitioner argues that the omitted mitigating evidence m Castro was 
id to be insignificant and cumulative because that additional evidence only related to Castro's 
nily circumstances, and not directly to Castro himself Opposition Memorandum at 15 On the 
ntrary, the omitted evidence related directly to Castro See 138 F 3d at 827-28 Castro claimed 
tt his mitigation case should have included more detailed testimony regarding his mental status, 
luding a diagnosis that he suffered from organic brain damage Id at 828-29 Therefore, 
titioner fails to distinguish Castro 
After reviewing the additional evidence of Castro's mental state, the 10th Circuit held that 
hough the evidence was "obviously relevant, [it was] not so different in kind from the evidence 
at was already] presented as to require us to find Mr Castro's due process rights violated " Id at 
8 Likewise, in this case, even assuming that petitioner could demonstrate the existence of some 
ditional mitigating evidence that his trial counsel did not introduce, petitioner cannot show that the 
ditional evidence is "different in kind" from the evidence that was presented Absent such a 
11 
THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON PETITIONER'S CLAIM 
THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE OBJECTED TO THE 
PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT (OPENING MEMORANDUM 
POINT IX, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT X) 
Petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's closing argument 
ference to killing a fifteen-month-old girl, which resulted in the supreme court reviewing the claim 
lly for plain error Amended Petition claim 26 Trial counsel's failure to object imposed on 
titioner the added appellate burden of demonstrating that the prosecutor made obviously improper 
>mments See e g State v Kell, 61 P 3d 1019, 2002 UT 106 132 However, even if trial counsel 
id objected, petitioner still would have had to convince the Utah Supreme Court that 1) the 
osecutor called to the jury's attention matters that it should not consider in reaching a verdict, and 
absent the prosecutor's improper statements, there would exist a reasonable likelihood of a more 
vorable result See State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342,2001 UT 191186-87, cert denied, 534 U S 
)18 (2001) Thus, petitioner's challenge to the trial counsel's failure to object would have merit if 
e supreme court found that the prosecutor made improper comments, and that, absent the 
)mments, there would exist a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result, but refused to 
verse only because the comments were not obviously improper 
However, the supreme court refused to reverse on the elements that petitioner would have 
id to prove even if trial counsel had objected State v Lafferty, 2001 UT 1186-87, 89-93 6 
showing, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice Consequently, even under the State's alternative 
argument, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim 
IX. PETITIONER DOES NOT ARGUE AGAINST GRANTING JUDGMENT TO 
THE STATE ON HIS CHALLENGES TO HIS TRIAL AND APPELLATE 
COUNSEL'S QUALIFICATIONS (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT VIII, 
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT IX) 
In claims 25 and 29, petitioner argued that his trial and appellate counsel did not meet the 
qualifications established in Utah R Crim P 8 and by the American Bar Association Guidelines for 
representing capital defendants The State moved for summary judgment on this claim because 
petitioner had a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, not to counsel who met 
certain qualifications Opening Memorandum at 52 As to his rule 8 argument, the State pointed out 
that Utah R Crim P 8(f) specifically precluded relief5 Id at 52 n 8 Petitioner responds only that 
he is not relying solely on rule 8, instead, he asserts that he "gives a variety of circumstances as 
listed supra " Opposition Memorandum at 16 
The State addresses petitioner's specific ineffective assistance claims in the other points in 
this and its Opening Memorandum Because petitioner has not disputed the State's argument that he 
had no constitutional right to counsel who met the qualifications delineated in the ABA Guidelines 
or in Utah R Crim P 8, the Court should grant judgment in the State's favor on claims 25 and 29 
5The State also pointed out that petitioner made the allegations on "information and belief," 
which failed to satisfy his obligation to plead all the facts supporting his claim Utah R Civ P 
65C(c)(3) 
12 
Counsel's failure to object at trial did not affect the outcome on appeal This claim fails as a matter 
of law7 
XI. PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT A BIASED JUROR SAT; 
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN THE STATE'S FAVOR ON 
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS THAT HIS APPELLATE COUNSEL SHOULD 
HAVE SOUGHT REVERSAL BECAUSE THE COURT DENIED 
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO CHANGE THE TRIAL VENUE (OPENING 
MEMORANDUM POINT X, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT XI) 
After trial, the only relevant inquiry remaining on a denied venue change motion was 
whether denying the motion resulted in denying petitioner his right to a constitutionally impartial 
jury State v Widdison, 28 P 3d 1278,2001 UT 601137-39 (refusing to reverse for the denial of a 
venue change where Widdison failed to prove that any juror was biased) The State argued that 
petitioner failed to state a claim because he had not alleged that any juror was biased Opposition 
Memorandum at 54 
In response, petitioner concludes that "all jurors were pro death sentence biased " As with 
his argument that counsel should have moved to sequester the jury, petitioner does not define what 
he means or provide any support for the conclusion For the reasons argued in point V, his failure to 
do so defeats the claim The Court should grant judgment in the State's favor on it 
Petitioner misrepresents that the supreme court "acknowledged that the prosecutor indeed 
'Petitioner makes a vague reference to "the cumulative evidence of the misconduct" 
Opposition Memorandum at 17 Petitioner limited his claim to a single argument He has not 
XII. PETITIONER'S DISSATISFACTION WITH DEATH-ROW CONDITIONS 
DOES NOT JUSTIFY POST-CONVICTION RELIEF; HE HAS ALREADY 
LITIGATED AND LOST HIS CLAIM THAT HOLDING HIM ON DEATH 
ROW FOR TWENTY YEARS IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
(OPENING MEMORANDUM AT POINT XIII, OPPOSITION 
MEMORANDUM AT POINT XIII) 
Petitioner asked for post-conviction relief because, as a death-row inmate, he has limited 
access to programs available to other inmates Amended Petition, claim 36 The State sought 
summary judgment because the PCRA only permits relief for constitutional defects in how a 
conviction is obtained or a sentence is imposed and petitioner's housing conditions on death row has 
nothing to do with either Opening Memorandum at 57 
Petitioner responds only that he "is dissatisfied with the conditions on death row " Petitioner 
cites to nothing that demonstrates that his dissatisfaction with death row conditions warrants 
vacating his conviction or sentence For the reasons argued, the claim fails as a matter of law, and 
the Court should grant summary judgment in the State's favor 
Petitioner also states that he claims that being held on death row for twenty years is cruel and 
unusual punishment Opposition Memorandum at 19 Petitioner already raised and lost a claim that 
it would be unconstitutional to execute him after twenty years on death row See State v Lafferty, 20 
P 3d 342,2001 UT 19 ffll35-39, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001) To the extent he seeks to 
rehtigate that claim, the Court should deny it as an abuse of the writ Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-
106(l)(b) (West 2004)(post-conviction relief is unavailable for claims that were raised and lost on 
direct appeal), Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96 \6, 44 P 3d 626 
If petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his housing 
conditions are cruel and unusual, the claim fails as a matter of law Petitioner cites no authority and 
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Petitioner has raised no ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to his choice of 
execution method He asserts no facts in either his Second Amended Petition or his Opposition 
Memorandum that would support such a claim 
The claim fails as a matter of law, the Court should grant judgment in the State's favor on it 
XIV. PETITIONER STILL FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM THAT THE STATE 
CANNOT EXECUTE HIM BECAUSE HE IS MENTALLY RETARDED 
(OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT XV, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM 
POINT XV) 
Petitioner claimed that he was denied due process because the United States Supreme Court 
did not decide that it was unconstitutional to execute mentally persons until after his trial Second 
Amended Petition claim 40 The State moved to dismiss the claim because petitioner had not 
claimed that he was mentally retarded or alleged facts demonstrating that he was mentally retarded 
Opening Memorandum at 58-59 
Petitioner now appears to allege that he is mentally retarded Opposition Memorandum at 
19-20 He alleges that "the facts uncovered in his social history and even facts already presented to 
the court" demonstrate that he meets some of the traits that the United States Supreme Court 
attributed to mental retardation Id 
Petitioner's allegations fail to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief First, 
petitioner's focus on some of the traits that the Supreme Court attributed to mentally retarded 
Dersons misses the point The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited executing 
nentally retarded persons Atkins v Virginia, 536 U S 304 (2002) However, the Supreme Court 
iid not attempt to define mental retardation for purposes of excluding from execution a person who 
provides no analysis for his claim that post-conviction and post-sentence confinement conditions 
may justify post-conviction relief As established in the State's Opening Memorandum, the PCRA 
provides relief only for constitutional defects in the conviction and sentence Opening Memorandum 
at 57 Post-conviction and post-sentence confinement conditions demonstrate neither 
The claim fails as a matter of law, the should grant judgment in the State's favor 
XIII. THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON PETITIONER'S 
CHALLENGE TO HIS CHOSEN EXECUTION METHOD (OPENING 
MEMORANDUM AT XIV, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM AT XIV) 
The State moved for summary judgment on petitioner's challenge to the firing squad because 
petitioner waived that challenge when he chose firing squad as the method for execution Opening 
Memorandum at 58 Petitioner responds that the State's argument "would be valid if [petitioner] 
was afforded an effective representation of counsel and if he was competent" He continues that his 
ability to choose "has been questioned" because he has argued ineffective assistance of counsel and 
asserts that he was incompetent Opposition Memorandum at 19 
Petitioner's competency at the time he chose his execution method is not at issue Petitioner 
already litigated and lost his competency challenge It is not subject to further litigation Utah Code 
Ann § 78-35a-106(l)(b) (West 2004)(post-conviction relief is unavailable for claims that were 
raised and lost on direct appeal), Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96 \6, 44 P 3d 626 
Petitioner may be able to obtain relief from his confinement conditions in a civil rights 
action if he can convince a court that his limited access to privileges and the amount of time he has 
to spend in his cell somehow violate his constitutional rights 
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In response to Atkins, the Utah legislature enacted Utah Code Ann §§ 77-15a-101 through 
106 (West 2004) Section 102 defines "mentally retarded" for purposes of excluding a person from 
execution9 Petitioner has not even acknowledged that standard, let alone attempted to demonstrate 
that he meets it 
Second, petitioner unfairly parses the language from Atkins Petitioner quotes the Supreme 
Court as finding that mentally retarded persons "have diminished capacities to understand and 
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to 
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others " 
Opposition Memorandum at 19-20, quoting Atkins v Virginia However, the quote continues that 
"there is abundant evidence that [mentally retarded persons] often act on impulse rather than 
pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders " 
Atkins v Virginia, 506 U S at 318 Based on these characteristics, the Supreme Court concluded 
that mentally retarded persons were less culpable for their crimes 
Petitioner did not act on impulse or without premeditation He purported to receive a 
revelation that Brenda Lafferty and her fifteen-month-old daughter needed to be "removed " He 
believed that Brenda encouraged his wife to leave him and that Erica would grow up to be a "bitch" 
9As used m this chapter, a defendant is "mentally retarded" if 
(1) the defendant has significant subaverage general intellectual functioning that results in 
and exists concurrently with significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning that exist primarily in 
the areas of reasoning or impulse control, or in both of these areas, and 
(2) the subaverage general intellectual functioning and the significant deficiencies in adaptive 
functioning under Subsection (1) are both manifested prior to age 22 
e her mother He purported to receive another revelation to "consecrate" an instrument to carry 
t the removal He communicated the "revelations" to his brother Dan On the day petitioner and 
in murdered Brenda and Erica, petitioner went to another brother's home to get a rifle to go 
anting" for "any fucking thing" that got m his way State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342,2001 UT 19 
3-13, cerr denied, 534 V S 1018(2001) 
Petitioner did not murder Brenda and her baby on impulse and he did not follow Dan's lead 
titioner masterminded Brenda's and Erica's murders through his "revelation " He and Dan went 
Brenda's home to carry out that "revelation " 
In short, petitioner alleges insufficient facts to demonstrate that he meets that definition of 
ntal retardation The Court should dismiss the claim 
L PETITIONER STILL ALLEGES NO FACTS TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM 
THAT HIS COUNSEL HAD A SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST; THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN THE STATE'S 
FAVOR (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT XVI; OPPOSITION 
MEMORANDUM POINT XVI) 
Petitioner claims that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest because he represented 
ltioner's brother and co-defendant Dan Lafferty The State moved to dismiss the claim because 
ltioner alleged insufficient facts to demonstrate a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to confhct-
e counsel The State also argued that petitioner likely could not meet his burden because, by the 
le the State retried petitioner, Dan's case had been concluded Opening Memorandum at 59-60 
Petitioner responds that 1) the State has never shown when his trial counsel withdrew from 
•resenting Dan or even if counsel ever withdrew from representing Dan, and 2) even if counsel's 
iresentation of Dan concluded, a conflict of interest may have remained because the conclusion of 
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facts that would demonstrate the necessary actual conflict that caused counsel to compromise his 
erests to further Dan's 
Petitioner has not met his burden of alleging facts that, if proven, would demonstrate that he 
s denied his right to conflict free counsel Because it appears that he cannot do so, the Court 
)uld grant judgment in the State s favor on this claim 
n. THE CLAIMS IN "PART TWO" OF THE SECOND AMENDED PETITION 
FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT XVII; 
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINTS XVII-XIX) 
In "Part Two" of his Second Amended Petition, petitioner alleged that (1) the prosecution 
nted evidence at the trial proceedings and witnesses were tampered with by way of a plea bargain, 
his second trial violated his protection against double jeopardy, (3) he has yet to be arrested, 
harged or properly arraigned on the current charges, and (4) his counsel erroneously advised him 
to file a 120-day disposition request Second Amended Petition "Part Two" at 1-2 The State 
mtered that these claims either failed as a matter of law, or failed to state a claim Petitioner has 
led to demonstrate otherwise 
The State argued that petitioner's substantive claims of "planted evidence" and "witness 
ipering" were procedurally barred because they could have been raised at trial or on appeal 
ening Memorandum at 61 Petitioner counters that the claims are not procedurally barred because 
has alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issues Opposition 
morandum at 21 This ineffectiveness claim merely repeats claim 22 from his Second Amended 
ltion For the reasons already stated above in point VII, the State is entitled to summary 
gment on this claim 
one case does not remove the "possible" conflict in a companion case Opposition Memorandum at 
21. 
Petitioner's response misses the point The State does not have the burden of proving that his 
trial counsel did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel Petitioner has the 
burden proving that he did Utah Code Ann §78-35a-105 (West 2004) Therefore, he has the 
burden of proving 1) that an actual conflict remained, one that forced his counsel to make choices 
that advanced Dan's interests to the detriment of petitioner's, and 2) that his counsel actually 
compromised petitioner's interests for Dan's benefit See, e g Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 
668, 692 (1984), United States v Alvarez, 137 F 3d 1249,1252 (10th Cir 1998), Edens v Hanmgan, 
87 F 3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir 1996), State v Lovell, 1999 UT 40122, 984 P 2d 382, 387, cert 
denied, 528 U S 1083 (2000), State v Taylor, 947 P 2d 681,686 (Utah 1997), cert denied, 525 U S 
833 (1998) Petitioner also has the burden of pleading all of the facts that support this claim Utah 
R Civ P 65C(c)(3) 
Petitioner has not met his burden Instead, he speculates that his trial counsel may still have 
represented Dan when he undertook petitioner's representation for the retrial He asserts that their 
interests conflicted on the issue of who committed the crimes, but alleges no facts suggesting that 
this asserted conflict caused his counsel to compromise his interests in order to further Dan's 10 He 
concludes that the "mere finahzation of one case does not remove the possible conflict," but alleges 
1
 Petitioner ignores that his counsel called Dan at petitioner's trial to testify that Dan 
physically committed both murders State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342,2001 UT 19 ^ 117, cert denied, 
534 U S 1018(2001) 
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Petitioner's double jeopardy claim merely repeats his claim 20 from his Second Amended 
Petition For the reasons explained in the Opening Memorandum at point V, and above at point VI, 
that claim is frivolous and the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law denying the claim 
For the same reasons, the State is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on petitioner's 
claim that he has never been properly rearrested, recharged, or rearraigned on the current charges 
The Tenth Circuit plainly held that the State was "free to retry" petitioner after it vacated his 
convictions and sentences Lafferty v Cook, 949 F 2d 1546, 1557 (10th Cir 1991), cert denied, 504 
U S 911 (1992) Petitioner cites no authority, nor is the State aware of any, that requires the State to 
formally rearrest, recharge, and rearraign a defendant who has been convicted and is in custody, but 
is granted a new trial 
Even if the State was required to follow different preliminary procedures prior to petitioner's 
retrial, it is well-established that "an error at the preliminary stage is cured if the defendant is later 
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt" State v Quas, 837 P 2d 565, 566 (Utah Ct App 1992), see 
also State v Schreuder, 712 P 2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985) Petitioner argues that Quas and Schreuder 
are distinguishable because they involved only an illegal arrest, followed by a proper charge, trial 
and conviction Opposition Memorandum at 21-22 While it is true that Schreuder only involved an 
illegal arrest, Quas was not so limited The issue in Quas was whether a district court had 
jurisdiction to review a magistrate's bindover order 837 P 2d at 566 The court of appeals held that 
the district court did, because otherwise, a subsequent conviction would moot any claimed error in 
the bindover Id In reaching this holding, the court of appeals relied not only on cases dealing with 
the effect of an illegal arrest on subsequent criminal proceedings, but also on cases addressing errors 
(presence of two witnesses in grand jury room, although illegal, is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt in light of subsequent conviction), and Holt v United States, 218 U S 245, (1910) (conviction 
upheld where errors such as hearsay and incompetent evidence occurred at indictment stage)) The 
rule m Quas applies to errors in both the arrest and charging stages of a criminal proceeding 
Petitioner fails to distinguish Quas He also fails to demonstrate that any error m the preliminary 
stages of his retrial entitle him to relief Therefore, his claim fails as a matter of law 
Finall>, petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective because his failure to file a 120 day 
disposition request allowed the press to pollute the jury pool with negative information and 
prevented petitioner from being tried by a fair and unbiased jury Opposition Memorandum at 22 
Petitioner ignores the State's argument that counsel's advice not to file the request was reasonable 
trial strategy because it allowed counsel sufficient time to prepare for a lengthy capital trial 
Moreover, petitioner's claim of prejudice fails As explained above in Points V and XI, petitioner 
has not established that any biased juror sat Absent such a showing, petitioner's claim of prejudice 
fails Petitioner cannot satisfy either prong of the Strickland test Therefore, the State is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on this claim 
CONCLUSION 
In its motion and opening memorandum, the State moved the Court for summary judgment 
on all of petitioner's claims, with the exception of claims 22,27,40, and 44 The State moved the 
Court to dismiss these claims for failure to state a claim Petitioner has now had the opportunity to 
allege facts sufficient to support these claims As to claims 22, 27, and 44, petitioner has not even 
attempted to do so Therefore, the Court should also grant judgment in the State's favor on claims 
22, 27,and 44 
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Petitioner has attempted to allege facts supporting his claim 40, asserting that he is mentally 
retarded However, he has still failed to state a claim Nevertheless, because it is not entirely certain 
that he cannot ever state a claim of mental retardation, the Court should simply dismiss claim 40 
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